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Outsourcing in Campaign Management 
An economic approach to campaigning 
Abstract 
This study investigates the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election 
campaigns. It is hypothesized that the extent of outsourcing is negatively related to the extent 
of political transaction costs and loss of control over the campaign organization if a process is 
given to external partners. Literature on campaigning has focused almost exclusively on 
campaign-voter communications. To date, no systematic investigation has considered internal 
campaign processes. This study closes that gap by combining aspects from the field of political 
science with business administration. An in-depth qualitative study was conducted, using data 
from 15 guided interviews with experts from political parties and agencies. 
The study first sheds light on relevant aspects of political theory, indicating relevant 
developments in the field as well as the relevance of campaigns for election outcomes, before 
analyzing the environment in which campaigns are organized, in particular demographic 
changes and intra-campaign management challenges. This is joined by a business perspective 
that applies outsourcing practices in the private economy to outsourcing in political 
campaigns. 
Findings show that while political transaction costs and loss of control only determine the 
extent of outsourcing, a number of economic factors (scarcity of human resources, seasonal 
changes in demand, financial resources) as well as organizational factors (age of organization, 
organizational level, need for external perspective) have an impact on the general openness 
of campaign organization to outsource specific processes. Contrary to expectations, it became 
clear that in principle there is no hesitation on the side of parties to give campaign-related 
processes over to external partners. Findings illustrate that while campaign organizations are 
hesitant to outsource processes related to strategy development and online campaigning, 
they are in favor of outsourcing technical and production services. The study concludes that 
parties generally make effective outsourcing decisions, but should show more courage to 
outsource strategy-related issues and creative thinking, but should limit themselves to few 
external partners.   
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1. Introduction 
Campaigning is one of the core competencies of any political party. In Germany, at least 
every four years on the federal and every five years on the Länder (state) level, parties are 
faced with elections that need to be accompanied by well-planned campaigns. Planning 
and managing a campaign is a management task par excellence. The largest part of 
scientific campaign research, however, was conducted in the field of campaign-voter 
communications. There is a significantly smaller amount of scientific work that deals with 
intra-campaign phenomena. Those that are available are mostly published by practitioners, 
such as Peter Radunski, Matthias Machnig or Frank Stauss who share best practices rather 
than results of scientific research.   
Outsourcing is a phenomenon that has been present in the business sphere for many 
decades. The term ‘outsourcing’ describes the assignment of previously internally 
performed tasks to external partners. Standing for the terminus ‘outside resource using’, it 
is the result of a make-or-buy decision in favor of the option ‘buy’. The primary goal of 
outsourcing is cost reduction and the shift of fixed costs to variable costs. Due to 
specialization of external partners, service providers are often able to perform required 
services less expensively and more efficiently than the organization that outsources. 
Originating in the automotive industry, outsourcing is commonly performed in the IT-
segment areas that do not belong to the core competence of the company such as security 
or office supplies. It is supposed to give the outsourcing company more flexibility. Mostly a 
phenomenon of the private sector, outsourcing has only slowly developed in the public 
sector, primarily in the context of privatization of formerly publicly owned service 
providers. 
There is a large spectrum of research available in business disciplines that covers 
outsourcing decisions in various fields, particularly in IT. However, outsourcing in a political 
context, namely in campaign management has hardly been a subject for scholars in the 
past.  
This dissertation attempts to close this research gap. By introducing a model that identifies 
the determinants for the extent of outsourcing, it sheds light on intra-campaign 
management. It approaches the field from a business perspective, regarding campaigning 
as a management discipline and applying models known from management studies to this 
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niche of political science research. Being a hybrid subject of business and political science, 
this study will put a new perspective on campaign management.  
In particular, this dissertation attempts to find the determinants for the extent of 
outsourcing performed in election campaigns. Therefore, the thesis statement “the more 
key players can maintain control over a campaign organization and the lower political 
transaction costs are, the larger the extent of outsourcing” will be tested, implying that 
those are the two main criteria for the outsourcing decision.  
Following a literature analysis that gives an overview of the current state of research, this 
dissertation will in chapter 2 focus on political theory, providing necessary definitions, 
analyzing the relevance of campaigns for the election outcome and exploring current 
trends in campaigning.  
In chapter 3, attention is then brought to campaign management itself. The environment 
in which contemporary campaigns act is elaborated as well as the organizational structures 
of modern campaigns.  
Chapter 4 will introduce the business perspective to outsourcing and outline the 
instrument of outsourcing in the private economy, including its various forms, necessary 
decision-making criteria, the make-or-buy decision as well as which processes are subject 
to outsourcing and what the relevant risks exist.  
Being the ‘heart’ of this study, chapter 5 analyzes the current state of outsourcing in 
modern campaigns. It explores motives to give processes to external service providers in 
the first place, defines the most important factors for determining the extent of 
outsourcing and sheds light on motivation of service providers to be engaged in campaigns.  
Chapter 6 looks at outsourcing in campaigns from a process-based perspective. After 
presenting general findings, it selects those processes that appeared to be the most 
valuable for further exploration. It also aligns them to the previously introduced model. 
The study concludes with a set of recommendations for increased productivity through 
optimized usage of external resources. These are based on the opinions expressed by the 
experts during the qualitative interviews.  
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The geographic population under study is the Federal Republic of Germany, attempting to 
create a counterbalance to available campaign management literature with clear focus on 
the Anglo-Saxon world.   
1.1. Research Questions & Hypotheses 
Private business entities often give large numbers of processes to external service 
providers. In contrast, political parties in Germany seem to act more conservatively when 
it comes to make-or-buy decisions in their campaigns. They seem to be hesitant to 
outsource processes, particularly when they are strategy-related. The factors that lead to 
such decisions are unclear. Are they products of political motivation or purely economic 
considerations? To answer this the main question of this dissertation is: 
Qm:  What are the determinants for the extent of outsourcing performed in election 
campaigns? 
This research question is based on a set of assumptions: 
a. If a campaign’s capacity to provide a certain service is not available, parties have the 
choice between outsourcing the process and building internal capacities. 
b. If internal capacities are available, parties hesitate to outsource the process. 
c. Parties are more willing to pay financial rather than political costs. 
Basic Assumption c) implies that, although financial costs play a significant role for political 
parties, negative effects on the parties, particularly on responsible campaign management 
stemming from a loss in election results are higher than those stemming from an exceeded 
budget are. In other words: losing 3% in an election result might be costlier than exceeding 
the campaign budget by 3%.   
The presumption of this dissertation is that main determinants for political parties are 
control over the process and minimized political transaction costs. This will be tested using 
the following hypothesis: 
Hm: The more control key players can maintain over the campaign organization and the 
lower political transaction costs are, the larger the extent of outsourcing.  
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Based on Hm the 
model shown in 
graph 1.1 
differentiates 
between four 
different 
possible levels of 
outsourcing: No 
outsourcing 
(make-or-buy 
decision is 
answered with 
‘make’); internal 
outsourcing (the process is given to a service provider that is part of the same organization); 
hybrid outsourcing (the process is given to an external service provider that has strong ties 
to the organization) and external outsourcing. The model claims that there is a hierarchy in 
types of outsourcing based on the extent of willingness to accept a loss of control and/or 
political transaction costs by key players. Key players are those individuals assigned to be 
responsible for the concept and running of the campaign. They are differentiated from 
other party members by the fact that they are also the ones held accountable for campaign 
success or failure. The model seeks to locate particular campaign processes, taking into 
account that a campaign consists of a set of single business processes. Hence, the 
respective extent of outsourcing may differ.   
In order to answer the main research question and to test the main hypothesis of the study, 
a set of assisting research questions and hypotheses need to be determined. With political 
transaction costs and control thought to be decisive factors, assisting research question 1 
focuses on the first: 
Q1:  What factors contribute to the extent of political transaction costs? 
The hypothesis that was created to answer Q1 claims that key players attempt to internalize 
successes and externalize failures in order to gain benefits for their political careers from a 
 
Graph 1.1: Outsourcing decision based on political transaction Costs and potential loss of control 
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successful campaign, and alternatively save their political careers in case of a failed 
campaign: 
H1:  The more key players are able to internalize successes and externalize failures, the 
lower potential political transaction costs are.  
Once factors that lead to the extent of political transaction costs are identified, it is sensible 
to determine influencing factors relevant to the extent of control over a campaign. 
Therefore, the second assisting research question is: 
Q2:  What factors contribute to the extent of possible control over the campaign 
organization? 
As with the previous one, this assisting question is answered by formulating a hypothesis 
that is tested. The presumption is that the most important factors that have an impact on 
the level of control are the complexity of processes (the more complex a process provided 
by an external service provider is, the more difficult it gets to remotely control the 
provider), the level of standardization (the more standardized the process, the clearer the 
benchmarks for quality control are), and the strategic importance of the process (the larger 
the strategic importance is, the closer key actors want to keep control).  
H2: Only if a process is low in complexity, can be standardized and has a negligible 
strategic importance, are key actors able to maintain control over the campaign 
organization.   
Knowing under what circumstances campaign management chooses to outsource, the 
question arises as to what other intra-organizational influencing factors are relevant for the 
make-or-buy decision? In particular, age of an organization, organizational level (the extent 
to which a party is organized on the national, regional and local level), recent changes in 
party leadership and party size could be factors of interest. Therefore, the third supporting 
question is: 
Q3: How strong is the influence of factors such as organizational level, establishment, 
change of leaders and party size on the willingness to use external resources? 
This list of potential factors is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, it is explored during 
expert interviews whether there are additional factors that need to be added.  
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As mentioned above, it seems that there is a high degree of hesitation when it comes to 
outsourcing certain processes. Whether this statement proves to be correct can only be 
tested, if there are processes that fulfill all prerequisites to be outsourced but a party still 
decides in favor of in-house production. This will be explored with the fourth assisting 
research question: 
Q4: Are there cases where a process meets all requirements to be outsourced, but a 
party chooses not to? If so, why does this occur? 
Once present usage of outsourcing in campaign management is tested and analyzed, focus 
will be brought to practical implications. Naturally, the question arises whether outsourcing 
decisions made by parties are sensible and logical in regards to efficiency and effectiveness. 
Therefore, the last assisting research question will attempt to find out if there are processes 
presently outsourced that should instead stay in-house and respectively, if there are 
processes provided by internal resources that should rather be given to external providers.  
Q5: What kind of processes should be outsourced? 
Recommendations made in chapter 7 are purely based on experiences of the selected 
experts, which were expressed during the interviews.  
By answering the above-given research questions, this work attempts to give an extensive 
inside view of outsourcing in campaign management, a concept that has its roots in the 
economic sphere. It will attempt to shed light on outsourcing decisions in the political 
context and give valuable recommendations for the future.  
1.2. State of research 
For many years, the main focus of research connected to campaigning was the interaction 
between campaigns and voters. Particularly, marketing methods and communications 
strategies were analyzed. However, “recent years have witnessed a growing academic 
interest in campaign operations"1. 
For the longest time, “scholars had little reason to study campaign strategy, because there 
was not much to suggest that campaign activities had a strong effect on electoral 
                                                     
1 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5 
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outcome."2 In recent years, however, increasing research has been performed on how 
campaigns influence election outcome. Chapter 2.3 will further elaborate on this debate. 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld’s study of the 1940 presidential elections in the United States marked the 
beginning of the research tradition of campaign management. During the 20th century, 
media played an increasingly important role for election campaigns. While at the beginning 
of the century radio played the most important role, television became popular after World 
War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first candidate who used television advertising for 
his campaign. 
In Germany, political identification with parties used to be very high. For large parts of the 
electorate, the voting question had been pre-answered according to the respective social 
environment. However, “due to declining ideological bond between citizens and parties 
and the growing number of late-deciding voters, relevance of campaign management still 
has been continuously increasing in Germany.”3 Nevertheless, campaign management had 
not been the focus of election research in Germany. Rather, communication between 
campaigns and voters as well as behavior of the voter had been the major point of interest. 
For the longest time, management of campaigns has been only a niche of research while 
analyzing campaign strategies was hardly tackled. “When speaking of election research, 
mostly the analysis of voter behavior from a political point of view is meant.”4 In Germany, 
it took until the 1960s for a branch of research to develop that focused on intra-campaign 
management. A possible cause could be that research of campaign management combines 
several disciplines: political science, sociology, communication research and sometimes 
even psychology. In post-war Germany, those branches had to be reorganized and 
boundaries between the disciplines had to be determined. 
Nevertheless, within the field of political communications, elections and election 
campaigns now began to be subject to intensive research.5 Today, particularly empirical 
                                                     
2 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5 
3 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder "Yes, We Gähn!"?, 19 [Original wording: "In Deutschland gewinnt die 
Wahlkampfforschung durch die abnehmende ideologische Bindung der Bürger an die Parteien und die zunehmende Zahl 
von spät entscheidenden Wählern kontinuierlich an Bedeutung."] 
4 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder "Yes, We Gähn!"?, 18 [Original wording: "Wenn von Wahlforschung die Rede ist, 
sind meistens politikwissenschaftliche Betrachtungen gemeint, die sich der Analyse des Wahlverhaltens widmen] 
5 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 25 
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election research can be considered one of the best developed branches of political science 
research. One of the causes for this is the international attention given to this particular 
field.  
However, this is not the case with research dealing with internal campaign management. 
Only since the turn of the century has professionalization of campaigns and campaign 
management increasingly become the center of attention. However, “it is still not possible 
to draw conclusions on how ‘perfect’ campaigns are organized."6 This underlines the lack 
of research in the field of campaign management in Germany. While many books and 
articles on a theoretical level were published in campaign communication research, the 
majority of books still stem from practitioners such as Peter Radunski, Mathias Machnig or 
Frank Stauss.  
1.3. Research Design 
The following section will outline the research design that was chosen for this piece of 
work. Taking into consideration the small amount of research that has been performed in 
the field of campaign management and the close ties between theory and practice, it is 
logical to consider it as a field of practitioners. Therefore, to stay consistent, practitioners 
play the central role in the research design of this piece of work. The core research will be 
a set of expert interviews, which follow a comprehensive literature analysis of the current 
research available.   
1.3.1. Qualitative methodology 
The decision to use qualitative research methods was heavily influenced by the outside 
conditions of the field. As stated earlier, there is not much research available in the context 
of campaign organizations. Since this requires extensive exploratory work, it seemed most 
sensible to apply qualitative methodology allowing an in-depth view on the subject. 
Further, since there are only a limited number of campaign managers in Germany, 
quantitative methods were not appropriate. Rather, this dissertation aims to gain inside 
views of the campaign organization. “Theories about the functionality of organizations and 
                                                     
6 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 15 [Original wording: "Es kann keine präzisen Aussagen geben 
hinsichtlich der 'perfekten' Wahlkampfführung“] 
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institutions are primarily based on qualitative descriptions"7. It is not only the aim to use 
the collected data to illustrate examples, but also to shed light on a set of hypotheses. 
Therefore, collected data “should be more than simple illustrations, but certainly less than 
a final proof. It is probable there are different levels and steps in confirming theories by 
qualitative data."8 
The aim of this thesis is to explain observed phenomena in the field and make practical 
recommendations to campaign practitioners. Therefore, empirical data is of significant 
importance. As Mayer states, “qualitative research underlines the value of empiricism for 
the generation of hypotheses and the development of theories and emphasizes that 
hypotheses gained inductively from reality have a higher degree of reality and a higher 
probability of affirmation than other forms of hypotheses generation.”9 Hence, qualitative 
research suggests that theories need to be drawn from empirical studies in order to reflect 
reality in an appropriate manner.  
In order to ensure reliability of the data, secondary data received from the literature 
analysis was double-checked during the expert interviews, which marked the second step 
of the research design.  
1.3.2. Literature Analysis 
During the literature analysis, the current state of research in the fields of campaigning and 
outsourcing was analysed. It laid the foundation for chapters 2, 3 and 4. Literature was 
drawn from both German and Anglo-Saxon sources. Since campaigns in Germany differ 
very much from political campaigns in the United States, American literature was treated 
                                                     
7 Barton and Lazarsfeld, ‘Das Verhältnis von theoretischer und empirischer Analyse im Rahmen qualitativer Sozialforschung’, 
82 [Original wording: „Theorien über die Funktionsweise von Organisationen und Institutionen basieren im Wesentlichen 
auf qualitativen Beschreibungen."] 
8 Barton and Lazarsfeld, ‘Das Verhältnis von theoretischer und empirischer Analyse im Rahmen qualitativer Sozialforschung’, 
87 [Original wording: „sollten mehr sein als einfache Illustrationen, sind aber sicherlich weniger als ein endgültiger 
Beweis. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass es unterschiedliche Grade und Stufen der Bestätigung von Theorien durch qualitative 
Daten gibt.“] 
9 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 24–5 [Original wording: "Die qualitative Forschung betont jedoch den Wert der 
Empirie für die Hypothesengenese sowie die Theorieentwicklung und hebt hervor, dass die induktiv in der Realität 
gewonnenen Hypothesen auch in der Generalisierung - durch Verifikation - einen höheren Realitätsgrad und eine 
bessere Bewährungswahrscheinlichkeit haben als andere Formen der Hypothesengenerierung." 
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with great caution. Only elements that are relevant for German election campaigns are 
taken into consideration.  
This dissertation combines two different fields of research: political science and business. 
In both fields, literature from distinguished researchers as well as practitioners is examined 
in order to receive a comprehensive and practical overview over current trends and 
assumptions in the fields under study.   
1.3.3. Expert interviews 
As mentioned above, qualitative methodology seemed to be most sensible for the 
empirical part of this study. “Interviews are suitable for exploration, measurement and 
interpretation of issues. They are relatively flexible and modifiable scientific instruments, 
which can be implemented in a variety of forms”10. Expert interviews represent the core of 
this dissertation. In the past, there have been discussions on the reliability of expert 
interviews. However, these conclusions were not caused by a general refusal of the 
methodology, but rather by the “fact that expert interviews often do not correspond to the 
common qualitative demands for openness and non-manipulation."11 The reliability of data 
received from expert interviews therefore heavily depends on the absence of deficits in the 
research design.  
While it is certainly possible to conduct purely qualitative interviews, it seemed more 
sensible for the purpose of this dissertation to conduct semi-structured interviews that are, 
to some extent, a hybrid form between qualitative and quantitative methods. They 
combine the advantages of a qualitative interview in gaining a more intensive inside view 
on processes with the higher level or reliability of quantitative methods. Meuser and Nagel 
underline that “unlike other forms of open interviews, expert interviews do not focus on 
the person as the object of the analysis, i.e. the person with all its orientations and attitudes 
                                                     
10 Schmid, ‘Expertenbefragung und Informationsgespräch in der Parteienforschung: Wie föderalistisch ist die CDU?‘, 309 
[Original wording: “Interviews eignen sich zur Entdeckung, Messung und Interpretation von Sachverhalten. Sie sind relativ 
flexible und modifizierbare Forschungsinstrumente, die sich in verschiedenen Formen durchführen lassen.“] 
11 Bogner and Menz, ‘Expertenwissen und Forschungspraxis: die modernisierungstheoretische und die methodische Debatte 
um die Experten’, 20 [Original wording: "Tatsache, dass Experteninterviews den üblichen 'qualitativen' Anforderungen 
nach Offenheit und Nicht-Beeinflussung des Interviewpartners häufig nicht entsprechen“] 
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in the context of the individual and collective way of live.”12 Rather, they focus on the 
organization process in which the interviewee is one of several actors.  
In order to ensure the reliability of interview outcomes, a comprehensive preparation was 
required. “Expert interviews are not just informative talks that are methodologically based 
on an arbitrary way to gather knowledge and opinions. Just like any other sampling 
technique they require an accurate justification and theoretic foundation."13 
According to Bogner and Menz14, the expert is in the possession of three different kinds of 
knowledge: Technical knowledge on operations and competences, procedural knowledge 
on routines and interactions and interpretive knowledge. The interviews conducted for this 
dissertation primarily focuses on the latter form. “Theory-generating expert interviews aim 
at gaining interpretive knowledge, i.e. subjective relevancies, rules, points of view and 
interpretation of the expert that draw the picture of expert knowledge being a heterogenic 
conglomerate. With the reconstruction of this interpretative knowledge one […] enters the 
field of ideas and ideologies; of fragmented, inconsistent attempts of interpretation and 
explanatory patterns."15 Therefore, the goal of the interviews was not only to learn about 
processes within the campaign organization, but also to receive opinions and perceptions 
of involved actors. This knowledge can then be compared to data received from the 
secondary literature analysis and conclusions drawn in order to shed light on the 
correctness of the proposed hypotheses.  
                                                     
12 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 72 [Original wording: "Im Unterschied zu 
anderen Formen des offenen Interviews bildet bei ExpertInneninterviews nicht die Gesamtperson den Gegenstand der 
Analyse, d.h. die Person mit ihren Orientierungen und Einstellungen im Kontext des individuellen oder kollektiven 
Lebenszusammenhangs“] 
13 Bogner and Menz, ‘Expertenwissen und Forschungspraxis: die modernisierungstheoretische und die methodische Debatte 
um die Experten’, 16 [Original wording: "Experteninterviews sind nicht einfach 'Informationsgespräche', in denen auf eine 
methodisch mehr oder weniger beliebige Weise Wissen und Meinungen erhoben werden; genauso wie andere 
Erhebungstechniken bedürfen sie der sorgfältigen Begründung und theoretischen Fundierung.“] 
14 Bogner and Menz, ‘Das thoriegenerierende Experteninterview’, 43 
15 Bogner and Menz, ‘Das thoriegenerierende Experteninterview’, 43–4 [Original  wording: "Das theoriegenerierende 
Experteninterview zielt auf die Erhebung von 'Deutungswissen', also jenen subjektiven Relevanzen, Regeln, Sichtweisen 
und Interpretationen des Experten, die das Bild vom Expertenwissen als eines heterogenen Konglomerats nahe legen. Mit 
der Rekonstruktion dieses 'Deutungswissens' betritt man […] das Feld der Ideen und Ideologien, der fragmentarischen, 
inkonsistenten Sinnentwürfe und Erklärungsmuster] 
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Guided interviews 
In order to improve reliability and to be able to make comparisons for the purpose of 
generalization, it seemed sensible to use guided interviews as a semi-structured interview 
technique for this study. “This standardization eases the comparableness of several 
interviews. Material from many interviews can be referred to questions in the guidelines 
and analysed much more easily. Due to the larger number of cases, results may easier be 
generalized.” 16 Merton and Kendall add that this is the fact because ”one can affirm that 
the same points of contact are touched and that the data is in correlation to the same 
hypotheses.”17 
In conducting guided interviews, a guideline with open questions is constructed prior to 
the interviews. There were no answering options; experts were able to answer freely 
without restriction. While order of the questions was not decisive for success of the 
interview, the guideline ensures that essential aspects of the research question are 
addressed during the interview.  
In the context of campaign management, the goal of the interviews was further to 
reconstruct everyday knowledge of campaign managers. Therefore, a general openness for 
anecdotes etc. was required while, for the purpose of comparison, a certain structure was 
indispensable. “To a certain extent, a guideline standardizes the structure in regards to the 
content of the narrative and eases its analysis. It further allows tracing subtopics across all 
interviews.”18 Further, guided interviews allow experts to elaborate on their perceptions 
and opinions while, at the same time, they significantly reduce the possibility that 
interviews drift to topics that are irrelevant for the research. It acknowledges both, the 
expertise of the interviewee and the limited interest of the researcher.19 Further, ”the work 
                                                     
16 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 70 [Original wording: "diese Standardisierung erleichtert die 
Vergleichbarkeit mehrerer Interviews. Das Material aus vielen Gesprächen kann auf die jeweiligen Leitfadenfragen 
bezogen werden und so sehr leicht ausgewertet werden. Und durch die größeren Fallzahlen lassen sich die Ergebnisse 
viel leichter verallgemeinern."] 
17 Merton and Kendall, ‘Das fokussierte Interview’, 184 [Original wording: "da man sich vergewissern kann, dass die gleichen 
Bezugspunkte berührt werden und dass die Daten in einem Zusammenhang zu den gleichen Hypothesen stehen." 
18 Helfferich, Die Qualtität qualitativer Daten, 180 [Original wording: "Ein Leitfaden standardisiert in gewissem Sinn die 
inhaltliche Struktur der Erzählungen und erleichtert dadurch die Auswertung. Er ermöglicht es zudem, Unterthemen 
'quer' durch alle Interviews zu verfolgen."] 
19 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 77 
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put into the development of interview guidelines eliminates the possibility that the 
researcher presents himself as an incompetent dialogue partner.”20 
The core of the guidelines was the extent of outsourcing used in election campaigns. This 
is coherent with Mayring’s proposition that interviews focused on a particular problem are 
particularly appropriate in theory-driven research with specific questions.21 As already 
mentioned, the intent during the construction of the guidelines was to gain information on 
both, factual knowledge as well as interpretative knowledge (with a focus on the latter). 
This was to be taken into consideration during the construction process. For factual 
information, guidelines could be more structured and questions could be focused directly 
on the desired information. When receiving interpretative knowledge, guidelines needed 
to be “as open and flexible – including generation of monologues – as possible, and as 
structured as necessary due to the interest of the research.” 22 
Chosen experts 
Expert interviews are a specific form of guided interviews. “The respondent is primarily a 
source of information; therefore the organizational and institutional context is of interest 
and not the personality of the interviewed person.”23  Politicians often consider themselves 
as representatives of their parties. Therefore, the choice of experts was crucial for the value 
of the interviews. Since expert interviews “usually make use of those persons who have 
gained reputation in the current subject literature"24, experts approached were either 
researchers with good reputation in their field or current and former campaign managers 
who have played an active role in campaign management on the federal level. According 
to Mayer’s definition25, individuals with clear and recallable knowledge in a specified field 
                                                     
20 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 77 [Original wording: "Die in die Entwicklung 
eines Leitfadens eingehende Arbeit schließt aus, dass sich der Forscher als inkompetenter Gesprächspartner darstellt."] 
21 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 70 
22 Helfferich, Die Qualtität qualitativer Daten, 181 [Original wording: "So offen und flexibel - mit der Generierung 
monologischer Passagen - wie möglich, so strukturiert wie aufgrund des Forschungsinteresses notwendig."] 
23 Schmid, ‘Expertenbefragung und Informationsgespräch in der Parteienforschung: Wie föderalistisch ist die CDU?‘, 310 
[Original wording: “Die Gesprächspartner fungieren also vorwiegend als Informationslieferanten, interessant ist daher der 
organisatorische oder institutionelle Zusammenhang und nicht die Persönlichkeit des Interviewten.“] 
24 Bogner and Menz, ‘Das thoriegenerierende Experteninterview’, 41 [Original wording: “greift in der Regel auf jene Leute 
zurück, die sich zum einschlägigen Thema in der Fachliteratur einen Namen gemacht haben“] 
25 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 41 
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were considered experts. This is in line with Schmid’s proposal to make use of the elite 
theory for expert selection26. The most appropriate approach in this case is the so-called 
‘decision-technique’. Therefore, experts were chosen that are regarded as decision makers 
with actual influence on the campaign organizations. Rather than just being nonbinding 
assumptions, their views are based on valid arguments, claims and judgements. While each 
respondent was an expert in his or her specific case, interviews were designed in a way that 
allowed for gaining knowledge relevant to other cases. Hence, those cases in which 
respondents were involved could be used as examples in the wider context of a broader 
generalization.  
When selecting individuals for expert interviews a set of five criteria was selected within 
which each having a high degree of relevance for management: 
a. Organizational level 
b. Establishment 
c. Proximity to the economy 
d. Frequency of changes in party leadership 
e. Party size 
For each criterion, one case was required and sufficient for interview selections. In each 
case, at least one 
expert from the 
party side and 
one from a 
relevant service 
provider needed 
to be selected to 
ensure that the 
perspectives of 
both sides were 
represented and 
the bias of 
                                                     
26 See:  Schmid, ‘Expertenbefragung und Informationsgespräch in der Parteienforschung: Wie föderalistisch ist die CDU?‘, 
315 
 
Graph 1.2: Selection of experts 
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selective perception was prevented. One exception was made to this principle: Since 
interviews showed that the Pirate Party did not employ external resources, only an expert 
from the side of the party was interviewed. In addition, campaign experts were selected 
who have accompanied a particularly high number of campaigns over a longer period of 
time and therefore have notable expertise in the field. In order to study the phenomenon 
of political transaction costs, another group of experts was added that included individuals 
who did not have a great political career after they had managed a campaign, but who were 
successful in other business disciplines. According to the concept of theoretic sampling, the 
sample was gradually enlarged on the basis of the respective knowledge during the 
research process.27 On several occasions, respondents mentioned names of other potential 
interviewees and served as a door opener. As shown in graph 1.2, some cases fit several 
criteria. This was taken into account during the process of analysis.  
In addition, an interview was conducted with Sonja Bach-Meiers, head of the Berlin-branch 
of Union Betriebs-GmbH. Since the purpose of this interview was solely to gain more 
information about internal processes of this organization, it was not conducted using 
interview guidelines and not transcribed, but solely recorded.   
Interview Design 
The interview process was designed in accordance to the propositions made by Mayring28. 
He proposed a 5-step process as indicated in graph 1.3. During the first phase, the research 
problem was analysed and research questions and hypotheses were formulated. In the 
second phase, interview guidelines were constructed as described below. In a pilot phase, 
the interview guidelines were tested on respondents who had a basic knowledge on 
campaign management, but did not belong to the basic population of campaign managers 
in Germany. After the interviews were conducted, the recorded interviews were 
transcribed into writing. 
Construction of interview guidelines 
Prior to the construction of guidelines, it was decided to use open guidelines for this 
research. This seemed to be the “technically neatest solution to the question on how to 
                                                     
27 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 39 
28 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 71 
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perform the data collection.”29 Therefore, as the name suggests, guidelines did not serve 
as a strict order of questions. Rather, they served as structure for the interviews. While it 
was the goal to respect the order of the questions during the interview, this was not 
obligatory if answers of the respondents brought added value in other relevant fields.  
The first step of the construction of interview guidelines consisted of the collection of 
questions. All questions related to the field under study were gathered. The declared goal 
was to receive a catalogue of as many questions as possible. While the respective 
importance of each question was neglected, it was attempted to approach the field with 
questions from all different angles and perspectives. Eighty-three questions were collected, 
fulfilling the goal of receiving a minimum of fifty questions for the initial catalogue. 
Questions were structured into categories. 
Questions were tested to see if each answer was already known from the literature 
analysis, if they produced new knowledge and if it met certain requirements. Since they 
usually lead to very short answers, all factual 
questions, except for those needed with regards 
to desired case studies, were eliminated. Their 
content was verified to see if it could be 
integrated into other questions or if they could 
be answered with a short questionnaire prior to 
the interview, and whether the questions were 
appropriate to the knowledge of the 
respondents. Further, the openness of the 
questions was verified. The goal of the 
interviews was not to implicitly or explicitly 
communicate assumptions of the researcher. 
Rather, questions were formulated in a way that 
allowed the respondents to come up with 
entirely new interdependencies, observations, 
assumptions and judgements. Also, it ensured that all of the research questions described 
                                                     
29 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 77 [Original wording: „die technisch saubere 
Lösung der Frage nach dem Wie der Datenerhebung zu sein."] 
 
Graph 1.3: Interview design according to Mayring 
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in chapter 1.1 were approached. Thus, the construction of the interview guidelines was 
“based on theoretic assumptions of parameters, problems or impacts that resulted from 
already available information.”30 Due to this revision, the list of questions was radically 
reduced to a total of thirty seven. 
In the next step, the remaining questions were sorted according to content with regards to 
the defined research questions. This resulted in five different clusters of questions. A few 
questions that were important, but not allocable remained on their own and received 
sensible spots at the end of the interview guidelines. 
In the last step, it was attempted to find simple introductory questions that were as open 
as possible to give the respondent room for their narratives. The previously collected 
questions were subsumed under that opening question. In a four-column chart, the 
respective opening question was marked down in the left column. In the second column, 
key aspects of the remaining questions were recorded to serve as memos and as checklist 
for possible queries. The interviewer only mentioned them if the respondent did not 
address them on his/her own. The third column served for specific questions that were 
obligatory for each respondent in a pre-defined wording. In the last column, steering 
questions void of content were noted that allowed the interviewer to motivate the 
respondents to give further information in the case of short answers. The guidelines can be 
found in the appendix. 
Pilot phase 
Before the actual interviews were conducted, interview guidelines were tested in pre-tests 
during a pilot phase. As Mayer suggested, during a pilot phase “problematic, too complex 
or circuitous wording can be identified and improved.”31 As mentioned above, respondents 
during the pilot phase were individuals that possessed certain knowledge on campaign 
management but did not belong to the basic population of campaign managers. Testing 
the interview guidelines was only one factor of the pilot phase. Pre-tests “also serve to train 
                                                     
30 Froschauer and Lueger, ‘ExpertInnengespräch in der interpretativen Organisationsforschung’ [Original wording: “basiert 
auf theoretischen Annahmen über Einflussfaktoren, Problembereiche oder Wirkungen, die sich aus bereits vorliegenden 
Informationen ergeben“] 
31 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 45 [Original wording: “Problematische, zu komplexe oder unverständliche 
Formulierungen können dabei erkannt und verbessert werden."]  
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the interviewer”.32 The interviewer could therefore use them to test question techniques 
and to become familiar with the interview situation and work with interview guidelines.  
Interviews 
Interviews were held in calm environments where respondents were neither distracted by 
other individuals nor had to worry that the discreetness of their answers was not respected. 
Before each interview, the interviewer informed the respondent that a visible Dictaphone 
recorded the interviews. The interviews 
were structured according to the 
guidelines. Nevertheless, it was possible 
that some respondents did not mention 
every aspect of research questions. The 
extent depended on the accuracy of the 
interviewees’ answers. As Mayring 
proposed, “the interview let the 
respondent to contribute as openly as 
possible to get as close to an open 
conversation as possible. However, it is 
focused on a particular problem, which is 
introduced by the interviewer and 
repeatedly revisited.”33 Also, each 
respondent was informed about the 
possibility of answering anonymously in order to guarantee a productive atmosphere. 
However, no respondent made use of this option. 
1.3.4. Computer-assisted analysis 
The goal of the analysis of the interviews was to find common denominators as well as 
explore the most significant differences in the respondents’ statements. Thus, it seemed to 
                                                     
32 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 69 [Original wording: “Zum anderen dient die Pilotphase der 
Interviewerschulung." 
33 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 67 [Original wording: "Das Interview lässt den Befragten möglichst 
frei zu Wort kommen, um einem offenen Gespräch nahe zu kommen. Es ist aber zentriert auf eine bestimmte 
Problemstellung, die der Interviewer einführt, auf die er immer wieder zurückkommt."] 
 
Graph 1.4: Analytic process according to Mayring 
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be sensible to analyse the interviews with a comprehensive content analysis. As outlined 
in graph 1.4, the particular strength of content analyses is their clear and strict 
methodological approach. Mayring points out that the “goal of the structured qualitative 
content analysis is to filter out a particular structure from the material. These may be 
aspects in regards to form, content or particular types.”34 The analytic process consisted of 
six steps starting at phrasing the research question. In all steps, only wording of 
respondents was analysed. Non-verbal expressions were not subject to interpretation since 
they are too subjective. Meuser and Nagel add that “the goal is to identify supra-
individually common elements by comparing texts to those of other experts, and to 
formulate representative statements on commonly shared knowledge, structures of 
relevance and reality, interpretation and interpretive paradigms.”35 For analysing the 
gathered material and interpret data, the software MaxQDA was used. 
Research questions 
The analytic process started as early as during the formulation of research questions. By 
phrasing research questions and hypotheses based on first outcomes and impressions of 
secondary literate analysis the frame was set for later analysis and comparisons.  
Interview recording 
All interviews were recorded with a voice recorder and later transcribed. According to the 
principles set out by Kuckartz36, interviews were quoted word for word. They were neither 
summarized, nor paraphrased. Language and punctuation were slightly smothered in order 
to be adapted to standard German. All transcripts may be found on the enclosed CD. 
                                                     
34 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 118 [Original wording: "Ziel der strukturierenden qualitativen 
Inhaltsanalyse ist es, eine bestimmte Struktur aus dem Material herauszufiltern. Das können formale Aspekte, inhaltliche 
Aspekte oder bestimmte Typen sein."] 
35 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 80 [Original wording: “Das Ziel ist vielmehr, im 
Vergleich mit den anderen ExpertInnentexten das Überindividuell-Gemeinsame herauszuarbeiten, Aussagen über 
Repräsentatives, über gemeinsam geteilte Wissensbestände, Relevanzstrukturen, Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen, 
Interpretationen und Deutungsmuster zu treffen."] 
36 Kuckartz, Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse, 136 
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Code development 
Combining a deductive approach in the first step with inductive enlargement during the 
process a category system based on the knowledge drawn from literature analysis and in 
line with the formulated research questions was developed. In a deductive approach, each 
category served as a code to which excerpts from each interviews were appointed. For 
instance, one of the codes was named “standardization” referring to H2. Wording of 
interview partners agreeing that certain aspects of campaigns can be standardized was 
attributed to the sub-code ‘positive’, while wording disagreeing were accordingly 
attributed to the sub-code ‘negative’.  By doing so, “next to the text, a sequence of codes 
develops that reflects how the text is evaluated under theoretical aspects and under the 
analytical perspectives of the defined categories”37. While reading the transcripts for the 
first time, “all passages are highlighted that are spontaneously visible answers to specific 
questions of the guidelines. During the second perusal, the highlighted passages are 
assigned to an existing category system, which is simultaneously enlarged.”38 This 
enlargement was focussed on additional explanations to the stated research questions and 
hypotheses that seemed of relevance. Through consistently applying this scheme the 
category system was inductively enlarged. This process subsumed the usable content in the 
category system. “This kind of open, optional pre-structuring prevents a limitation of the 
openness, which would have been resulted by the limited previous knowledge of the 
researchers and the thereby limited perspective.39” 
After approximately 20 percent of the interviews were analysed, the code system was 
revised and slightly adapted to be better structured according to research questions. This 
is in line with Mayring’s proposition to perform this revision after 10 to 50 per cent. “It 
needed to be checked, if the logic was clear (no overlaps) and the degree of abstraction 
                                                     
37 Kuckartz, Einführung in die computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten, 60 [Original wording: "Neben dem Text entsteht 
so quasi eine Sequenz von Codes, die das wiedergibt, was unter theoretischen Gesichtspunkten, unter den analytischen 
Perspektiven der definierten Kategorien, von diesem Text zu halten ist."] 
38 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 48–9 [Original wording: "werden alle Textstellen markiert, die spontan 
ersichtliche Antworten auf die entsprechenden Fragen des Leitfadens sind. Beim zweiten Durchlesen wird der Text in ein 
vorliegendes Kategorieschema eingeordnet und dies zugleich erweitert.“] 
39 Früh, ‘Kategorieexploration bei der Inhaltsanalyse’, 129 [Original wording: "Diese Art der offenen, optionalen 
Vorstrukturierung verhindert sogar eine Einschränkung der Offenheit, die sonst durch das begrenzte Vorwissen der 
Forscher und die damit eingeengte Perspektive entstanden wäre."] 
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fitted to the subject of the research and the research question. After changes in the 
category system were made, the material was again analysed from the very start.”40  
Analysis 
Once the entire material was coded, interviews were grouped in sets. Each consisted of all 
respondents with the same party affiliation. Document variables were then assigned to 
each interview. The respective variable reflected the respective party affiliation of the 
respondent. Hence, document variables ‘CDU’, ‘SPD’, ‘Greens’, ‘FDP’, ‘DieLinke’ and 
‘PirateParty’ were assigned, each consisting of the interviews with respondents that are 
affiliated with the respective party.  
During 
the next 
step, for 
each code 
(including its sub-code) cross tables were generated indicating the amount of sequences 
attributed to each code grouped by party affiliation (see graph 1.5). Cross tables gave a first 
indicator on whether there were significant differences in the assessment of the respective 
research question between party affiliations.  
In the following, segment matrices were generated that did not only show the amount but 
also the wording of each coded sequences. Thereby “a synopsis of all passages of the text 
sets assigned to a 
particular category or 
sub-category can be 
created.”41 In addition, 
results were visualized 
for better analysis using code matrix browser (see graph 1.6). The synopsis represented the 
                                                     
40 Mayring, Einführung in die qualitative Sozialforschung, 117 [Original wording: “Es muss geprüft werden, ob die Logik klar 
ist (keine Überlappungen) und der Abstraktionsgrad zu Gegenstand und Fragestellung passt. Falls dadurch 
Veränderungen des Kategoriensystems vorgenommen werden mussten, wird das Material nochmals von Anfang an 
bearbeitet."] 
41 Kuckartz, Einführung in die computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten, 26 [Original wording: „"kann eine Synopse aller 
zu einer bestimmten Kategorie oder Subkategorie zugeordneten Textstellen des gesamten Text-Sets erstellt werden.“] 
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basis for the final step of analysis during which statements regarding the same research 
questions were compared and evaluated as to whether or not respondents from different 
sets contrasted. If so, it was analysed whether this was the case due to a very particular 
experience or whether it could be regarded as an overall trend due to their background or 
experience working with or for the respective party.  The goal during this process was to 
“construct an inner logic between the single items of information with the interviews.”42 
The results from this analysis were then taken for the hypothesis testing and to determine 
whether the proposed hypotheses were valid or if they needed to be discarded. In order to 
better visualize results by code matrix browsers, data was transformed to line graphs. 
1.3.5. Research ethics 
All research that was conducted in this dissertation was subject to a strict code of ethics.  
All respondents agreed freely to take part in this study. In the declaration of consent, 
interview partners agreed to be interviewed and that the conversation would be recorded, 
transcribed and used for this dissertation. Interviewees were informed that the decision of 
not taking part in the study or in any of its parts would not have any negative consequences 
for them. In the spirit of ‘informed consent’43, respondents could make their own decision 
after being informed about how their data would be analysed and used. All data was strictly 
used only for the purpose of this study.  
Everyone was fully informed and there were no obligations of anyone participating in the 
study. It was ensured that if  interviewees preferred to stay anonymous, their names would 
not be mentioned in this dissertation and their identity would be kept confidential. 
Respondents who wanted to stay anonymous had the opportunity to request the disposal 
of any recordings as soon as they were no longer needed for the purpose of this study.  
During the analysis of the available literature as well as during the analysis of the interviews 
it was always attempted to apply an objective view and to avoid subjective selectivity. The 
collected data was recorded fully and accurately.  
                                                     
42 Mayer, Interview und schriftliche Befragung, 50 [Original wording: "Hier geht es um die Herstellung der Logik zwischen den 
Einzelinformationen innerhalb des Interviews."] 
43 Helfferich, Die Qualtität qualitativer Daten, 190 
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In order to ensure comfortable reading, the author translated translations of citations in 
languages other than English. The translations were made to the best knowledge and 
belief. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the original wording is cited in the respective 
footnote.  
1.3.6. Risks and challenges 
As any other research, this study was also subject to risks and challenges. Most of them 
were closely connected to the research design and the decision to apply qualitative 
research methods. By examining and dealing with the risks, it was attempted to minimize 
them to an appropriate level.  
“The expert has two alternatives: either he is convinced by what he is communicating or 
he beguiles intentionally. According to our experience, the second alternative is rather rare, 
but not generally to be excluded.”44 The length of the interviews limits the risk of 
beguilement. While it is certainly possible to maintain a deception over a short period of 
time, it seems to be a challenge to keep it up for an interview that takes roughly one hour.  
Further, the author was aware of effects that are typical challenges in qualitative 
interviews. The paternalism effect is characterized by a “benevolence of the respondent 
with the research request.”45 Just as presentation and image borrowing effect, this effect 
can be used in a positive way, since the respondent is willing to communicate information 
that is useful for the research purpose. In the latter, the respondent wants to underline 
his/her competence. Being aware of the existence of these effects avoids loss of objectivity. 
The catharsis effect describes a situation in which respondents use the interview to 
communicate and compensate their frustration.46 During the analysis, this was kept in mind 
in order to identify possible inaccuracies due to frustrated respondents. By interviewing 
respondents from both sides, party and service provider, this affect was further limited. 
                                                     
44 Meuser and Nagel, ‘ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig bedacht’, 91 [Original wording:  "Dem Experten stehen 
zwei Alternativen offen: Entweder ist er von dem überzeugt, was er uns mitteilt, oder er täuscht uns absichtlich. Die 
zweite Alternative ist unserer Erfahrung nach eher selten, prinzipiell jedoch nicht auszuschließen."] 
45 Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’, 182 [Original  wording: "Gutmütigkeit des Befragten 
gegenüber dem vorgetragenen Forschungsanliegen"] 
46 Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’, 183 
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The iceberg effect47  describes a lack of interest in the research project and thus a hesitant 
willingness to release information. Since respondents agreed freely to take part in the 
interviews, this was a rather rare incident. According to the above-mentioned liberty of 
taking part, the interview was then completed as quickly as possible.  
When the feedback effect occurs, the respondent tries to invert the question-answer 
situation. He is tempted to “find out, how his actions are perceived by the environment”48 
During the interviews, it was made sure that the roles of respondent and interviewer were 
clearly defined. While questions for clarification were allowed, respondents were 
prevented from the attempt of slipping into the interviewer’s role.  
Trinczek49 raises the issue that some managers tend to be very dominant during the 
opening period of the interview. In such cases, rather closed questions were used during 
the opening phase in order to channel and minimize the dominant expectations. Questions 
then became more open in order to create a fruitful basis for interaction.   
                                                     
47 Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’ 
48 Abels and Behrens, ‘ExpertInnen-Interviews in der Politikwissenschaft’, 184 [Original wording: "erkundigen, wie sein 
Handeln vom gesellschaftlichen Umfeld wahrgenommen wird."] 
49 Trinczek, ‘Wie befrage ich Manager?’, 214 
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2. Political Theory 
This chapter will cover relevant aspects of campaign management from the political science 
perspective. It will lay the theoretic foundation on which the empirical part is built. After 
defining the most important terms, it will address the most important influencing factors 
for election outcome with particular attention to the relevance of campaigns. The current 
trend of professionalization will then be explored and consequences for contemporary 
campaign management will be analyzed.  
2.1. Definitions 
First, it is necessary to define certain terms that are of great value to the study. As 
Kellermann von Schele notes, “every scientific analysis requires clear, precise and 
consistent definitions and calls for the labelling of factually, socially and timely defined 
units.”50 Therefore, the following sub-chapter will define the most important terms.  
2.1.1. Campaigns 
Campaigns are the core focus of this dissertation. Wolf notes that “the art of campaigning 
is the coordination of politics and advertising by proper organization.”51 German 
campaigning expert Peter Radunski interprets campaigns as “contest of the parties for 
approval of program and person"52. Therefore, the core of an election campaign is to 
inform and mobilize the electorate and to influence the casting of votes.   
While many understand campaigns as an effort to win an election, this would fall short of 
many facets of campaigns. Rather, it is an effort to persuade and mobilize potential voters. 
Pippa Norris distinguishes between four elements: “the messages that the campaign 
organization is seeking to communicate, the channels of communication employed by 
                                                     
50 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 17[Original wording: „Jede wissenschaftliche Analyse setzt 
eindeutige, genaue und konsistente Begrifflichkeiten voraus und erfordert die Benennung sachlich, sozial und zeitlich 
definierter Einheiten.“] 
51 Wolf, Wahlkampf und Demokratie, 76[Original wording: „"Die Kunst des Wahlkampfes besteht in der inhaltlichen 
Koordination von Politik und Werbung durch gute Organisation."] 
52 Radunski, Wahlkämpfe, 11 [Original wording: „eine Auseinandersetzung der Parteien um Zustimmung zu Programm und 
Person."] 
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these organizations, the impact of these messages on their target audience and the 
feedback from the audience back to the organization."53  
This implies that it is possible to distinguish between different types of campaigns: the 
classic election campaigns, referendum campaigns, information campaigns and image 
campaigns. 
One common denominator of all four types is that they are “limited in terms of time and 
that they have a tendency to sharpen the circumstances.”54 Further, campaigning is not 
limited to the persuasion of individuals; rather it is a trinity of political content, 
management efforts and communication with the people. While personalized campaigns, 
as the name suggests, focus on enhanced 
public awareness of particular 
individuals, campaigns generally “have 
the goal to get in contact with citizens in 
order to manipulate their opinions by 
sending out messages. Citizens are 
supposed to be motivated to go voting 
and to vote for a particular party or a 
particular candidate.”55 This implies that 
all subordinated efforts have to strive 
after the same goal in order to place 
messages and opinions for the own advantage. This also includes, “actors’ preparations and 
strategic considerations for their campaigns that often take place behind closed doors.”56  
As mentioned above, it would fall short of the complexity of the issue to limit campaigns 
only to elections campaigns. Geisler points out that in modern media democracies, it is 
                                                     
53 Norris, ‘Do campaign communications matter for civic engagement?’, 128 
54 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: "Gemeinsam ist allen Kampagnen die zeitliche 
Befristung und die Tendenz zur Zuspitzung von Sachverhalten."] 
55 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: "Kampagnen haben zum Ziel, mit Bürgern in 
Kontakt zu treten, um mit Botschaften deren Meinung zu beeinflussen. Bürger sollen motiviert werden, zur Wahl zu 
gehen und eine bestimmte Partei oder einen bestimmten Kandidaten zu wählen."] 
56 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 18 [Original wording: „Vorbereitungen und 
Strategieüberlegungen der Akteure speziell auf den Wahlkampf hin, die oft hinter verschlossenen Türen stattfinden."] 
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common routine “to extend methods and instruments used in election campaigns to areas 
of ‘usual politics’”57. He particularly points out that this is the case in the use of 
demographic instruments.  
Before elaborating on the different types of campaigns, attention should be brought to the 
fact that every campaign consists of several elements: The most important one is the lead 
campaign. Plank points out that it is impossible to successfully campaign without one: 
“Particularly because voters, other than political actors, are not fully concerned about 
politics, a bracket is needed for the entire campaign that represents the main goal.”58 By 
including mutually interfering elements such as PR campaigns, usage of mass media or 
mobilizing efforts, a campaign seeks to approach all potential target groups.  
As outlined above, the term ‘campaign’ is used in several contexts in the literature. In order 
to properly analyze campaigns, however, it is vital to distinguish between the following 
types. 
Election campaigns 
Election campaigns are the main focus of this work. According to Schmitt-Beck, it is the 
“most obvious type [...] which is characterized by a set of competing actors (political 
parties/candidates) each campaigning on a range of issues (as well as a focus on candidate 
and party image), with the principal goal being electoral success."59 Three phases can be 
identified: preparation phase, pre-election campaign and final phase.60 During the 
preparation phase, all necessary procedures for the party organization, such as party 
conventions, internal elections and decision on major focuses, are planned. They are then 
conducted during the pre-election phase. The biggest challenge from a managerial 
standpoint is to coordinate all actions up to Election Day. As pointed out above, the final 
phase is then characterized by the lead campaign with sub-ordinated mass media 
campaigns, PR campaigns as well as mobilization campaigns. 
                                                     
57 Geisler, ‘Alte Gladiatoren, neue Arenen’, 197 [Original wording: "die im Wahlkampf zum Einsatz gebrachten Methoden und 
Instrumente auch auf den Bereich der Routinepolitik auszudehnen.“] 
58 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 70 [Original wording: "Gerade weil sich Wähler - im Gegensatz zu den 
politischen Akteuren - oft nicht umfassend mit Politik beschäftigen, bedarf es einer Klammer um die gesamte 
Wahlkampagne, die das Hauptziel darstellt."] 
59 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 4 
60 Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 84 
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Burton, on the other hand, does not distinguish between the different phases of an election 
campaign, but between the extent of competition: "There are three basic types of election: 
uncontested, contested incumbency, and open seat."61 This is particularly relevant in highly 
personalized campaigns such as mayoral races, presidential elections with a direct election 
or, in Germany, in federal elections in which candidates for the federal chancellor are not 
elected directly but a decisive factor for the voting decision of the electorate. Blaemire 
describes that "an election [campaign] is like a 'one-night stand' with the voters. The 
Permanent Campaign is more like a marriage."62 
Referendum campaigns 
A referendum campaign shares many characteristics of an election campaign, including 
limited length and the fact that there are competing actors. 
The main differences, however, are:  a) actors are not necessarily parties but also interest 
groups, b) the campaign is solely focused on one issue and c) in most cases there is no 
personalization involved. 
Information campaigns 
Information campaigns are issue-driven campaigns that are either run by government 
agencies or by pressure groups. While governments seek to “inform the public (e.g. 'drink 
and drive' campaigns), and/or to mobilize support and raise acceptance of particular 
policies”63, information campaigns run by pressure groups are interest-based. They 
attempt to raise awareness of particular issues and to influence their spin or the political 
agenda.  
Image campaigns 
Image campaigns can be performed by parties, interest groups or even individuals. They 
“may involve a range of issues, wrapped together with various kinds of emotional appeals. 
Their purpose is to raise the public esteem of the actor in question."64 Image campaigns do 
not necessarily have to be part of an election campaign, but they may. Political actors often 
                                                     
61 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 39 
62 Blaemire, ‘Database Management and the Permanent Campaign’, 147 
63 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 4 
64 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 5 
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use them as a permanent campaign in order to portray the respective actor in the most 
positive light and to prepare the electorate for the next election.  
2.1.2. Success of a campaign 
In order to evaluate whether techniques applied in a campaign were successful, it is 
necessary to define what success stands for in the context of campaigns. As Plank realizes, 
this is a challenging task: “Success is a stretchable term: For one party it is a success to beat 
the five per cent threshold while other are striving for absolute majority.”65 
Indeed, campaigns set themselves a large variety of goals: Some aim at winning an election 
while others at mobilizing as many party sympathizers as possible or occupying a particular 
topic. Further, the campaign is not the only relevant factor for the election outcome. 
Chapter 2.2 will further elaborate on a range of influencers. 
Therefore, the assessment whether a campaign was successful has to be made on a very 
individual basis. A common denominator in election campaigns, however, is the aim of 
maximized mobilization. This implies that if the potential was exploited to a maximum 
extent, the campaign may be regarded as being successful.  
2.1.3. Outsourcing 
The phenomenon of outsourcing is often seen as a rather new concept. However, it has 
been around for decades stemming from the automotive industry. During recent years an 
evolution has been taking place, formalizing the process of the make-or-buy-decision as 
well as the bidding process, implementation and monitoring.  
As Tan states, “the term ‘Outsourcing’ describes the assignment of internally performed 
tasks to external partners. Standing for the terminus ‘Outside Resource using’, it is the 
result of a make-or buy-decision in favour of the option ‘buy’.66 
Making use of economies of scale and expertise acquired by specialization, the goal of 
outsourcing is to reduce costs and increase quality. Pollert and Polzin add that outsourcing 
means to “outsource measures, tasks or divisions of the enterprise to stand-alone 
                                                     
65 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 66 [Original wording: "Erfolg ist dabei ein dehnbarer Begriff: Für die 
eine Partei ist es ein Erfolg, über die 5%-Hürde zu kommen, während eine andere Partei die absolute Mehrheit anstrebt."] 
66 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 184 
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companies such as research and development or IT consulting to in order to save costs and 
bring more flexibility to the enterprise.67 
Generally, there are four different types of outsourcing: Internal, external, global and 
hybrid forms. Internal outsourcing means that the respective tasks are allocated to a profit 
center that does not assemble an independent unit with a separate legal form but is to be 
seen as a subsidiary of the outsourcing company, whereas external outsourcing allocates 
tasks to external service providers that do not have any legal identity with the outsourcing 
unit. Global outsourcing points out the geographical dimension of the topic, underlining 
the fact that services are often not performed by service providers in the same country but 
all around the world. Last but not least, hybrid forms represent a mixture between internal 
and external outsourcing, e.g. when the unit is legally independent but personally 
dependent. 
Simon and Gathen note that “often outsourcing is limited to activities that do not belong 
to the imminent core business of the enterprise.”68 This particularly involves IT, legal affairs, 
car pools or canteens.  
2.2. Influencers of election outcome 
Despite the fact that this dissertation focusses on election campaigns, it is important to 
point out that those are not the only influences on the actual election outcome. The impact 
of situations or events that occurred before the start of a campaign can be analyzed 
relatively easily. More challenging, however, is the analysis of impacts of factors that occur 
during the running of a campaign.  
                                                     
67 Pollert, Kirchner and Polzin, Das Lexikon der Wirtschaft, 292 [Original wording: "Maßnahmen, Aufgaben oder Bereiche des 
Unternehmens, z.B. Forschung und Entwicklung, EDV-Beratung, in eigene Gesellschaften auszulagern, um Kosten zu 
sparen und mehr Flexibilität in das eigenen Unternehmen zu bekommen. "] 
68 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 154 [Original wording:  "Häufig beschränkt man sich 
beim Outsourcing auf die Auslagerung von Aktivitäten, die nicht unmittelbar zum Kerngeschäft des Unternehmens 
gehören."] 
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This sub-chapter will focus on some factors that are known to have the largest impact on 
voters’ decisions besides 
campaigns of the parties. 
Chapter 2.3 will explore the 
actual relevance of 
campaigns for election 
outcome. Some literature 
further suggests that the 
impact of influencing 
factors in the months 
before the election is 
generally limited. Burton and Shae argues that “the voter's choice is largely predetermined; 
the models that assume voters’ rationality tend to imply that the few voters who are open 
to persuasion are disaffected or disinterested and therefore not predisposed to vote."69 
Nevertheless, the overall tendency of late-deciding voters contradicts this theory. More 
likely, Graner and Stern’s conclusion seems to be accurate that “the voting decision is based 
on both, long-term influence that is being manifested in a party identification, as well as 
short-term influence.”70 
2.2.1. Socioeconomic situation 
The socioeconomic situation of the electorate has an influence on the rate of satisfaction 
with the government in office. Scholars therefore agree that the better the socioeconomic 
situation of a country is, the better are the chances for the governing coalition to be 
reelected. This pattern has widely been visible across Europe in the past years with 
numerous government changes. In nation states with solid economic performances, the 
governing parties were reelected or at least one of the coalition members has been able to 
enlarge its share of votes.  
In Germany, the end of the coalition of the Social-Democrats and the Greens in 2005 is a 
prime example of how the socioeconomic situation influences the election outcome. A 
                                                     
69 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 123 
70 Graner and Stern, ‘It's the Candidate, Stupid?’, 149 [Original wording: "Die Wahlentscheidung basiert demnach sowohl auf 
langfristig wirksamen Einflüssen, die sich in einer Parteiidentifikation manifestieren als auch auf kurzfristigen Einflüssen."]   
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perceived decline in the socioeconomic situation following Agenda 2010 – policies of 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder led many voters to turn their back on the governing coalition 
and produced a change in government, despite an impressive campaign effort, particularly 
in the last weeks before elections.  
2.2.2. Personalities 
30 years ago, parties were still the main actors in election campaigns. Questions about the 
character and personality of the candidate were rarely asked (a notable exception was the 
candidature of Franz-Joseph Strauss). “In the 'golden age of parties,' candidates did not run 
campaigns - they stood for election. Office seekers were expected to contribute to their 
own electoral efforts, of course, perhaps with a donation to the party coffers, but day-to-
day campaign operations were often left to the party."71 This has significantly changed over 
the last decades.  
Today, personalities of candidates play an increasing role in the voting decision.  Since the 
Reagan-campaigns in the 1980’s, “the tendency in favor of personalization of American 
campaigns has reached a new quality: The candidate himself is the message, his 
appearances, the discussion of his strengths and weaknesses are the actual media event.”72 
That this also applies to the case of Germany was visible in the 2013 campaign, when 
discussions on strengths and weaknesses of Peer Steinbrück received great media 
attention.  
It is undisputed that characters and personalities of candidates nowadays play a much 
larger role for the election outcome than in the past. German Bundestag campaigns are 
highly personalized. Being a representative of certain policies, the candidate himself is part 
of the message. "A campaign would want to take advantage of the fact that many 
persuadable voters are highly interested in the election - but are stalling on their final 
                                                     
71 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 8 
72 Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 51 
[Original wording: "hat die Tendenz zur Personalisierung der amerikanischen Wahlkämpfe allerdings eine neue Qualität 
erlangt: Der Kandidat selbst ist die Botschaft, seine Auftritte, die Diskussion seiner Stärken und Schwächen sind das 
eigentliche Medienereignis”] 
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answer because they are ambivalent, because some important policy preference is not 
squaring with their party's candidate."73 
Personalization today stands for the outstanding role candidates play in media coverage, 
while political questions often only play a secondary role. In some campaigns, such as the 
2013 CDU-campaign, the personality of the candidate is the most important message a 
campaign wants to communicate. Reasons behind this trend are mostly the decreasing 
party identification and the trend toward visualization. A strong candidate is much more 
tangible than a certain policy.  
However, personalization and political content are not necessarily contradictions, but can 
go hand in hand as long as campaign strategies fit to the respective candidate. 
2.2.3. Time in office 
The case seems to be clear: “The truth is most incumbents win most of the time."74 Burton 
and Shea underline this conclusion with the fact that V.O. Key suggested in 1966 that 
“voters use recent history as their guide: 'As voters mark their ballots they may have in 
their minds impressions of the last TV political spectacular of the campaign, but, more 
important, they have in their minds recollections of their experiences of the past four 
years'"75 
Indeed, there is no doubt that a challenger generally faces more obstacles (such as little 
name recognition) than the incumbent on his way to being part of the public discussions. 
“The incumbents of the governing party make use of the symbols of their public posts, their 
titles, their prominence, their statesmen-like distance, their entourage, the aura of their 
power.”76 If an incumbent has not been involved in any scandals or has made major 
mistakes, the challenger’s chances are rather weak. "A partial list of the possible sources of 
these asymmetries includes reputations from previous elected office, incumbency, recent 
policy commitments, organizational ability, and the strength or popularity of one's party."77 
                                                     
73 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 124 
74 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 142 
75 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 5 
76 Althaus, ‘Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf’, 130 [Original wording: "Die Amtsinhaber der Regierungspartei 
nutzen die Symbole ihrer öffentlichen Ämter, ihre Titel, ihre Prominenz, ihre staatsmännische Distanz, ihren Tross, die 
Aura ihrer Macht”] 
77 Meirowitz, ‘Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages, and Campaign Finance’, 682 
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At the same time, it is clear that incumbency advantage decreases with an increase in 
profile of the election. While at mayoral elections, particularly in smaller towns and villages 
an incumbent is very hard to beat, the case is different on the national level. So far, each 
chancellorship was ended by election defeat.  
Nevertheless, incumbency is a valuable advantage. Generally, name recognition, media 
attention, quality of staff, financial situation, connections with interest groups and base of 
volunteers are better than the ones of challengers.78  
2.2.4. External events 
Even in a precisely planned campaign with a popular candidate, there is still a level of 
uncertainty. Any moment, the momentum of a campaign can be reversed by unexpected 
events that happen outside of the campaigning hemisphere. “Unexpected events can lead 
to a sudden necessity of adapting the campaign strategy to the changed situation. Pre-
defined strategies become victims “of events and developments that now move too rapidly 
for careful advance planning."79 
This was particularly visible in the 2011 Baden-Württemberg state elections: “One month 
before the elections, 4% of voters stated that the turnaround in energy policy is their most 
important topic. Then there was Fukushima. All of a sudden, a week before Election Day, it 
was 44%. And now we have a green state premier.”80 
Also on the federal level, trends can be set by unexpected events such as crises, wars or 
other tragic events. "Crises are events that prevent voters from receiving your message in 
the final days or, worse, actions that cause voters to receive a bad message."81 Although, 
those events might be beyond the control of the candidates and might be subject 
interpretation, voters may be influenced by a certain mood leading to a reward or 
punishment of the respective candidate.82 Without the floods in 2002, Gerhard Schröder 
                                                     
78 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 39 
79 McCurry, ‘Mass Media Politcs’, 470 
80 Schrade, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 23 [Original wording: “Einen Monat vor der Wahl sagten vier Prozent der 
Wähler, die Energiewende sei für sie das wichtigste Thema. Dann kam Fukushima - dadurch waren es eine Woche vor der 
Wahl plötzlich 44 Prozent, und jetzt haben wir einen grünen Ministerpräsidenten.”] 
81 Allen, ‘Crisis Management in Campaigns’, 482 
82 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 45 
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most likely would have lost his post as chancellor. But he quickly made use of the changed 
situation and visited the affected region – days before his challenger Stoiber decided to do 
the same. It was this decision that created a mood within the population that Schröder was 
more capable of dealing with difficult situations.  
2.2.5. Campaigns 
Despite all of the named influencers on election outcome, it is undisputed that there is also 
an effect of campaigns to the outcome of elections. Plank notes a simple reason: “Because 
voters expect it.”83 
There is, however, a 
more scientific 
explanation for the 
existence of 
campaigns. As 
shown in graph 2.3., 
Burton and Shae suggest that each party has a base of supporters that will give their vote 
to the respective party, no matter what happens during the run of the campaign. "The base 
vote corresponds to the worst performance that a party has shown over the past several 
elections."84 This part of the electorate would vote for a party even with the party’s 
absolute worst candidate.  
The rest of the votes represent the swing vote. This is the share that parties compete for 
when they run their campaigns. It is the share of the electorate that has not made its final 
decision before the start of the campaign and could vote for either of the running parties. 
The so-called swing-factor therefore measures "the extent to which voters move from one 
party the other between two election years."85 
Part of the swing vote, however, represents a group of the electorate that has sympathies 
for a certain party, but that has not yet made a final decision. This group may be called the 
                                                     
83 Plank, ‘Kampagnen: Gut geplant ist halb geschafft?’, 68 [Original wording: "weil Wähler dies erwarten."] 
84 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 83 
85 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 84 
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soft partisan vote. That is “the portion of the electorate that goes for both attractive and 
less desirable 
candidates [of a 
party], but tends to 
shy away from the 
very worst."86  
Together with the 
base vote, the soft 
partisan vote 
represent the typical minimum vote share a party receives in an election. Burton and Shae 
define this share as the partisan vote (see graph 2.4).  
The rest of the vote, the so-called toss-up vote, is the share of the electorate that has no 
preference for either of the running parties. It is this section of the electorate that is the 
true site of election campaign battles. The toss-up vote, jointly with the attempt to 
motivate the party’s partisan vote to actually cast a vote, is what parties compete for during 
the run of a campaign. Due to the existence of the toss-up vote and a share of the partisan 
vote that needs to be mobilized, election campaigns exist. Summing it up, Korte correctly 
states that “the one who mobilizes, wins”.87 
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2.3. Relevance of campaigns for election outcomes 
After elaborating on the reasons for campaigns as well as on potential influencers for the 
election outcome, the question about the actual relevance of campaigns for campaign 
outcomes persists. The question if campaigns really matter is still an under-researched 
topic. "One of the problems with the research on campaign effects is that it is located at 
the interface of various sub-disciplines of political science - among them electoral studies, 
political communications research and party sociology, to name a few of the obvious ones 
- but does not fit easily into any one of them."88 At the same time, actual relevance of 
campaigns for election results is highly disputed. While some scholars argue that campaigns 
indeed have very large influence, others have strong doubts. 
Perception that campaigns are highly relevant often is driven from opinion polls that show 
a continuously growing percentage of voters who do not make their final voting decision 
until the end of a campaign. It appears that campaigns are important to a growing share of 
the electorate. “Public opinion polls […] can sometimes provide circumstantial evidence of 
[…] shifts over the course of a campaign."89 According to Thomas M. Holbrook90, four 
factors are responsible for this trend: 
 An increasing amount of late-deciding voters 
 Decreasing party-identification 
 Significant fluctuation in candidate support during a campaign 
 Increasing availability of information that affects voting decisions." 
Effects of campaigns can be both, positive and negative. While argued that a well-run 
campaign can be the decisive factor, poor and, respectively vague communications with 
the electorate, can also lead to dropping approval rates. Kellermann von Schele strongly 
argues in favor of campaigns: “Election campaigns are (co-) decisive for election results.”91 
Falter and Römmele come to a similar conclusion, also arguing that professional campaigns 
                                                     
88 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Studying political campaigns and their effects’, 19 
89 Norris, ‘Do campaign communications matter for civic engagement?’, 151 
90 Strohmeier, Moderne Wahlkämpfe, 23 
91 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 11 [Original wording: "schließlich sind Wahlkampagnen 
(mit)entscheidend für den Ausgang einer Wahl."] 
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are decisive keys for election success.92 Particularly in close runs, campaigns may become 
the decisive element. Burgard argues that in such cases, “professional orchestration of 
candidates and content management that is supported by state-of-the-art polling may be 
‘decisive’.”93 
This perception, however, is disputed. There are also researchers who doubt that 
campaigns have a significant effect. Burton and Shae argue “several early election studies 
found little evidence that they did"94. Other previously mentioned factors lead to a 
situation in which campaigns are only a very small piece in the big picture of an election. 
Not many voters would cast their vote in favor of a specific party only due to a decent 
campaign. Party-identification might decrease, but the majority of voters still seem to 
decide based on hard facts such as party programs and on soft ones such as sympathies for 
the candidate. 
In conclusion, it seems that campaigns have an effect on election outcome. But it is only 
one of many factors. Particularly campaign practitioners seem to overrate their 
importance.  “While it would be a clear exaggeration to state that campaigns are of prime 
importance in determining the election result, [...] it seems pretty incontrovertible that 
campaigns do, indeed, matter for the behaviour of citizens at elections and referendums."95 
2.4. Americanization, Modernization, Professionalization 
The most visible trend in campaigning that occurred over the last couple of decades is often 
described by the term “Americanization”. However, this wording only refers to practices 
developed particularly in the United States and is because US election campaigns often 
serve as role models for campaigns worldwide. Nevertheless, the term “Americanization” 
was very useful as a starting point for modern campaign research96.  
                                                     
92 Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 50 
93 Burgard, Von Obama siegen lernen oder "Yes, We Gähn!"?, 35 [Original wording: "können eine professionelle Inszenierung 
der Kandidaten und ein von moderner Meinungsforschung unterstütztes Themenmanagement 'kriegsentscheidend' 
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94 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 4 
95 Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, ‘Do political campaigns matter?’, 185 
96 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 40 
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However, the term “Americanization” does not properly define and describe the actual 
developments. Since there are considerable differences between campaign management 
in the United States and in Europe, it can be regarded as a synonym for the terms 
‘modernization’ or ‘professionalization’, which seem to be more appropriate.  
“Americanization describes a correctly identified tendency. Nevertheless […] the terms 
‘modernization’ and professionalization characterize the dominant type of campaigns 
more adequate than the term ‘Americanization’, which is equipped with a cultural-critical 
undertone.” 97 
2.4.1. Definition 
Kellermann von Schele elaborates that “professionalization in political communications, 
and particularly in election campaigns, means the strategic, i.e. goal-oriented planning of 
the campaign by economically using resources with the help of (independent) advisors and 
external service providers – not only coming from parties, not primarily intuitive and on no 
account with a continuously changing strategy.”98 
By accessing external advisors, campaign managers were able to use existing know-how to 
further enhance the quality of their campaigns and to market their respective candidate in 
a more effective manner.99 
Professionalization is a strategic approach that includes particular knowledge and skills 
mainly in management. While classic campaigns heavily relied on intuition, 
professionalized campaigns attempt to avoid situations of uncertainty.  
2.4.2. Reasons 
Taking developments outlined in chapters 2.2 and 2.3 into account, there seem to be three 
major evolutions that led to an increasing need of professionally planned campaigns:  
                                                     
97 Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 62 
[Original wording: "Insofern beschreibt das Schlagwort von der 'Amerikanisierung' zwar eine richtig erkannte Tendenz, 
dennoch […] charakterisieren die Termini 'Modernisierung' und 'Professionalisierung' den hierzulande dominierenden 
Typus moderner Wahlkämpfe adäquater als der häufig mit einem kulturkritischen Unterton versehene Begriff der 
'Amerikanisierung'.“] 
98 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 58[Original wording: „Professionalität in der politischen 
Kommunikation und besonders im Wahlkampf meint die strategische, d.h. zielführende Planung der Kampagne unter 
ökonomischer Verwendung der Ressourcen mit Hilfe von (unabhängigen) Beratern und externen Dienstleistern - nicht 
allein aus der Partei heraus, nicht primär intuitiv und keinesfalls mit einer ständig wechselnden Strategie."] 
99 Geisler, ‘Alte Gladiatoren, neue Arenen’, 197 
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 Increasing complexity in voting behavior 
 Socio-cultural changes 
 Changes in media systems 
Voting behavior has significantly evolved over the last decade. As stated above, those 
developments include an increasing amount of late-deciding voters and decreasing party-
identification. Those factors have led to an increase in ‘toss-up vote’-share over the past 
years. Parties need to devote much more efforts to influencing voting behavior particularly 
in the last weeks and days of campaigns.  
Socio-cultural changes led to a significant decrease in party-identification. In the first half 
of the 20th century, social milieus had a large impact on voting behavior. It used to be 
common sense that blue-collar workers were voting in favor of social-democrats while 
upper classes were more biased towards Christian-democrats or liberals. Nowadays, some 
of the former social milieus have disappeared and identification with others has decreased. 
For campaign managers this led to an increased need for more personal voter approaches. 
Unlike the past, it is increasingly more difficult to find topics that are relevant for entire 
social groups. Rather, more individualistic approaches are needed.  
Thirdly and lastly, the media system has changed entirely. The past 100 years have brought 
numerous changes in information technology: radios, televisions, phones, mobile phones, 
or internet. Even within one technology, such as the internet, certain trends lead to more 
professionalized approaches: Today, it is indispensable that parties and candidates are 
present in social media. This not only requires more resources, but also very professional 
approaches in order use the respective media in the most efficient manner.  
Every one of these developments requires higher intensity of media usage as well as more 
focused voter approaches.  
2.4.3. Developments 
Professionalization in campaign management is a relatively new phenomenon. Up until the 
90’s of the past century, there was hardly any academic literature on political 
communications and campaign management available. Development of campaign 
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management is the result of social modernization processes and the rise of mass media.100 
While campaigns used to be run by parties themselves and their amateur staff, they are 
run by professionals today. Focus more and more switches to marketing techniques and 
political advertising. In business speak this means that selling the product and generating 
profit (election success) have moved to the spot light. This tendency is not uniquely an 
American phenomenon. Rather, it can be observed in most western democracies. “It is 
dependent on various factors such as people, party and political developments and the 
current situation, so to speak the observed necessity for change or adaption.”101 As a result, 
professionalization should not be regarded as a development; rather it occurs in wave 
motions.  
Professionalization is a development that not only affects certain techniques or styles in 
campaign management, rather it entirely transforms campaigns. This is particularly 
observed in the following developments: 
(1) Consultant-centered campaigns. Until a few years ago, German campaigns were 
controlled by established party structures. Normally, the secretary-general of a party 
headed the campaign and his staff consisted of regular party personnel. "Consultant-
centered campaigns are less beholden to the old party structures than their 
predecessors were, as candidate have released themselves to set up their own 
campaign operations and have come to rely on professionals who know the strategies 
and tactics of campaign management."102  
(2) Mass communications. Despite the undisputed necessity of grassroots campaigning, 
mass communications is still a decisive factor in campaigning. With the rise of mass 
media in the 20th century, campaigning has gone through a thorough transformation 
process. With the rise of radio, TV and internet, it became possible to access large 
amounts of people with comparably little effort. While this does not substitute personal 
contact with voters, it has changed the behavior of campaigners who set their focus on 
                                                     
100 Falter and Römmele, ‘Professionalisierung bundesdeutscher Wahlkämpfe, oder: Wie amerikanisch kann es werden’, 50–1 
101 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 51 [Original wording: " Sie ist abhängig von verschiedenen 
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techniques to reach the broad mass of people. Even today, TV duels between 
candidates are not only orchestrated in a very professional manner, but also 
accompanied by vast media attention and are thought to be a key element in parties’ 
media campaign.  
(3) Local campaigning. In the past two decades, decreasing share of voters who actually 
cast their ballots led to the necessity of approaching voters more directly. Voters are 
faced with mass media advertising on a daily basis. Hence, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to convince people of a certain behavior (go voting) by simply throwing out 
mass messages. In times of web 2.0 and social media, people expect to receive tailor-
made messages.  “Local campaigning focused on the one activity that could best be 
done locally – mobilizing voters to go to the polls.”103 One of the major achievements 
of the 2008 Obama campaign was the development of grassroots campaigning. It was 
realized that John Doe is more likely to listen to what his neighbor tells him than to 
what he reads in a letter or an email from a campaigner unknown to him. Despite the 
need of large numbers of volunteers, professional and efficient management is needed 
in order to coordinate those grassroots efforts. 
2.4.4. Turning points 
As stated above, campaign research is a relatively new field and professionalization in 
campaigning a contemporary phenomenon. There is only a little research available that 
covers campaigns before the 1990’s. However, there are four campaigns in the United 
States that can now be regarded as turning points in the evolution of professionalization of 
campaign management.  
Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign was the first one that made use of television. Prior to this 
campaign, TV advertising and market segmentation based on research was only used by 
the private sector. The Eisenhower campaign not only used media for campaign purposes, 
but also employed expert staff from the private sector – a first step towards outsourcing. 
„Advertising pioneer Rosser Reeves, whose best-known slogan was 'M&M's - melts in your 
mouth, not in your hands"104, was in charge of the TV campaign.   
                                                     
103 Denver and Hands, ‘Post-Fordism in the constituencies?’, 110 
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In the 1960 presidential elections, John F. Kennedy ran against Vice-President Richard 
Nixon and eventually won the race. It happened to be the closest election since 1916. Nixon 
became the first presidential candidate who lost the election despite earning a majority of 
states. A key reason for Kennedy’s success was his successful campaign. "John F. Kennedy 
and his advisers spent three years planning their 1960 presidential campaign."105 He 
reached a new level of professionalism by not campaigning in every one of the 50 states 
(as Nixon did), but rather concentrating on swing-states. The 1960 campaign also marked 
the beginning of televised presidential debates. The four debates were the first debates 
ever held between presidential candidates and said to be a decisive factor for Kennedy’s 
victory. While he looked young and full of energy, Nixon appeared pale with sweaty face. 
This was used heavily by the Kennedy camp to further sharpen Kennedy’s image as the 
energetic young candidate that represents the future.  
As the third turning point in US campaigning, the 1992 Bill Clinton campaign set new 
standards. It is considered to be the “role model of professional campaigning”106 Since his 
campaign, professionalization in campaigning became a worldwide trend. The campaign 
represented a milestone in professional usage of media and voter segmentation. It also 
introduced the concept of a “war room” that was later used by the Blair campaign in the 
UK and the Schröder campaign in Germany. 
In Germany, Adenauer already in his first campaign used some elements of professionalized 
campaigning techniques. Not only did he use external PR agencies, but also of external 
advertising agencies and pollsters.107   
For many decades, however, professionalization in Germany is linked to the work of Peter 
Radunski. During the campaigns he managed in the 1980s, he started to differentiate 
between three forms of campaigning: political campaign, advertising campaign and party 
campaign. In the political campaign, “he introduced the ‘One-Voice-Principle’: political 
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position should be communicated in one voice both, in terms of content and format. From 
the top of the federal party down to members.” 108  
Until today, the 1998 SPD campaign represented the peak of professionalization in 
Germany. The campaign of 1998 was “characterized by a degree of professionalization that 
was previously unknown. In particular, this was the case with the SPD-‘Kampa’–
campaign.”109 The Kampa-concept represented an important milestone in the tendency to 
organize campaign personnel outside regular party structures. It was the first time that 
Clinton’s war room concept was applied in Germany and up until today regarded as the 
most advanced campaign organization Germany witnessed so far. 
2.4.5. Party traditions 
For many decades, parties played the main role in campaigning. Successful campaigning 
was considered unthinkable without the assistance of a party organization. “Office seekers 
relied on party organization to carry petitions, organize volunteers, give money, make 
telephone calls, and canvass door to door."110 Only parties were able to mobilize a critical 
mass of people needed to carry out a campaign.  
In Germany, SPD was a front-runner in terms of organization. Already in the early 20th 
century, the party gathered a considerable number of supporters. Party organizations 
suffered heavy losses during the years of National Socialism in Germany that resulted in 
the disappearance of most political parties. However, SPD reorganized very quickly after 
the war. Already in 1948, there were 10.000 local SPD committees. This lead to the fact 
that its party organization was present in entire Germany before the first Bundestag 
elections took place.111  
Party organization and resulting party affiliation was not only important for carrying out 
campaigns, but also to mobilize voters. During times when society was still heavily divided 
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into classes and with SPD being the typical working class party, it seemed that party 
affiliation and socioeconomic situation had lager effects on voting decision than actual 
campaigns.  
However, parties started continuously to lose members, election turnout decreased and 
the image of politicians generally worsened. This was triggered by a variety of factors, 
including scandals, increasing unemployment, and the rise of protest parties. Particularly 
large parties suffered from this sociocultural change. Grafe describes today’s campaigns as 
image campaigns of a sector that has a devastating image.112 Because of this trend, party 
support started to become less important. “A growing number of candidates began running 
for office without much party help.”113 
However, in Germany parties still dominate the political landscape. “Parties rule over the 
political world like God over the universe. They have the first and last word.”114 Although 
media becomes increasingly important, parties are the main trigger for political integration 
and communication. Party traditions are still very alive and important for parties’ identities 
and therefore for their actions and campaigning styles. Unlike in the United States, where 
campaign managers and spin-doctors are mostly hired by candidates, parties in Germany 
still have significant power. Spin-doctors in Germany, as few as there exist, are mostly 
politically motivated or gain their influence through political consulting or over the media. 
A prime example for this is Michael Spreng who was hired by the 2002 Stoiber team being 
a media expert. 
However, Kellerman von Schele suggests that Spreng was a remarkable exception. 
According to her, party traditions hinder modernization tendencies such as the assignment 
of external experts in the field of strategy and campaign communications.115 In the future, 
the degree to which candidates run independently from parties and to which their 
traditions earn election success will decide over relevance of independent campaign 
managers. 
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2.4.6. Professionalization in Germany 
The previous sub-chapters applied a global look on professionalization. Despite global 
trends, however, national characteristics in campaigns continue to exist. It is not possible 
to simply use an American campaign as blue print for campaigns in other countries such as 
Germany. Some scholars even consider drawing conclusions from US campaigns as 
absurd.116 While the extent of similarities between US and German campaigns is arguable, 
this view seems to be quite extreme. Rather, it can be stated that there are overall and 
global trends in campaigning, but national characteristic still play an important role.  
In Germany, for instance, “professionalization of strategies, organization and 
communication may be observed without a professionalization of the actual profession.”117 
Campaign management is still not a clearly defined and accredited profession in Germany.  
However, polling is a highly professionalized sector whose services are used by all major 
parties. Polling institutes are highly specialized and do not directly belong to a specific 
party.118 But there are limits to further developments in this sector: data security laws as 
well as financial resources prevent parties from carrying out street campaigns of American 
extent.119 
Scholars, however, agree that campaigning in Germany is at a turning point. “The trend to 
professionalization, to topic and event management and approaches tailored to target 
groups is evident.”120 
2.5. Consequences for contemporary campaign management 
After defining relevant terms, elaborating on the significance of campaigns for election 
outcome, and outlining the trend of professionalization, the following practical 
consequences can be drawn for contemporary campaign management: 
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(1) Campaigning is important. Although there are many other factors that have influence 
on election outcome, proper campaigning is not only expected by the electorate, but 
still required to mobilize potential voters. 
(2) Campaigning is neither high art nor pure science. Campaigning has become a 
profession. Although intuition is still a valuable asset with which the electorate can be 
impressed, modern campaigns would not successfully work without a professional 
approach that includes pollsters as well as media or PR consultants that are able to 
transfer the appropriate messages to the relevant target groups. The extent to which 
campaigning is professionalized varies from region to region. While in the United States, 
spin-doctors even have their own professional organization121, German campaigns so 
far have reached their professional peak with the 1998 SPD campaign. However, it can 
be expected that Anglo-Saxon campaigns continue to serve as role models and the 
degree of professionalization in German campaigns will continue to grow.  
(3) Campaigns can be run like small businesses. “Political organizations and institutions 
develop their own professional know how (spin-doctors) in order to design their media 
and communications strategy in an optimal way.”122 While campaigns used to be run 
based on a broad basis of volunteers and in a rather intuitive manner, professionals can 
coordinate almost every aspect of campaigning today. Parties “have responded to the 
rise of high-tech, market-driven electioneering, which draws outside consultants into 
the mix, by merging into 'service-oriented' organizations that allocate money and 
expertise."123 Financial resources are playing an increasingly important role. 
The third finding in particular leads to the conclusion that the environment of campaigning 
has evolved and changed in favor of business-minded approaches. The following chapter 
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will therefore elaborate on the question whether management practices that previously 
had their homes in the private economy, such as outsourcing, seem to be appropriate 
approaches to cope with the new challenges and realities of campaigning.   
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3. Campaign Management 
Campaign management has a long history that reaches back to ancient Roman times. 
Quintus Tuilius Cicero may be considered as the first campaign manager in history. In 
charge of his brother’s campaign for a seat in the Senate he already realized the importance 
of a well-organized and efficiently running campaign. In a letter to his brother Marcus he 
gave advice: "Seek out men everywhere who will represent you as if they themselves were 
running for office."124  
Traditionally, parties and candidates used to rely on their own organizational structures 
and their own resources. As already indicated in the previous chapter, this has at least 
partly changed in recent decades. “Generally, media presentation of candidates is not 
organized by party organizations, but by external consultants. These so-called “political 
consultants” not only take over sub-tasks such as Press and Public Relations, advertising, 
target group analysis, direct marketing, acquisition of donations or opponent research, but 
also manage entire campaigns.125 Characteristics of campaign management will therefore 
be the focus of this chapter. After elaborating on the evolution of campaigning, attention 
will be brought to contemporary campaign management and how today’s campaigns are 
organized as well as to the specific tasks of campaign teams and managers.  
3.1. The evolution of campaigning 
As shown in chapter 2.3, campaigning does matter. Recent developments and trends 
indicate that this will continue to be the case. Of particular importance to the evolution of 
campaigning are the following sociocultural developments:126 
- Rise of a media democracy; 
- Decreasing political interest / Change in communication with voters; 
- Increasing volatility of voters; and 
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- Decreasing party identification. 
Particularly in the second part of the 20th century, campaigning has undergone a 
remarkable evolution: Professionalism in campaigning began with Mark Hanna's work in 
1896 and was hastened by Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1952 campaign for president. Since 
then, campaigns have been significantly more professional and scientific. The 1970s and 
1980s brought marketing-orientation 
and professional fund-raising. In 
retrospect, the most significant 
development took place in the 1990s 
with the rise of the internet. It brought 
fundamental change to campaigning 
and campaign management. "Every 
position paper, every advertisement, 
every news release, can now be 
personalized to voters across the 
World Wide Web."127 While it is then 
possible to precisely target particular voter groups, this also meant an increase in costs. 
Campaign managers were faced with increasingly expensive new campaigning tools: micro-
targeting, radio, video, website productions. Particularly in the United States, this led to a 
significant rise of campaign budgets. The US remains a role model for German campaigns. 
Just as overseas, campaign managers were faced with an increasing share of non-voters or 
swing voters. 
3.1.1. Rise of a media democracy 
„No campaign escapes mass media. Through mass media, voters are being informed about 
what is happening in politics.“128 Mass media may easily be considered as the single most 
significant change in campaign-voter, respectively, intra-campaign communications in the 
21th century. With the rise of radio, TV and internet, communications channels have 
changed entirely. Politics is faced with a steady drift away from party democracies towards 
media democracies. Important indicators for this development are increased 
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commercialization, specialization of actors and, most significant for this work, increased 
usage of external sources.129 Packaging politics as entertainment is common subject to 
debate. In the 2013 Bundestag campaign, the discussion whether the comedian Stefan 
Raab was an appropriate person to co-host the general televised debate showed that 
entertainment has become a common element in today’s campaigns130. That has the 
potential to reach groups of the electorate that previously had no interest in politics (and 
therefore likely to belong to the toss-up vote). At the same time, there are heavy critics 
among politically interested people who argue that ‘Politainment’ neglects the actual 
importance and seriousness that should be devoted to politics. In recent decades it has 
become a common understanding that campaigns which do not use media in their means 
are unlikely to be successful.  
At the same time, “influence of media on campaigns has realized a dramatic change. […] By 
now, people know whether something is a media hype, let it be positive of negative, or 
whether it is reality.”131 Practitioner Robert Heinrich, who has managed several campaigns 
for the Green Party, underlines that “what is written in newspapers is important. How it is 
intonated and commented should not be overestimated.”132 The electorate is mature 
enough to draw their own conclusions of what is presented to them via media. Some 
scholars argue that media debates often do not actually reach voters: “The difference 
between media outrage and citizen outrage has become significant.”133  The main thesis of 
those critics is that excitements in media do not necessarily reflect excitements among the 
electorate.134 This leads to the conclusion that not only a certain degree of tiredness 
towards politics may be observed (the following chapters will elaborate more on this), but 
also some towards media. The latter is said to be caused by extensive usage and 
continuously increasing velocity of news. Media is the main source of information for most 
people. This is likely to persist. “In coming campaigns, classic media will still play a main 
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role in opinion forming.”135 For the largest part of the electorate, classic media is still the 
number one source of information. While digital media is clearly on the rise, “what is 
written in FAZ, Spiegel, Bild, etc. will be picked up by social media and there it becomes the 
topic of the day. Classic media therefore still decides what is being talked about.”136 In 
recent years, web 2.0 has been revolutionizing campaign communications. Social media 
has witnessed a rise in significance as a news source. In this context, Facebook has rather 
become a forum for discussion while Twitter has overtaken the role as source of 
information, particularly in areas of conflicts where the presence of journalists is hardly 
possible. In the context of campaigning, Twitter has become a tool for fast reactions. Since 
Tweets can only hold a maximum of 180 characters, content is limited. For candidates, 
Facebook today not only serves as an important display for self-presentation, but also as a 
direct forum for communication with a large part of the electorate. 
For campaigns, this development leads to a new challenge: In mass media, parties do not 
only compete with their political opponent, but also with private advertisers that largely 
have a significantly higher budget and, most important, professionally made 
advertisements.137 Due to evolving challenges for journalists as well as rising expectations 
regarding media competences of politicians, political actors need to carefully consider 
opportunities and threats of this trend. “For politics, adapting to the rules of media means 
to adapt to the necessities of media. Media need pictures, people and short statements. 
Emotions are as demanded as professional appearance, particularly in front of cameras and 
microphones.”138 
The most significant change to campaigners caused by the rise of mass media and internet 
is the overall velocity of politics. In the past, year two after a campaign was comparably 
quiet. This has significantly changed. Parties today are faced with campaign processes that 
                                                     
135 Christiansen, ‘Contribution in the conference’, 23 [Original wording: "werden die klassischen Medien am Ende im 
kommenden Wahlkampf immer noch eine Hauptrolle in der Meinungsbildung spielen, denn sie sind immer noch für die 
meisten Menschen die erste Informationsquelle.“] 
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are almost continuous. “There’s no such thing as an off year anymore. […] Campaign cycles 
once measured in months and weeks are now measured in hours and minutes.”139 
While there used to be daily, quite well-defined news cycles, today news goes in and out 
on a 24/7 basis. "Within minutes of a major announcement or development, opinions are 
formed, positions are staked out by the principals, and any response that sounds 
'conventional' will likely be ignored or treated as something other than wise."140 Therefore, 
campaign managers and spin doctors need to react far more quickly than in the past.  
With the rise of a media democracy, professional campaign management needs adapt to 
new habits of the electorate. It has to cope with the challenges of shorter attention spans 
and nonstop flows of information that voters are faced with.  
Today’s campaigns therefore need to be focused on mass media. This has direct influence 
on internal organization of campaigns: “Media-centered campaigns are centralized 
campaigns. But communications management not only needs to have an eye on campaign 
headquarters crew, leaders of parliamentary groups or on the government, but on all 
campaigners. Actual communicators are not the few professionals at the tip of the 
organization, but also local party leaders when they visit a local newspaper.”141 
Campaign managers attempt to react to this trend by devoting more importance to political 
staging, symbolic policies and pseudo-events. For German campaigners, US campaigns still 
represent the role model in this regard where party conventions are staged in party-like 
atmospheres. In addition, “important informal contacts to journalists, whose selection and 
supervision must be done with particular attention”142 serve as direct channels of 
communication to the media. By continuously nurturing those contacts, campaign 
managers and spin doctors attempt to exert influence on relevant media channels. 
Increased importance to advertising in media, particularly on television, also leads to 
increased costs. “Therefore, political actors have a strong incentive to supplement these 
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'paid' media by 'free' media [...], through appearances in the news and other political 
programs on television as well as in the press."143  
Digital media has the potential to take over core functions in campaign management. “By 
now, digital channels are indispensable to mobilize own supporters.”144 This view is shared 
by many other practitioners. Michael Spreng adds that “politically internet can only work 
when it is understood as participation media. This includes publicly discussing drafts for 
party programs as well as drafts for laws. For today’s politicians it is more important and 
more efficient to build up Facebook communities […] rather than organizing elective 
assemblies.”145 
In conclusion, it may be stated that the rise of a media democracy is likely to have brought 
the most significant changes to campaign management during the past decades. While it 
brought a range of new challenges related to the increase of the overall velocity of 
campaigns, it also brought opportunities to each campaign mostly on the digital level. 
Particularly communications with followers and supporters have become much easier. 
Campaign managers need to make use of these opportunities while, at the same time, 
attempt to limit negative influences on their work. "Too many contemporary campaigners 
are allowing the stress of media inquiry and rapid-fire technology to rob them of their 
dignity."146 Media therefore certainly plays a central role in contemporary campaigns and 
needs to be used to enhance communications with voters and intra-campaign 
communications, but campaign managers need to be aware of the pitfalls. 
3.1.2. Decreasing political interest / Change in communication with voters 
Another major development all parties in Germany are faced with is a continuous decrease 
in political interest among the electorate. Political topics are not the main issues anymore 
that are being discussed at regulars’ tables. The most visible result of this development is 
the decrease in turnout. While in the 1970‘s turnouts were around 90%147, it declined to 
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70,9 % in 2009148. The share of voters who are actually interested in politics is even lower. 
In fact, "the number of truly concerned, interested citizens has been modest over the past 
decade - about 30 percent are interested in campaigns."149 By assuming that regular 
citizens closely follow activities of parties and candidates, party activists would make a 
“fatal mistake”.150 
Decreased political interest also has an effect on campaign management: “Parties depend 
on their members and followers. For instance, they are the ones who staff info booths, run 
events, are ready to discuss issues and therefore locally represent the party’s offer to the 
electorate.”151 While candidates increasingly become the center of attention in campaigns, 
they are not necessarily a decisive factor. "Only when a dramatic, crosscutting issue divides 
the electorate would voters be swayed by candidate appeals."152 Neither are they the ones 
who raise the most substantial part of financial resources. This is particularly important 
since financial resources play in increasingly important role. “Campaigns cost money, a lot 
of money. Therefore, parties rely on donations. But in times of funding scandals, mistrust 
is spreading and so is the old prejudice, parties could swim in money.”153  
One of the strategies to counter this development is to attempt to communicate with 
voters directly. Since they are not used to that, voters are not only surprised, but also have 
the feeling that they (and their concerns) are being taken seriously.154 
The other strategy is to change intra-campaign communications from a top-down to a 
bottom-up model. With the top-down model being the traditional way of running a 
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campaign, this used to be the main choice of German parties.155 Only on the first view, such 
a change seems to contradict with the overall assumption that campaigns are run like 
dictatorships, rather than democracies: “It is the duty of political campaign leaders to 
define the main message and focus topics of a campaign as well as the presentation of the 
candidate.”156 However, the 2009 Obama campaign showed that it is indeed possible to 
have a strong hierarchical order and a bottom-up focus at the same time. While there was 
clear leadership by his campaign managers under the auspices of David Axelrod “a large 
number of volunteers were appointed as organizers of the campaign and led to increased 
independence of the campaign according to the bottom-up principle.”157 The biggest 
challenge hereby was to create a large number of multipliers who were able to convince 
their surroundings of the candidate and to acquire new potential supporters.  Particularly 
since "volunteers take time to organize and they are sometimes unreliable"158, 
management of a bottom-up approach needs to be straight forward: “As outlined in an 80-
page manual, volunteers were trained to be specific organizers according to their interests 
and talents. After completion of a four-day seminar they received titles such as team 
coordinator, data coordinator, volunteer coordinator, voter registry coordinator or voter 
contact coordinator. In addition, everywhere in the country precinct captains were 
trained.”159 
By applying a bottom-up approach, communications with the voter is not only changed, 
hence more direct, but also the vast potential of volunteers (in business speak: cheap 
resources) may be used. The general tendency of decreased political interest is countered 
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by an approach that specifically uses the natural surroundings, i.e. neighbors, family, etc. 
of targeted voters to provide them with personal relations to the party, candidate or the 
message of a campaign. The feeling of being approached personally and being personally 
engaged may play an important role by activating resources that could be decisive on 
Election Day. 
3.1.3. Increasing volatility of voters / Late deciding voters 
Recent federal elections in Germany have shown comparably large differences between 
results projected by polling institutions and actual election results. While one can draw the 
conclusion that polling institutions simply failed in providing an accurate picture, another 
explanation seems to be more likely: At the time of the poll, respondents simply have not 
made up their minds. This hypothesis underlines the fact that the share of late deciding 
voters consistently increases. Even “polls a few days before the election often deviate from 
the final result. Most important reasons are the voters’ late readiness to decide and the 
decreasing turnout.”160  
McAllister sums up that "this new phenomenon of the late deciding voter is often traced 
to partisan dealignment; with fewer voters possessing affective loyalties to the major 
parties, they enter the election campaign undecided about their vote and therefore more 
susceptible to the issues, appeals and themes which emerge during the course of the 
campaign."161 
For campaign management, this leads to an important conclusion: There is an increasingly 
large share of voters still reachable during the run of a campaign. Hence, an increasingly 
large number of voters are still available to be politically influenced by a well-run campaign.  
3.1.4. Decreasing party identification 
During the first decades of the 20th century, voting decisions of large parts of the electorate 
were literally pre-determined. Unlike today, it was not only clear to voters to cast their 
ballots in an election, they often voted for the same party during their entire life according 
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to their social class. Working class people, for instance, had a tendency to vote in favor of 
the social democrats.  This was due to a strong identification with a certain party. Already 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld and the ‘Michigan School’ considered party identification as a “powerful 
explanatory factor of electoral choice.”162 
Today, German parties are faced with an increasing number of swing and non-voters. While 
some are neither party members, nor core voters, “many do not want to be voters at all.”163 
There are a few explanations for this development. Some scholars argue that "party politics 
are important, but there are other forces: ideology, personal finance, imagery, a sense of 
identity, and so forth."164 While this argument seems logical, one can ask what has brought 
the change to party identification over time. Have the above-mentioned factors not played 
a role 50 years ago? While this explanation seems to be unlikely, it is more sensible that 
parties themselves were largely responsible for the decline in party identification: “There 
are factors that encourage change as well as restrictions. As cause for the failure of 
changes, crises and party affairs [CDU] as well as intra-party conflicts may be named. 
Hence, internal conflicts between ideological wings, unfavorable personnel situations and 
sometimes also detrimental communication cultures hinder the development and 
implementation of organizational, content-related as well as communicative strategies for 
further development of the party.”165 It seems that this explanation provides an 
inconvenient truth for parties. Rather than blaming sociocultural developments, parties 
themselves play a major role in the decrease of party identification. Rather than tackling 
this issue with determination, parties seem to ignore it. According to Michael Spreng the 
reason is that “parties would promptly come to the conclusion that the shortage of 
democracy within the party is a central cause for lack of engagement for democracy.”166 
Rather than dealing with this conclusion, there is a tendency to hide the current legitimacy 
crisis. Spreng further reminds parties that “turnout is a result of political participation. A 
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result of the chance to participate outside of established party structures rather than just 
casting a vote every four or five years.”167 Scholars agree that parties have not yet reacted 
appropriately to counter the crisis in party identification. Schöneborn draws a comparison 
to business and economics describing this crisis as market failure in which provided supply 
(of political offerings) is not as demanded anymore as in the past.168 
For campaign management this leads to two important conclusions:  
- There is a growing share of the electorate that can potentially be influenced in their 
voting decision by a campaign.  
- Parties have to make more effort to convince people to vote than in the past. 
The swing vote that was defined in chapter 2.2.5 has been growing. "Party identification 
has a sheltering effect, meaning that it protects citizens from the influence of the campaign. 
This is not to say that party identifiers will not pay any attention to the campaign, but that 
their party identification will strongly bias the way they process new information."169 Since 
swing and non-voters are the main targets of campaigns, there is a direct effect of 
decreasing party identification on relevance of campaigns for election success. At the same 
time, campaigns face the challenge that due to “increasing unemployment, small and large 
scandals, resignings, the ghost of radical right-wing groups, new bourgeois protest parties 
[…] election campaigns are advertising campaigns in a sector with a horrific image.”170 
3.2. Contemporary campaign management 
Campaigning has reached a remarkable level of professionalism. Contemporary campaigns 
are largely organized similarly to private business entities. Outsourcing and modularization 
of tasks into processes are just two characteristics. "The professionalization of political 
campaigns stems partly from the efficiency of well-executed modularization."171 There is 
an increasing awareness that well-organized campaigns are a key element for success. In 
the 2013 SPD election campaign this became particularly visible when it became known to 
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the media that “topic in the hallways of Willy-Brandt-Building is not success chances of the 
candidates, but the deficiencies of single campaign members.”172 There had been great 
confusion regarding competences as well as internal “trench warfare” 173. 
Sticking to this martial wording, "for a political strategist, campaigns are civilized warfare, 
a form of single combat."174 Scholars suggest that campaigns need congruent management 
that is able to react quickly to unexpected situations. "While the strategic goal of 
professional campaigning remains the same as it ever was - finding enough votes to win an 
election - the tools of the trade have undergone, and continue to undergo, a permanent 
technological revolution."175 In the following, contemporary campaign management is 
analyzed and described. Data therefore stems from both, secondary sources as well as from 
interviews with distinguished campaigning experts.  
3.2.1. Party Organization 
Before campaign management is examined, it is important to define influential factors on 
management decisions. In this regard, the most interesting question to ask is “how large is 
the influence of party organizations to management decisions in campaigns?” The term 
‘party organization’ refers to permanent party committees and institutions that have a 
saying in basic political decision-making. Other than in the United States, even party leaders 
are very loyal to party organizations. “Under American circumstances, talented younger 
German politicians such as Andrea Nahles or Sigmar Gabriel, but also popular mayors like 
Petra Roth in Frankfurt or Christian Ude in Munich would have challenged party 
establishment long ago.”176 The extent to which party organization plays a role for the 
campaign can be illustrated in the process of how an election manifesto is being developed 
and what function it serves. Such manifestos are being developed and adopted by party 
conventions. Unlike one might assume this is not a pseudo-democratic process. Rather they  
are actual discussions and debates on content. This leads to the fact that electoral 
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manifestos have an internally integrating function that both serves as a tool for 
mobilization and to discipline the respective party wings. The external advertising effect 
should not be overestimated.  
In Germany, campaign leaders have an important hinge function between campaign 
organization and party organization. On behalf of leading party committees, they steer the 
campaign. Hence, party leaders as well as external consultants or researchers are often 
represented in campaign management functions. This applies to both, leading functions as 
well as responsibilities aspects of the campaign. Although some scholars argue that “by 
now, influence of party committees on real decisions in the framework of campaign 
planning and implementation can be considered as low” 177, there are still strong indicators 
that party organization indeed does have strong influence on how a campaign is run. "If 
you have to rely on the support of the party, which is more than likely, you'll need to be 
diplomatic. Sit down with party leaders and get a complete understanding of their wishes 
and strategies as they pertain to your campaign"178 
3.2.2. Campaigning as a management task 
Most of the available research analyzes campaigns from a political point of view. It 
elaborates on its function for democracy and sheds light on campaign-voter 
communications. As described above, this work applies a different view. “A relatively new 
branch in Germany is functional campaign research that covers organizational, technical 
and communicative aspects from the viewpoint of acting players. For them, campaigning is 
a modern management task like everything else that has to be handled in order to reach 
the best possible result.”179 Regarding campaigning as a management task is the basic 
rationale of this work. Well-respected campaign managers such as Peter Radunski have 
advocated this on a number of occasions.180 American campaign expert Joe Napolitan 
realizes that "If your candidate wins, it's because of his charm, appeal and powers of 
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persuasion; if he loses, it's your fault."181 In the end, even top-notch politicians admit that 
a well-organized campaign was crucial for their success: "Incumbents tell us they would not 
have been elected if their past campaigns were not correctly run."182 
When regarding contemporary campaign management as a regular management task, it 
becomes obvious that many conclusions can be drawn from management of private 
corporations. "Because political campaigns share many of the same day-to-day processes 
as corporations, we can learn from corporate experience. Both campaigns and corporations 
have a specific goal - to elect a candidate or increase profit. They have an operating 
structure focused by a leader - campaign manager or president or CEO. Both campaigns 
and corporations raise money. They mobilize staff and other stakeholders to accomplish 
specific objectives. Both need to reach a targeted public audience, using the media and 
events to demonstrate credibility and increase brand awareness."183 
There is no such this as a blue print for campaign organization. Every campaign is to some 
extent unique (how unique it is will be elaborated at a later stage). "The contours of a 
campaign plan will vary from candidate to candidate, campaign to campaign, and 
consultant to consultant184. For a limited amount of time, the campaign takes over both, 
coordination and steering of political messages.185 For campaign managers this implies that 
they have to manage a team that includes a variety of experts: from fundraisers to 
communication experts, from pollsters to district managers.  
Just as in private businesses, this is impossible to fulfill without a profound strategy. 
"Strategy is the single most important factor in a political campaign […]. Even a brilliant 
campaign is likely to fail if the strategy is wrong. The strategy must be adapted to fit the 
campaign; you cannot adapt the campaign to fit the strategy."186 The strategy further needs 
to comply with the fact financial as well as human resources are limited (just as in private 
corporations). Therefore, "political support must be nurtured, identified, recruited and 
activated. Limited capital must be optimized. Ad hoc assemblages of human resources, 
often under the most chaotic and emotionally charged conditions must be managed."187 
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Depending on the size, amount of supporters and available resources, parties have to adapt 
their strategy to the circumstances. "Campaigns with money to spare might pay attention 
to coverage, while those that are short on funds might decide to go with efficiency."188  
3.2.3. Organizational management 
Organization is a crucial element of successful campaigns. Although there is a permanent 
party organization, campaigns place considerable demands on the respective organization. 
“A campaign is that period in the permanent competition of parties in which parties make 
additional organizational and content-related efforts to gain votes.”189  
To manage organizations, leadership skills are a basic prerequisite. But what is the 
appropriate leadership style for campaigns? Due to immense time pressure and the 
necessity to react quickly to unforeseen events, scholars agree that authoritarian 
leadership styles are more appropriate than laissez-faire styles. Often parallels to military 
organizations are drawn. "Napoleon believed that there is nothing more important than 
unity of command. Campaigns should be run by dictatorships, not committees. Time is 
everything, and decision-making moves much too quickly for you to sit around and get 
everybody's input. Few statues were ever built to honor a committee."190 This implies that 
successful contemporary campaigns require tight organization, stringent concepts and 
strong leadership skills. "Campaigns are crazy enough as it is. Vague job descriptions not 
only waste time and resources, they spur turf warfare. You are much better off if your 
staff's competitive juices are being directed toward the opposing campaign rather than 
each other."191 An important element to achieve this is a clear and thought out campaign 
plan that describes what is to be done by whom and what instruments need to be used. 
"Election and referendum campaigns can be seen as complex processes of purposive 
political communication that are essentially 'top down', originating from campaign 
organizations like parties, candidate's support organizations, government institutions or 
interest groups, and aimed at the mass public in its entirety or at specific 'target' 
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segments."192 Nevertheless, even leadership requirements in campaign organization have 
undergone a process of evolution. With increased involvement of external actors and an 
increasing degree of professionalism, top-down structures have become increasingly 
important. "Studies of developments in political campaigning over the last two decades 
note marked changes in the way that elections are managed. It appears now to be the 
normative view that campaigns are highly strategic and coordinated affairs under the 
control of small cadres at the top of party structures. These campaign teams will rely 
heavily on the advice of consultants, often from the commercial sector, who will be 
embedded within the coordinating body."193 However, clear organizational structure and 
authoritarian leadership styles must not undermine the development of a sense of team 
spirit in the team. Efficiency and capabilities to react quickly can only be assured if the 
individual parts of the team mesh together. "For a campaign to function at an optimal level, 
the staff must work as a team. Staff meetings not only allow you to exchange information, 
but reinforce the cooperative aspect of the campaign."194 
Another important aspect is whether or not a campaign is centralized or decentralized. 
While authoritarian leadership style initially suggests a rather centralized approach, the 
sheer size of electoral territory in national elections provides a solid argument for 
decentralized organization. At the same time, however, control is an important aspect in 
providing the electorate with clear and coordinated messages. Therefore, centralization 
seems to be more appropriate when there are strong local constituencies. “Centralization 
of campaigning is perhaps appropriate for political systems where there is little link 
between voting and local representation. Under proportional representation votes are cast 
solely to gain representation within national political legislatures."195 However, given the 
above-described tendency towards more professionalization, "it is difficult to contest the 
accuracy of claims that campaigning has become centralized and a more professional 
affair."196  
One of the characteristics of increased professionalism is the rise of ‘war rooms’. Those 
represent a centralized campaign quarter which purpose is to react quickly to unforeseen 
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situations. The fact that “large campaign organizations need a ‘war room’ as strategic 
center is considered an unshakable lesson of the 1990’s. Unfortunately also the 
misunderstanding is spreading that an external headquarter, hence separate from party 
headquarters, is absolutely necessary.” 197 
In conclusion, it is necessary to adapt management style as well as organization to the 
actual circumstances of the campaign. In cases where local constituencies are rather weak 
or less decisive due to smaller electoral areas, centralized campaign management seems 
to be more sensible.  
3.2.4. Managing business processes  
The basic assumption of this study is that management processes in campaign organization 
can be defined and described as business processes just as in private business entities. 
When describing a campaign as a set of processes that go hand in hand, it is necessary to 
define what is meant with the term ‘business process’. A business process describes a set 
of structured tasks that produces a particular product or service for the consumer or 
customer. As early as in the 1780’s, Adam Smith elaborated on business processes in his 
famous pin factory example.  Being an important element of the ‘division of labor” concept, 
a business process “characterizes a logically structured series of activities, respectively sub-
processes that characterize the business of an enterprise. They serve the purpose to 
provide the customer with more or less clearly defined output (performance) made from a 
specific input und ultimately aim at the implementation of business goals and protection 
of business success. This means that business processes create costs and take time.”198 
When defining the work of a campaign as a set of business processes, it means that a 
campaign consists of many small modules that need to be managed. "Contemporary 
campaigns are built by adapting pretested components to the particular needs of different 
localities, candidacies, and constituencies."199 This leads to two important consequences:  
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(1) Although campaigns need a certain degree of individual approach, some processes can 
be found in any campaign. "Campaign consultants formulate a basic strategy and then 
mix and match preexisting slogans, color schemes, policy stands, and media strategies 
to suit a range of clients. Campaigns, in this sense, are neither handcrafted, as in the 
days of retail campaigning, nor mass-produced."200 
(2) Campaign managers can define which processes should be defined as core processes 
and which as support processes. Not only can a hierarchy and thus a ranking order of 
priorities be defined, but campaign managers can easily decide to outsource certain 
processes. 
According to business processes, roles and responsibilities in a campaign are defined with 
the campaign manager being the supervisor and strategist.  
3.2.5. Campaign manager 
While the candidate is the focus of media attention and naturally the most important 
person in a campaign for the electorate, campaign managers are the most decisive staff 
members for the campaign itself. The campaign manager is “the person who runs the entire 
campaign operation, implements strategy, oversees staff, coordinates consultants."201  
There is no doubt that wishes and convictions of the candidates need to be represented in 
the campaign. However, during campaigns, candidates are driven by their extremely tight 
schedules. They simply do not have the time to take care of everyday business or to develop 
long-term strategies. Campaign managers take this role. Scholars as well as practitioners 
agree “the ultimate responsibility for making campaign decisions should rest with the 
campaign manager."202  
There is no such thing as a job description for campaign managers. Nevertheless, Peter 
Radunski, who is probably Germany’s most experienced campaigning expert, defines a set 
of competences that should be given to the campaign manager203: 
 Direct access to the candidate and party leaders 
 Membership/participation in all committees and meetings relevant for the campaign 
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 Budgetary sovereignty  
 Authority on the definition of the campaign schedule 
 Sovereignty over campaigning measures 
The campaign manager serves as team leader and chief strategist. "A strong manager 
makes a consultant's life easier by reducing internal problems that may have needed their 
attention. Managers should also work to make sure the consultants are meeting their goals 
on time and within the established budget."204 Further, the campaign manager should 
always know where every campaign staffer can be reached in case of an unexpected event. 
The manager should have clear competences and be superior to specialized consultants. 
"Managing a campaign means managing the consultants. Manage your consultants - or else 
they will manage you."205 
This leads to the question of what personal competences and characters campaign 
managers need to have?  
Peter Radunski adds to a set of competences he declares as indispensable for a successful 
manager206: 
 Knowledge about party history, program and policies  
 Political conviction 
 Knowledge about internal organization and decision making processes 
 Knowledge about communications channels to the voters 
 Willingness to work together with PR agencies. 
Campaign managers should therefore have a strong character with in-depth knowledge of 
the party and a political sense. Further, "managers need to sacrifice their own aspirations 
or popularity in order to take difficult actions, for example, challenging debate sponsors 
over a proposed format."207 Since the campaign manager is surrounded by staff that 
consists of experts in their respective field, he/she must be willing to accept that his/her 
employees have an advantage of knowledge in their specialist area. The professional 
background of campaign managers can vary. "Campaign managers usually come in one of 
three types: (a) professionals who go from one election to another, (b) amateurs who are 
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so good at it that they become professionals and (c) amateurs who have other careers and 
take on the job to help a friend or to further a cause."208 Largely this depends on the 
financial background of the campaign. "The independent professionals who have become 
the core of the campaign team expect direct payment for their labors."209 Although 
financial resources are also 
limited in campaigns on the 
national level, having 
amateur campaign 
managers would be a 
remarkable exception. The 
trend of professionalism has reached campaigns to an extent that they are either staffed 
with competent party members or with outside professionals. 
3.2.6. Campaign Staff 
There is no such thing as a blue print to show how staffing should look. It varies from 
campaign to campaign. Nevertheless, there are roles that are somehow represented in the 
vast majority of campaign organizations. Those will be outlined in the following. Managing 
human resources is a core competence of any campaign manager. "If you don't have 
control of the checkbook, you aren't really the manager. Your job is to work with your 
candidate and consultants to make choices where to allocate precious resources, whether 
time or money."210 Just like in private enterprises, resources are limited. This applies to 
human just as to financial resources. Therefore, it is of utmost important to fill decisive 
positions with appropriate persons and to stay flexible. "Forget about recruiting the 
'perfect' staff. Organize staffing by tasks and function. Even if you have it in July, it won't 
be there in October. Some will quit for better paying jobs or to spend more time with their 
families. Some will jump to other campaigns. Others won't work out."211 However, scholars 
underline that if there was one field where money should be spent, it is experienced and 
competent campaign staff. "Although all campaigns must be conscious of costs, price 
shouldn't dictate which consultant or vendor is chosen. Campaigns need to look for value, 
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not price"212 Regardless of what function an employee serves, a core competence is to have 
a sense for political developments. Therefore, staffing a campaign with proven experts in 
their relevant field, but who do not have a political background is a risk that is not worth 
taking. "It's better to hire a media consultant with a strong political background. But if one 
is not available or affordable, and if you're forced to rely on people with campaign 
experience, make sure someone with a political background - such as a general consultant, 
pollster or campaign manager - supervises the ad production and directs concept, message 
and the writing of copy."213 Specialization of staff and, hence, opinions of staff members is 
a valuable good that should not be underestimated. Consultants are a campaign manager’s 
most valuable resource, whether they come from inside or outside. They offer experience 
that campaign managers themselves might not have.  
Generally, staff can be divided into three categories: Internal experts, external experts and 
individuals who come from the closer surroundings of the candidate. "Every candidate has 
a circle of close friends whom he or she has known for years and whose opinions he 
respects. These people are trusted confidantes and have only the candidate's best interests 
at heart."214 They might be experts in certain fields or have a particular sense for the 
candidate’s personality, respectively political developments.  
Finance director 
There is no such thing as a free lunch. No matter whether a campaign organization solely 
consists of non-paid volunteers or of much-praised professionals, there are costs that need 
to be covered and finances that need to be managed. Without financial resources, there is 
no campaign. It is as simple as this. Therefore, "the finance director is the most important 
person in any campaign, other than the candidate and the campaign manager. If the 
director fails to raise the necessary funds, the campaign will falter."215 When recruiting 
staff, campaign managers therefore need to clearly define who will be responsible for 
finance. In large organizations, this is a full-time job. However, in smaller races campaign 
managers might as well take over the role of the finance director, holding everything in 
their hands that is of managerial importance.  
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Consultants 
Consultants to the campaign can either be actual members of the campaign organization 
or could be hired externally. "Though capabilities vary, most good consultants provide 
strategy advice as well as produce and place ads. Some are highly experienced in politics 
and will assume the role of chief strategist."216 The question whether campaigns are 
actually willing to employ external consultants in matters of strategy will be analyzed at a 
later stage of the study. Some parties are in the position to have experienced staff that 
have taken part in many campaigns over a long period of time. Experienced personnel 
might as well serve as consultants at a later stage of their career. A prominent example of 
this model would be Peter Radunski, who served as campaign manager for many years and 
now works as a private consultant. In addition, other fields of specialized consultants 
include fundraising, direct mail, telephone contact, web sites and database management".  
Media Consultants 
Media consultants are important specialists who have become increasingly significant for 
the success of a campaign. Depending on campaign budget, media consultants either stick 
to their defined role or additionally assume a strategy function. Michael Spreng in the 2002 
CDU campaign was an important consultant to candidate Edmund Stoiber. Despite his 
media background he did not only serve as a media consultant. Rather he was also tasked 
with overall strategic questions and served as a main advisor to the campaign. 
Media consultants are a rather new phenomenon that is closely linked to the rise of media 
democracy.  "In the early 1990s, few political professionals had heard of the Internet, but 
in the new millennium a strong presence on the World Wide Web is considered 
essential."217 Hence, job descriptions in campaign organizations have evolved. Today, 
media consultants are a central element of a campaign. Their main task is to “maximize the 
number of times that eligible voters can be reached with a campaign pitch, either through 
paid advertising or through news coverage."218 In close cooperation with campaign 
managers and general strategy consultants they develop campaign messages and ensure 
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their distribution. Media consultants may either have a party background or come from 
external sources, mainly from PR agencies. 
As described above, political experience is a core competence for campaign staff. This does 
not apply only to general consultants, but also to personnel tasked with media issues. 
"Media consultants with limited political experience - such as a local advertising or PR 
agency that makes ads primarily for grocery stores and car dealers - should be limited to 
technical or creative tasks such as designing logos and sign, taping and editing TV spots, 
etc."219 Preferred media consultant staff is therefore a senior member of a PR agency with 
good reputation who is either a member of the party he/she is willing to work for or already 
has experience in past campaigns.  
Spin Doctors 
Being a rather new phenomenon, there is an urgent need to define this function. “Spin 
Doctor is a term difficult to translate that did not appear in dictionaries of the 1970’s. It is 
meant to be a kind of witch doctor of campaigning, a miracle healer who brews the 
appropriate magic potion at the right time to even lead ‘underdogs’ to victory.”220 Hence, 
Spin Doctors interpret particular developments or events in a way for the public that is 
most helpful for the party to reach the goal of a successful campaign. In Germany, Peter 
Radunski can be considered as one of the first spin doctors in the 1980’s. The first time a 
spin doctor gained public attention was in 1997, when Peter Mandelson was responsible 
for Tony Blair’s campaign in the UK and for the transition of his party to “New Labour”. This 
was picked up by German Social Democrats who introduced Bodo Hombach as Spin Doctor 
for Gerhard Schröder’s campaign. Some scholars argue that “the great years of Spin 
Doctors are over. Self-staging, always a considerable part of their professional 
performance, doesn’t work in the media anymore.” 221 Nevertheless, Spin Doctors still are 
needed not only for public interpretation, but also to quickly find common speech in all 
party constituencies. “As long  as polling institutes ‘only’ present forecasts or first 
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projections, the time frame for adventurous interpretation is still open since one can 
always refer to the provisional nature of the results. Naturally, this ‘spin’ is coordinated 
internally in a party – particularly in state elections it is striking how identical wording in 
state parliaments and Berlin is.” 222 
Polling & Research 
Polling is a task seldomly performed by internal campaign members. Generally, it is 
performed by polling institutes that have long history and experience in their field. Polling 
is considered key when it comes to development of strategies. “I would not underestimate 
the strategic handling of polling results as a central instrument of campaigning, particularly 
when both coalition formations that are up for elections do not have a prospect of reaching 
the majority.”223 Polling experts and researchers who either further analyze the behavior 
of voters or perform background searches on relevant issues are staff that can be found in 
almost every campaign organization. 
"Voters clearly respond to targeted, precise information, effectively delivered by either the 
press or the candidates. Today's realities leave little room for error in a candidate's 
organization and presentation."224 Despite the fact that some scholars point out that 
polling has become less important to the increase of late deciding voters225, outcomes of 
polls and research still represent an important basis for every campaign. Data is gathered 
that needs to be managed. "Database management - if the campaign is large enough, you 
may need full-time staff to handle this function. If not, a part-time paid or volunteer 
consultant will do."226 Ultimately it depends on the parameters of the campaign whether 
this task is performed internally or externally, with professionals or with volunteers. 
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Communications 
Communications directors have a three-way function: "they staff and oversee […] the 
entire press / media / advertising operation and its coordination"227 in close cooperation 
with media consultants and the spin doctor. They need to ensure that internal 
communication is working and they have supervised communications that is performed by 
the candidate. "Some campaigns also make the mistake of failing to stay in contact with 
volunteers throughout the campaign cycle. While some campaigns continuously update 
their volunteers on activities and seek their assistance, far too many only call the volunteers 
at the last minute, when they are in pinch."228 It is a matter of efficiency. If communications 
directors do well in their job to shorten the distances with a campaign, the entire 
organization is able to move faster and quicker to unforeseen events. Candidates are in 
need of professional communications. "Media training political candidates has become an 
increasingly popular product for public relations companies and independent 
consultants."229 In times of fast-spreading news and when there is no day during a 
campaign the candidate is not seen on television this is an important aspect. So is the fact 
that candidates are extremely busy and rush from one appointment to the other. 
Therefore, communications with the candidate is a basic prerequisite for successful 
campaigns. “This rule seems obvious but too often candidate and campaign manager are 
too busy to proactively schedule time when problems can be discussed and decisions 
made."230 Particularly in large organizations great attention needs to be brought to this 
issue.  
Volunteers 
For many decades, volunteers have served as the backbone of campaigns. "Historically, 
campaigns were run by armies of volunteers made up of family, friends, and party activists 
who used such time-honored tactics as neighborhood canvassing and street corner 
pamphleteering."231 Some volunteers were strong and loyal party supporters, others family 
members of candidates. 
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Volunteers are important to campaigns for a number of reasons. The first aspect is that 
they are a comparably cheap resource. "Volunteers are a pain in the neck. But, like getting 
out of bed in the morning, they are an essential pain in the neck. First of all, despite their 
deficiencies, they do some work and they do it for free. Effective use of volunteers can 
reduce a campaign's payroll by 20 percent."232 Particularly when a campaign has limited 
financial resources or is running low on funds, volunteer operations may be a key element 
in campaign strategy.  
Volunteers are most relevant for local campaigning. While professional campaign 
managers define the overall strategy, it would be almost impossible to cover all regions and 
villages in a national election without an army of volunteer supporters. "Local voluntary 
activists canvass the neighborhood and seek face-to-face discussions with their fellow 
citizens at street stands. They are also a human resource important for organizing the local 
rallies for candidates and party leaders."233 In this regard, volunteers serve as multipliers. 
A significant number of enthusiastic volunteers suggest that there is a strong emotional 
support for the respective party or candidate. This may lead to additional volunteers joining 
the campaign and further increased support. “Volunteers suggest to voters that the 
candidate is worthy of commitment. Volunteers, in other words, not only help deliver 
messages to voters - by licking envelopes, writing notes or telephoning friends - they are 
messages in themselves."234 However, it is clear that a campaign cannot solely rely on 
volunteers. They are a precious resource, but they need to be motivated and guided. 
Generally, there are two kinds of motivations behind voluntary engagement: (a) belief in 
the cause or (b) expectation of a benefit. Despite all changes in campaigns over time, 
Cicero’s observation is still valid: "They will only support you if they believe they have 
something to gain. If so, they will miss no chance to help you."235 For some supporters, this 
might be a potential job after a successful election, others solely expect benefits due to 
new policies according to the respective party program. Regardless of what the basic 
motivation is, all practitioners and scholars agree that conviction and enthusiasm are 
important factors in keeping voluntary staff motivated. “Convinced party supporters 
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continue to be the decisive factor in interpersonal communications and the decisive 
addition to mass communications, because they perform the actual persuasive work.”236 
They are the ones who talk to large parts of the electorate on the street and who have to 
argue in favor of their respective party. Current poll results may also play a role in how 
motivated voluntary staff is. "The supporters whose candidate is perceived as behind are 
motivated to work harder, while those of the candidate seen to be ahead tend to become 
overconfident and lazy."237  
Enthusiasm and motivation alone do not automatically lead to an efficient and effective 
army of volunteers. There are also certain experiences that volunteers should have in order 
to be of real help to the campaign. "A persistent problem for political professionals is the 
impassioned amateur - the person with enthusiasm but little experience - who does not 
have the knowledge to put the campaign in perspective."238 This does not necessarily mean 
that volunteers need specialized skills. For those tasks there are the above-mentioned 
specialists. Rather, general social communicative and persuasive skills are helpful. "Because 
so many people these days are competent on PCs, it feels logical to do it themselves rather 
than to pay a vendor. But just because a person writes letters doesn't mean he can also 
write a novel. Just because a person is competent with a video camera doesn't mean he 
should be making the campaign commercials."239 A campaign therefore may not solely 
consist of volunteers. Specialized professionals are essential. But volunteers represent the 
foot soldiers of a campaign. They “are absolutely essential and can take on a lot of 
responsibility in a campaign, but they don't substitute for professionally designed mail and 
other services you need."240 
Ideally, there are a significant number of volunteers supporting a campaign. Volunteers are 
usually spread over the whole election area. There is an urgent need in communicating 
with them and coordinating their activities. For this purpose, particularly larger campaign 
require "volunteer program coordinators” - staffers paid or unpaid who organize door-to-
door canvassing, phones, voter registration, absentee ballots, early voting efforts, postcard 
                                                     
236 Radunski, Wahlkämpfe, 128 [Original wording: "Eine überzeugte Parteien-Anhängerschaft ist nach wie vor der 
entscheidende Faktor in der interpersonalen Kommunikation und die entscheidende Ergänzung zur 
Massenkommunikation, weil sie erst die eigentliche Überzeugungsarbeit leistet."] 
237 Napolitan, ‘Napolitan's Rules’, 26 
238 Napolitan, ‘Napolitan's Rules’, 49 
239 Blaemire, ‘Database Management’, 142 
240 LeMieux, ‘The Common Mistakes Novice Candidates Make’, 465 
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and letter writing, coffee parties, signs, rallies, get-out-the-vote operations, poll workers 
and Election Day legal teams."241 Some even argue that volunteer coordinators should 
belong to the core staff of a campaign, serving as the single point of contact. Not only is it 
the task of the volunteer coordinator to communicate with supporters and to mediate in 
case of quarrels, it is also their job to keep them busy and motivated. "To truly have an 
effective corps of volunteers, campaigns need to keep their volunteers engaged, or they 
will wither and die on the vine. It's far easier to maintain a volunteer base than it is to 
reactivate or re-create one from scratch."242 In conclusion, it can be said that volunteers 
represent both, a major challenge and an important support factor to the campaign. For 
campaign management it means that one has to differentiate between a core staff of 
specialists that is in the close surroundings of the campaign managers and a wider array of 
volunteer supporters who are likely to never be in personal touch with the campaign 
management.  
3.2.7. Challenges & Conclusion 
Campaigns are unusual times for parties. Relatively slim party organizations need to be 
temporarily enlarged to meet the demands of running a contemporary campaign. “The 
‘fight’ before an election is fought on short-term with a high degree of financial as well as 
human resources in order to then release voters to the everyday life that is characterized 
by a minimum of attention coming from political actors and their persons in charge of 
marketing quickly after the election.” 243 Hence, campaigns temporarily change 
organizational structures as well as decision-making processes of parties. Formerly simple 
questions become difficult and complex, and lobbying groups attempt to exert increased 
influence on party policies. Kellermann von Schele outlines the most important challenges 
management is faced with during the run of a campaign244: 
 Realistic judgment of the situation (current situation and condition of the party) 
 Political strategy 
                                                     
241 Faucheux (2), ‘Writing your Campaign Plan’, 77 
242 Caroline, ‘Grassroots Politics’, 520 
243 Butter, Fuchs and Srnka, ‘Vom Wahlkampf- zum POLIT-Marketing’, 231 [Original wording: "Der 'Kampf' vor einer Wahl 
wird unter kurzfristig sehr hohem Aufwand an finanziellen und personellen Ressourcen geschlagen, um dann unmittelbar 
nach den Wahlen die Wähler wieder in den - durch ein Minimum an Aufmerksamkeit seitens der politischen Akteure und 
ihrer Marketingverantwortlichen gekennzeichneten - Alltag zu entlassen."] 
244 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 63 
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 Communications strategy 
 Effective campaign management 
 Professional usage of instruments and techniques 
 Coordination of party and candidate 
 Linking topics with persons 
 Monitoring and effective crisis management 
 Tactics, flexibility, ability to react 
Although staff in party headquarters and campaign staff have been increased during the 
run of a campaign, particularly in fields related to online communications, campaign 
managers must not aspire to reach all potential voters. “Resources are limited; there are 
never enough people to staff info booths or call numbers on phone lists, there is never 
enough money to place further ads on radio or newspapers”245  
For campaign managers this means that they have to cope with the challenge of very 
uncertain environments, scarcities of resources and staff that might possess very different 
levels of qualifications. The challenge is to find an organizational structure that fits to the 
campaign, to recruit core personnel with actual expertise in their respective field, manage 
and motivate volunteer supporters and find the right PR strategy and to find an external 
partner that fits to the circumstances. As described above, campaign tasks may be regarded 
as business processes. Without having to restructure the entire campaign, campaign 
managers therefore may easily decide, which processes they wish to be performed by 
internal staff members and which are given to external experts. The following chapter will 
therefore explore how outsourcing is performed in private business entities in order to 
draw a conclusion on what is sensible to be outsourced in campaigns.  
  
                                                     
245 Althaus, ‘Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf’, 127 [Original wording;  
"Ressourcen sind begrenzt; es gibt niemals genug Leute, die Infostände besetzen oder Telefonlisten abtelefonieren, es gibt 
niemals genug Geld, um weitere Radiospots oder Zeitungsanzeigen zu schalten."] 
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4. Outsourcing in Business 
After elaborating on political theory as well as on campaigning and campaign management, 
this chapter will introduce a business view on outsourcing. Before both fields (business and 
political science) are brought together, this chapter will analyze how outsourcing is 
performed in private enterprises. As described above, outsourcing is not a new 
phenomenon. It “has gained considerable management attention since the 1980s. 
Traditionally, many non-core information technology (IT) activities, such as desktop 
support, call centers, network operations, and application development have been 
relegated to external service vendors."246 This may be seen in the context of a trend to 
focus on processes that belong to the core business of an enterprise. This chapter will 
therefore outline what reasons there are to employ external sources and describe potential 
motives for outsourcing particular processes. “Single activities or production steps 
represent the basic elements of a process. Consequently, all products or services produced 
in a business that are composed of singular activities can be mapped in processes. A process 
is defined as a closed, and logical sequence of activities in terms of time and content that 
are triggered by an event and produce a defined work result from a defined input.” 247 
Chapter 4.2 will introduce a model that puts the different styles of outsourcing into context. 
In the following, the different steps of an outsourcing process will be described before 
focusing on the make-or-buy decision and what processes  potentially may be outsourced. 
Finally, risks and problems that may occur with outsourcing will be presented. 
4.1. Motives 
There are various motives that can lead to a make-or-buy decision in favor of ‘buy’. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the most common model is to outsource processes that do 
not belong to the core competences of the business. “The fundamental idea of 
performance-oriented motives is that the usage of an external service provider can lead to 
increases in performance since it has comprehensive know-how, qualified specialists and 
                                                     
246 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 180 
247 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 79 [Original wording: "Die einzelnen Aktivitäten oder 
Arbeitsschritte in einer Unternehmung bilden die Grundbestandteile eines Prozesses. Entsprechend lassen sich alle von 
einer Unternehmung erstellten Sach- oder Dienstleistungen, die sich aus einzelnen Aktivitäten zusammensetzen, in 
Prozessen abbilden. Ein Prozess ist als die inhaltlich abgeschlossene, zeitliche und sachlogische Abfolge von Tätigkeiten 
definiert, der durch ein Ereignis ausgelöst wird und aus einem definierten Input ein definiertes Arbeitsergebnis erzeugt."] 
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modern technology.”248 In the following, the most commonly known motives are 
described. Naturally, this is not a exhaustive list, but it does have the aspiration to cover 
those that also play an important role when it comes to outsourcing in campaign 
management. 
4.1.1. Cost savings 
Increased competition due to the continuous trend of globalization has led to the situation 
that the motive of cost savings nowadays is probably the most important one for the 
decision to outsource. Particularly in the 
long run, companies need to ensure that 
they keep their fixed costs at a low level 
in order to be profitable. One instrument 
to keep fixed costs at a lower level may 
be outsourcing. “Thereby the customers 
reduce their fixed costs, respectively 
transform them into variable costs.”249 
Financial costs as well as other 
opportunity costs need to be calculated 
carefully. Particularly, processes that are 
not needed at all times may be potential 
elements to be outsourced. This needs to 
be analyzed on a case-to-case basis and with a long-term perspective, since outsourcing 
often creates costs particularly at the beginning of a contract. “In the long run, despite 
initial investments (project planning, selection of provider, migration, staff reduction, etc.) 
and some higher operating costs (e.g. telecommunications, provider management, etc.) 
significant savings may be realized that considerably compensate such increases in 
costs.”250 This is particularly the case when outsourcing allows using the product or service 
                                                     
248 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 59 [Original wording: "Grundgedanke der 
leistungsorientieren Motive ist, dass die Inanspruchnahme eines externen Dienstleisters zu Leistungsverbesserungen 
führen kann, da dieser über umfassendes Know-how, qualifizierte Fachkräfte und moderne Technologien verfügt."] 
249 Siber and Bujak, ‘Business Process Outsourcing’, 187 [Original wording: "Dadurch verringern die Leistungsnehmer ihre 
fixen Kosten bzw. wandeln diese in variable Kosten um."] 
250 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 36 [Original wording: "Langfristig lassen sich trotz der Anfangsinvestitionen 
(Projektplanung, Provider-Auswahl, Migration, Personalabbau etc.) und einiger erhöhter Betriebskosten (z.B. 
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on an on-demand basis, allowing reducing costs to almost zero in times when there is no 
demand. It is important to note that “in the long-run, cost advantages can only be reached 
if the outsourcing provider offers structural advantages.”251 These may include lower factor 
costs such as labor, availability of more efficient technology or knowledge and, most 
importantly, economies of scale. 
"A supplier can lower costs if it can centralize the work of several companies to one 
location, or if it can use volume purchasing to buy materials or supplies."252 The service 
provider therefore can create cost savings by making use of economies of scale. Economies 
of scale occur when an increased output in a given period of time decreases the average 
cost per unit. “It is therefore a cost-reducing effect depending on volume.”253 Since the 
vendor normally only provides the service for itself and therefore only deals with 
comparably small numbers, it does not have the capability to create economies of scale 
itself. By contrast, the service provider serves a whole range of customers with the same 
product and is therefore able to produce significantly higher numbers in output. “The usage 
of economies of scale of the business process outsourcing provider is particularly visible in 
the composition of procurement volumes, enhanced utilization of IT-structures, choice of 
more capable suppliers and the better utilization of critical resources.”254 Globalization is 
an important factor that promotes cost savings through service providers. This is 
particularly the case when resources from low cost countries are used (see chapter 4.1.5). 
“The merging of markets allows producing business processes in off- and nearshore 
countries in order to reduce process costs or by using cheaper, fully available production 
factors to flexibly react to changes in quantities.”255 Therefore, outsourcing is regarded as 
an appropriate tool to lower costs and create more flexibility. As shown in graph 4.1, 
outsourced production leads to increased transaction costs due to fees and non-financial 
                                                     
Telekommunikation, Anbietermanagement etc.) erhebliche Einsparungen realisieren, die solche Kostenerhöhungen 
deutlich überkompensieren."] 
251 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 57 [Original wording:“ "Kostenvorteile können langfristig nur dann erreicht 
werden, wenn der Outsourcing-Anbieter strukturelle Vorteile bietet.“] 
252 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 39 
253 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 75 (Original wording: „Es handelt sich somit um eine        volumenabhängige Kostendegression."] 
254 Schewe and Kett, Business Process Outsourcing, 13 [Original wording: "Die Nutzung der Economies of Scale des BPO-Dienstleisters zeigt sich vor allem bei der Zusammenfassung von Beschaffungsvolumina, der verbesserten Auslastung der IT-Strukturen, der Wahl leistungsfähigerer Lieferanten sowie der besseren Auslastung kritischer Ressourcen."] 
255 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 87 [Original wording: "Das Zusammenwachsen der Märkte ermöglicht eine Geschäftsprozesserstellung in Off- und Nearshore-Ländern zur Reduktion der Prozesskosten oder durch Nutzung günstiger, umfassend zur Verfügung stehender Produktionsfaktoren zur flexiblen Reaktion auf Volumenänderungen."] 
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costs such as increased demand for communications. At the same time, however, it may 
considerably decrease production costs in comparison to in-house provision. 
4.1.2. Increase in Productivity 
Specialization has a positive impact on productivity. "As professionals hone their skills, they 
become more efficient."256 Therefore, outsourcing allows internal staff to focus on a set of 
few and clearly defined core competences, while other task are given to specialized 
contractors who are able to fulfill the same task in a shorter amount of time. This has two 
important consequences: time savings and, hence, again cost savings. For the outsourcing 
company, giving away particular processes leads to a smaller degree of complexity. The 
amount processes staying in-house is reduced. “A provider’s lead in know how may not 
only be limited to single temporary projects, but can also lead to increases in efficiency in 
day-to-day business.”257 In many cases, the decisions to outsource particular services are 
connected to larger restructuring programs in the organization that further increase 
productivity. “The background is that a business relieves itself through targeted 
outsourcing of certain activities that only represent fringe areas and do not belong to the 
core business of an organization. By doing so, a business is able to concentrate its resources 
and business activities on the remaining relevant areas in which it already possesses core 
competences or wants to build those up.”258 
4.1.3. Increase in Quality 
When a provider is specialized in a certain field, he is normally able to deploy more and 
better resources to the task than a business that has to cover a wide range of different 
processes. This may also have a positive impact on quality. “Transparency and consistence 
of processes represent a prerequisite to increase their quality. Relocating processes to a 
specialized outsourcing provider is connected to the expectation not only potential cost 
savings may be exploited and that focus can be set on core processes, but also to the 
                                                     
256 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 15 
257 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 85 [Original wording: "Ein Know-how-Vorsprung des 
Anbieters muss sich jedoch nicht nur auf einzelne zeitlich begrenzte Projekte beschränken, sondern kann auch im 
Tagesgeschäft zu Verbesserungen der Effizienz führen."] 
258 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 59 [Original wording: "Hintergrund ist, dass sich ein 
Unternehmen durch gezieltes Outsourcing von bestimmten Aktivitäten entlasten kann, die lediglich Randbereiche 
darstellen und nicht zum Kerngeschäft des Unternehmens gehören. Dadurch ist eine Unternehmung in der Lage, seine 
Ressourcen und unternehmerischen Aktivitäten auf die verbleibenden relevanten Bereiche zu konzentrieren, in denen es 
bereits Kernkompetenzen besitzt oder aufbauen möchte."] 
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expectation of a significant rise in quality of processes.”259 By outsourcing processes, 
businesses are able to make use of external know how of providers who are able to pool 
their competencies in order to reach a product of superior quality. “The increase in process 
quality can be reached through pooling processes from several businesses that are equal 
in terms of content and able to be standardized through the business process outsourcing 
provider.”260 Since providers deal with a significantly larger amount of similar processes 
that come from a variety of vendors, they are able to build up greater expertise and a 
steeper learning curve than the outsourcing organization for which the outsourced process 
is just one support process of many.   
4.1.4. Scarcity of Resources 
A rather obvious motivation for outsourcing is that the organization may not have enough 
qualified personnel to fulfill a certain task or it needs potential staff or other important 
functions. "A company may find that the skill set of its in-house staff is inadequate for a 
given function. [...] A company can solve this problem by handing over the function to an 
outsourcing supplier who specializes in that function and is highly competent in its 
administration, using well-trained and experienced staff and the most current procedures 
and technological advances."261 Buying the product or service from an outsourcing provider 
can be more cost effective than hiring needed additional staff. By engaging in a close 
cooperation with the service provider, the vendor is able to assess the resources, know-
how and experience of the provider. This might enable him to “secure a better competitive 
position than when providing the services in-house.”262 
4.1.5. Labor Arbitrage 
The term ‘arbitrage’ describes the use of differences in prices for the same product in 
different markets. By consuming a resource from a market in which the product is offered 
                                                     
259 Siber and Bujak, ‘Business Process Outsourcing’, 188 [Original wording: "Transparenz und Konsistenz der Prozesse bilden 
eine Voraussetzung , um die Qualität der Prozesse zu steigern. Die Auslagerung der Prozesse an einen spezialisierten 
Outsourcing-Anbieter ist mit der Erwartung verbunden, dass nicht nur die Ausschöpfung der Kostensenkungspotenziale 
und Fokussierung auf Kernkompetenzen erreicht werden, sondern auch die Qualität der Prozesse wesentlich erhöht 
wird." 
260 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 242 [Original wording: "Die Steigerung der 
Prozessqualität kann durch die Bündelung inhaltlich gleicher und standardisierbarer Prozesse von mehreren 
Unternehmen durch den BPO-Anbieter erreicht werden.“] 
261 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 37 
262 Streit, ‘Outsourcing’, 19 [Original wording: „ist das Unternehmen u.U. in der Lage, sich eine bessere Wettbewerbsposition 
zu sichern, als bei interner Leistungserbringung möglich wäre."] 
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at lower cost than in the home market, cost advantages can be reached while the same 
product is still consumed. “Labor Arbitrage effects occur when the structure of personnel 
costs of an IT service provider is lower than the personnel costs of the outsourcing business. 
This can result from simple differences in labor costs or from differences in the age 
pyramids.”263 Prerequisite for achieving labor arbitrage effects is that the outsourcing 
provider is able to use a different market than the vendor.  
4.2. Types of outsourcing 
As indicated in the research hypotheses in chapter 1.1, there are several forms of 
outsourcing. The most commonly known type is classic external outsourcing to an 
independent service provider. Nevertheless, this does not represent the only form of 
outsourcing. Processes may also be given to internal providers that act as a separate entity 
within the same organization. In the following, the most common types of outsourcing will 
be defined and described.  
4.2.1. Internal outsourcing 
As the name suggests, internal outsourcing is the relocation of processes to a provider that 
is part of the same 
organization. “In 
internal 
outsourcing, 
capital 
participation is 
agreed or a 
division of an 
enterprise is relocated as a separate subsidiary, respectively profit center. 264 In most cases, 
so-called shared service centers are created that provide the outsourced processes to 
several entities within the organization. “Through this centralization, economies of scales 
                                                     
263 Bugelnig, ‘Wirtschaftlichkeits- und Nutzenbetrachtung beim Outsourcing’, 36 [Original wording: "Labor-Arbitrage-Effekte 
entstehen dann, wenn die Personalkostenstruktur eines IT-Dienstleisters geringer ist als die Personalkosten des 
auslagernden Unternehmens. Diese können sich einfach aus Unterschieden in den Lohnkosten oder aus Unterschieden in 
der Alterspyramide ergeben."] 
264 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 156–7 [Original wording: "Beim internen Outsourcing 
hingegen wird eine Kapitalbeteiligung eingegangen, eine Kooperation vereinbart oder eine Abteilung des Unternehmens 
als eigene Tochtergesellschaft bzw. Profit Center ausgelagert."] 
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can steadily be achieved and processes within these centers generally are generally easier 
to be further professionalized and industrialized.” 265  
Prerequisite to attain advantages from this form of outsourcing is that several divisions 
within the company work separately on the same processes. By sourcing them out to an 
internal service provider, those services can be bundled, specialization can be developed 
and economies of scale can be reached. “Shared service centers bundle the competences 
as an internal service provider. They have to know the increasing expectations and 
requirements they are faced with and can derive targeted courses of actions.” 266 
4.2.2. External outsourcing 
The classic form of outsourcing is a relocation of processes to an external service provider. 
“In relocation or external outsourcing a partial or complete transfer of business functions 
to external, legally independent organizations takes place, on which no direct influence 
through capital links can be exerted.”267 Unlike the outsourcing business, the service 
provider has a core competence in the services it is supplying. “With giving up in-house 
production, a business gives up own competences and becomes dependent on the 
market.” 268  
Those skills are not only provided to one customer, but the same service is delivered to a 
whole range of outsourcing companies. External outsourcing providers are able to pool 
competences and create large economies of scale.  
                                                     
265 Wilken and Otto, ‘Sourcing als Grundlage der Transformation von Banken’, 33 [Original wording: "Durch diese 
Zentralisierung lassen sich regelmäßig Skaleneffekte realisieren sowie die Prozesse innerhalb dieses Centers in der Regel 
leichter weiter professionalisieren und industrialisieren."] 
266 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 51 [Original wording: "Shared Services bündeln die Kompetenzen als ein 
interner Leistungserbringer. Sie müssen die an sie gerichteten steigenden Anforderungen und Erwartungen kennen und 
gezielt neue Handlungsoptionen ableiten.“] 
267 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 12–3 [Original wording: "Bei der Auslagerung oder externem Outsourcing erfolgt 
eine partielle oder vollständige Übertragung von Unternehmensfunktionen auf externe, rechtlich eigenständige 
Unternehmen, auf welche keine direkte Einflussnahme durch eine kapitalmäßige Verflechtung ausgeübt werden kann. "] 
268 Streit, ‘Outsourcing’, 6 [Original wording: "Mit dem Verzicht auf die bis dahin erfolgte Eigenfertigung gibt das 
Unternehmen eigene Kompetenzen auf und begibt sich in die Abhängigkeit des Marktes."] 
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Global sourcing may be described as a sub-type of external outsourcing, therefore it is 
necessary to name this form separately. The reason for this is that global sourcing is one of 
the main reasons why outsourcing has a rather negative image among German workforces. 
Global sourcing 
describes 
outsourcing to an 
external provider 
which is using 
resources on a 
global market. 
Hence, global 
sourcing is often 
used to create 
larger labor arbitrage effects. This is possible by substituting high German labor costs by 
human resources from low cost countries such as India. Particularly in the segment of IT, 
global sourcing is a widely common phenomenon. There is a set of reasons in favor of global 
sourcing269: 
 Usage of advantages of world-wide division of labor 
 Usage of world-wide know-how 
 Usage of world-wide information sources and monitoring systems 
 Overcoming market entry barriers  
 Preparation for further globalization of products and the creation of foreign 
subsidiaries 
 Reduction of dependencies from single suppliers 
Global sourcing providers by definition need to be of a certain size. Being locally present 
in at least the core target markets is a prerequisite. 
 
 
 
                                                     
269 Bea and Haas, Strategisches Management, 516 
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4.2.3. Hybrid forms 
As alternatives to internal and external outsourcing, different hybrid forms can be named. 
Hybrid forms describe a relocation of processes to an external partner that still has strong 
ties to the outsourcing 
company. Those ties 
might either be in the 
form of capital 
investments or of 
personnel that have close 
connections to the 
vendor. This might be 
either because personnel were formerly employed by the vendor or because (and this is of 
particular interest for political parties) there are strong sympathies for them. “A range of 
cooperation strategies belong to hybrid forms, e.g. in which a service division is built up 
and operated jointly. Besides risk sharing, each of the involved partners brings their 
comparative advantages into the cooperation and allows reaching synergy effects.”270  
4.3. Make-or-buy decision 
The make-or-buy decision is the core step in an outsourcing project. It is the basic question 
every company needs to ask itself when it is considering outsourcing a particular process. 
The alternatives are simple: either a process stays in-house or it is given to an internal or 
external outsourcing provider. When attempting to answer the question, one important 
equation needs to be in everybody’s mind: “Only intelligent […] outsourcing promises 
benefits.”271 
There is a general agreement in literature that concentration on core competences leads 
to cost advantages and therefore to an improvement of competitive advantage. As a 
general rule, core competences should not be outsourced. "The corporate goals serve as a 
                                                     
270 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 13 [Original wording: "Zu den Mischformen gehört eine Vielzahl von 
Kooperationsstrategien, in denen bspw. eine Service-Einheit in gemeinsamer Regie zwischen Outsourcinggeber und -
nehmer aufgebaut und geführt wird. Neben Risk Sharing, bringt jeder der beteiligten Partner seine komparativen Vorteile 
in die Kooperation ein und ermöglicht somit die Erzielung von Synergieeffekten."] 
271 Gründer, ‘Erfolgreiches IT-Management - Strategisches Sourcing als Option’, 27 ["Vorteile bringt nur intelligentes [...] 
Outsourcing.”] 
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basis for determining project success. Core competencies, as a general rule should not be 
outsourced."272 
Houssem recommends that “projects build up on business processes, respectively 
activities, that are based on inimitable, not substitutable and that are benefit generating, 
respectively have synergetic relations 
to other in-house resources and to 
exclude them from offshoring 
considerations.”273 Therefore, the 
determination of core competences is 
a necessary element in order to 
answer the make-or-buy decision. 
Inimitability represents a strategic 
competitive advantage since it leads 
to an insufficiency of the market in 
favor of the possessing company and, hence, to a high surplus.274 A possible substitute has 
a significant negative impact on the strategic importance of the process. Therefore, the 
make-or-buy decision may not be seen as a single decision, but rather as part of the process 
that will be described in the following sub-chapter. 
4.4. Steps in outsourcings 
Outsourcing is not a technique which can be implemented from one day to another. Rather, 
it is a process involving several steps. Ideally, the process should consist of a series of five 
steps described in the following (see graph 4.5). 
4.4.1. Analysis of the status quo 
Analysis of the status quo or due diligence is the first step in the outsourcing process and 
represents the basis for anything that follows. “During the situation analysis the processes 
of the supply chain are examined in order to identify functions suitable for outsourcing. For 
                                                     
272 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 36 
273 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 106 ["empfiehlt es sich für Outsourcing- [...] Vorhaben, Geschäftsprozesse bzw. 
Aktivitäten, die auf unternehmensspezifischen, nicht imitierbaren, nicht-substituierbaren und nutzenstiftenden 
Ressourcen aufbauen bzw. eine synergetische Beziehung zu anderen In-house Ressourcen aufweisen, aus den 
Offshoring-Überlegungen auszuschließen."] 
274 Cf. Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 104 
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this purpose, every single step of the supply chain needs to be analyzed whether its 
provided service is eligible to be outsourced.”275 In particular, Hösel276 recommends 
devoting attention to the following areas: 
 Costs 
 Quantity 
 Quality 
 Capital requirements 
 Resources 
 Utilization 
 Organization 
 Scope 
Outsourcing should only be performed in areas in which the vendor does not have core 
competences and in which its performance is inferior to the one of potential service 
providers. The goal is to ensure that strategically important processes are not harmed and 
that key knowledge is kept. "Identify your company's core competences and determine its 
strategic objectives."277 In order to achieve this, for each process the necessary skills need 
to be defined and examined whether those skills are available in the organization or not. 
“A second step analyses whether those competences contribute to developing, 
respectively keep competitive advantages and therefore belong to the core 
competences."278. Another important aspect of due diligence is also to make processes 
transparent and measurable. It needs to be clearly defined what resources are needed for 
the respective process. Even in case the make-or-buy decision is answered in favor of 
‘make’, important information was gained from this step of the process. A positive side 
effect of due diligence is that internal provision of services is becoming transparent and 
measurable. “Services all of a sudden become plannable and steerable.” 279 
                                                     
275 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 157 [Original wording: "Bei der Ist-Analyse werden die 
Prozesse der Wertschöpfungskette im Unternehmen untersucht, um darauf aufbauend für das Outsourcing geeignete 
Funktionen zu identifizieren. Hierzu ist jede einzelne Stufe der Wertschöpfungskette daraufhin zu analysieren, ob die dort 
erbrachten Leistungen auslagerungsfähig sind."] 
276 Hösel, ‘Make or buy?’, 8 
277 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 33 
278 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 157 [Original wording: "So ist ein einem zweiten 
Schritt zu analysieren, ob diese Kompetenzen zum Aufbau bzw. Halten von Konkurrenzvorteilen beitragen und somit zu 
den Kernkompetenzen gehören."] 
279 Schewe and Kett, Business Process Outsourcing, 16 [Original wording: "Dienstleistung wird plötzlich plan- und steuerbar."] 
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4.4.2. Requirement profile and contacting 
After the status quo is analyzed and needs are defined, a requirement profile should be 
developed that clearly defines characteristics and qualities a potential service provider 
needs to have. Such a profile is not only needed in order ensure a high level of quality of a 
bought service, but also to ensure that the role and tasks of the provider are clearly cut. It 
also prevents misunderstandings between the vendor and the future provider. “The more 
complex a service is the more difficult is it to find a suitable partner.” 280 
Once a profile is developed, first contact to service providers is established. This is usually 
done with the use of a so-called “Request for Proposal” or RFP, in which providers are asked 
to submit their bids according to the specific requirements and necessary profile. 
4.4.3. Decision for service provider 
When all processes potentially available for outsourcing have been analyzed, those that 
are not directly connected with the core competences of the business are possibly eligible 
to be outsourced. The next step is the actual decision in favor or against outsourcing the 
process. Important factors in this consideration are not only purely financial costs, but also 
the impact on quality, quantity and efficiency needs to be regarded. A comprehensive cost-
benefit analysis needs to evaluate whether the expected benefit exceeds all transaction 
costs, both financial and non-financial. After all offers are scanned, a decision in favor of a 
particular service provider needs to be made. Important aspects therefore are mostly 
expected performance, availability, and costs of the provider. Simon recommends a 
scoring-system for a profound evaluation: “A scoring-process has proved to be helpful in 
the decision between different businesses in order to not only take quantitative (cost-) 
aspects but also quality of the service and criteria concerning the cooperation into 
consideration.”281 Since it takes considerable effort to dissolve an outsourcing relationship 
and even more to go back to in-house production, the decision is meant to be a long-term 
directive that marks the starting point of a close cooperation that requires trust on both 
sides. 
                                                     
280 Pätzold, ‘DIE LINKE wirkt, nicht nur politisch…’, 22 [Original wording: „Je komplexer die Dienstleistung, desto schwieriger 
ist es, den geeigneten Partner zu finden.“] 
281 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 159 [Original wording: "Bei der Entscheidung zwischen 
verschiedenen Unternehmen erweist sich ein Scoring-Verfahren als hilfreich, um neben quantitativen (Kosten-)Aspekten 
auch die Qualität der Leistung und der Zusammenarbeit betreffende Kriterien berücksichtigen zu können."] 
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4.4.4. Implementation  
The implementation phase marks the period in which outsourcing is actually performed. 
During this step, production of the outsourced service is being fully transferred to the 
service provider who from the point on delivers it according to the agreed conditions. 
During this phase “legal aspects play a role. This includes labor legislation schemes that 
need to be considered when laying off employees or in case of a relocation of employees 
to the service provider. Particularly in the field of outsourcing of data management, privacy 
considerations are of great significance.”282 Management of an outsourcing relation also 
requires resources. Manpower is needed in order to ensure that regular and quick 
communication channels are established and transaction costs occur due to increased need 
for exchange between the vendor and the service provider. Therefore, efficient 
management of the relation is a core element in order to keep costs at the lowest possible 
level. 
4.5. Elements to be outsourced 
As mentioned above, processes that do not belong to the core competences of a business 
are the ones that are most suitable to be outsourced. Popular outsourced processes include 
IT, legal affairs, vehicle fleet and catering. Outsourcing entire processes is also called 
‘business process outsourcing’ or BPO. "Recent years have seen burgeoning business 
process outsourcing (BPO), which involves farming out non-core yet mission-critical 
business processes such as finance and accounting, human resources, and customer 
support to third-party service providers, often in offshore location."283 In order to identify 
processes potentially suitable to be outsourced, it is sensible to distinguish between the 
following functions:  
 Leading functions 
 Specialized functions 
 Clerical functions 
                                                     
282 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 159 ["Darüber hinaus spielen spätestens in dieser 
Phase juristische Aspekte eine Rolle. Hierzu zählen beispielsweise arbeitsrechtliche Regelungen, die bei einer Freisetzung 
von Mitarbeitern oder im Fall einer Umsetzung von Arbeitnehmern in das ausgegliederte Unternehmen zu 
berücksichtigen sind. Insbesondere bei der Auslagerung der Datenverarbeitung sind darüber hinaus 
datenschutzrechtliche Gesichtspunkte von großer Bedeutung."] 
283 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 180 
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 Support functions 
Leading functions are core 
management functions and 
should stay within the 
organization in order to ensure 
proper coordination and 
strategic vision. Specialized 
functions are often part of the 
core competence and the 
knowledge present in those 
functions frequently 
constitutes the competitive advantage over opponents.  
However, the latter two might be potential processes to be outsourced. Particularly clerical 
and support functions, whether they are singular tasks, project tasks or frequently 
recurring, seem to be much more suitable to be given to an external provider. 
4.5.1. Singular tasks 
Singular tasks are often project tasks that require a high level of knowledge and creativity. 
They are less standardized and do not occur in high numbers. It is not possible to learn from 
experience caused by a continuous repetition of the task. Rather, there are high dynamics 
and emotions connected with the fulfillment of singular tasks. Prime examples are strategic 
decision-making, negotiations or fundamental research. In all cases, due to the lack of 
experience, there is no established problem-solving mechanism available. Singular tasks 
are found in all of the above-mentioned categories, in particular in leading and specialized 
functions. Singular tasks often require specialized personnel with a high degree of 
qualifications. Hence, it is rather risky and unusual to outsource singular tasks. 
4.5.2. Recurring tasks 
Recurring tasks are characterized by high determination and structure as well as a 
comparatively low degree of dynamics. Other than singular or project tasks, they mostly 
require a lower degree of information.284 Recurring tasks can usually be classified as clerical 
                                                     
284 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 64 
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or support functions. Depending on the particular characteristics of the process, 
standardized tasks may often be performed in an assembly line type structure or, since the 
degree of experience plays an important role, with a rather low degree of necessary 
knowledge. Since they have a high potential to be standardized, they are suitable to be 
outsourced. Recurring tasks are often support functions that do not belong to the core 
business or core competences of the organization. They are mostly routine functions that 
support strategy leaders or specialists in their work. Administrative task are often clerical 
functions with a high degree of repetition and routine. Regular triggers such as orders, 
complaints or other standardized procedures cause them. Low complexity and dynamics as 
well as high determination are common characteristics.285 Administrative tasks are often 
clerical functions that mostly deal with the handling of databases and standard procedures. 
Many administrative tasks nowadays are fulfilled almost entirely automatically. Holiday 
applications, for instance, can be filed using an application. Depending on the degree of 
automization, administrative task may be outsourced comparably easily. 
4.5.3. Project tasks 
Projects tasks are a hybrid form between singular and recurring tasks. “In comparison to 
content-related recurring tasks, project task possess a higher degree of complexity and a 
lower degree of repetition. They are differentiated from singular tasks due to their project 
character, their higher degree of repetition and their often recurring framework 
conditions.”286 Since project task usually have a very clearly specified scope, it is possible 
to differentiate them clearly from other processes in the organization. This makes them 
quite suitable to give to an external service provider. Whether it is sensible to outsource 
the project mostly depends on its strategic importance. If the project is related to the core 
business or core competences of the organization, organizations are very hesitant to 
outsource it. If it is rather a support function, they are highly suitable to be given to an 
external provider.  
                                                     
285 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 62 
286 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 62 [Original wording: "Im Vergleich zu den sachbezogenen Regelaufgaben weisen 
Projektaufgaben eine höhere Komplexität und einen niedrigeren Wiederholungsgrad auf. Von Einzelfallaufgaben werden 
sie jedoch aufgrund ihres Projektcharakters, ihres höheren Wiederholungsgrads sowie ihrer häufig wiederkehrenden 
Rahmenbedingungen abgegrenzt."] 
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4.6. Risks & Problems 
Outsourcing should not be regarded as a panacea for all problems of in-house processes or 
lacks of efficiency that occur. Some of the problems outlined in the following occur before 
an outsourcing relationship is established. Some during the implementation phase and 
some do not become apparent until the contract is terminated and processes should be re-
integrated. “There is no doubt that outsourcing relieves from problems, but there is also 
no doubt that it creates new ones that would not exist – at least in this form – without 
outsourcing.”287 Some of the problems that might occur “are outsourcing imminent risk 
factors that need to be accepted.”288 However, other risks are caused by transaction costs 
that are not necessarily financial as well as by an increased complexity caused by difficult 
customer-provider relations. Competent management, sensible contract design and 
efficient monitoring mechanisms can limit the latter. Strategies to limit potential risks are 
further explored in chapter 4.6.6. Problems and risks may arise in all phases of the 
outsourcing process: Choosing the right partner is the first major obstacle. Each 
relationship then needs to be effectively managed and monitored in order to avoid the 
costs that are described below.  
4.6.1. Principal/Agent-Problem 
Principal/agent-problems commonly occur in asymmetric relations between the vendor 
and the service provider. Main driver of agency costs are asymmetries in information 
between the principal and the agent. On one hand, the agent has a much deeper 
knowledge of its own business characteristics, intentions and actions than the principal 
does. Due to those asymmetries, the agent is able to perform actions that will remain 
hidden from the principal. On the other hand, “the external service provider usually lacks 
knowledge about the culture of the outsourcing business and inside view on its business 
processes.”289 This represents an increased risk for the vendor and uncertainty whether it 
is able to fulfill the demands in an appropriate manner.  
                                                     
287 Grell, ‘Outsourcing’, 20 [Original wording: "Outsourcing entlastet zweifellos von Problemen, schafft aber ebenso 
zweifelsfrei neue, die es ohne Outsourcing - jedenfalls in dieser Form - nicht gäbe."] 
288 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 65 [Original wording: „handelt es sich um Outsourcing 
immanente Risikofaktoren, die in Kauf genommen werden müssen.“] 
289 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 40 [Original wording: "Dem externen Dienstleister fehlen i.d.R. die Kenntnis über 
die Kultur des outsourcenden Unternehmens sowie die Einblicke in seine unternehmerischen Prozesse."] 
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The outsourcing contract and employees that coordinate and monitor the implementation 
are of critical importance in this regard. It is their responsibility to minimize information 
asymmetries and therefore minimize costs that occur due to hidden actions of one of the 
outsourcing partners.  
4.6.2. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs occur during all phases of the outsourcing relationship. Simon and 
Gathen include “initiation costs, e.g. for information, contacting and contract negotiations, 
logistical costs, costs for 
communications and 
coordination with the external 
business and quality control of 
the provided services”290 (see 
graph 4.7). Transaction costs on 
one hand include financial costs 
such as fees for the provided 
services, but also non-financial 
costs that occur when there is 
an increased need for coordination, lack of communications or through the inability to 
assign precious resources to other projects. Therefore, outsourcing projects may become 
risky and expensive.291 They might exceed the costs that were formerly needed for in-house 
production. This may particularly be the case when the expected costs for outsourcing the 
process were miscalculated or when costs were incorrectly attributed to the process during 
the due diligence phase. “The reason for higher total costs compared to the initial situation 
can lie in the fact that the aimed rationalization and cost reduction goals could not be 
achieved by the contract partner due to lack of consistent implementation or unrealistic 
goals.”292 The amount of actual transaction costs often depend on the quantity of 
                                                     
290 Simon and Gathen, Das grosse Handbuch der Strategieinstrumente, 160 [Original wording: "Anbahnungskosten, etwa für 
Information, Kontaktaufnahme und Vertragsverhandlungen, Logistikkosten, Kosten für die Kommunikation und 
Abstimmung mit dem Fremdunternehmen oder die Qualitätskontrolle der erbrachten Leistung."] 
291 Gründer, ‘Erfolgreiches IT-Management - Strategisches Sourcing als Option’, 20 
292 Bartenschlager, Erfolgswirkung des Business-process-Outsourcing, 66 [Original wording: "Die Ursache für diese im 
Vergleich zur Ausgangssituation höheren Gesamtkosten kann darin begründet sein, dass die angestrebten 
Rationalisierungs- und Kostensenkungsziele von den Vertragspartnern mangels konsequenter Umsetzung oder 
unrealistischer Zielsetzungen nicht erreicht werden."] 
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transactions. Through economies of scale, an increase in quantity of transactions with 
similar transaction costs not only decrease average production costs, but also lower 
average transaction costs. 
Initiation costs 
Transaction costs may appear when an outsourcing relationship has not yet been 
established. Initiation costs include all financial, non-financial, personnel and material costs 
that are required for gathering information about potential service providers.  
Agreement costs 
Once potential providers have been identified and RFPs have been answered, contract 
negotiations are the next source for costs. Not only do costs occur directly with 
negotiations, e.g. wages for negotiators, travels, hotel bookings, etc., it is also of critical 
importance that negotiations and the following agreement are based on reliable and 
correct information. “If the outsourcing decision was based on an opaque or insufficient 
basis of cost data, it is inevitably a suboptimal decision that can hardly lead to the goal of 
cost reduction.”293 
Implementation and controlling costs 
The agreed fee for the provision of the outsourced process is not the only cost during the 
implementation phase. In addition, implementation and controlling costs occur. They are 
costs for managing, leading and coordinating the relationship between the vendor and the 
service provider. The level of those costs highly depends on the amount of outsourced 
processes, complexity and customization of the processes, accuracy of the contract, 
priorities of the provider and available human resources on both sides. The risk hereby is 
that "the time required to manage the contract may make it more expensive than initially 
calculated - even beyond its intended value-add."294 If the contract needs to be re-
negotiated or adapted, further costs occur. Therefore, there is the danger that outsourcing 
fees plus implementation costs may add up to a sum that exceeds in-house production of 
the process. 
                                                     
293 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 39 [Original wording: "Stützt sich die Outsourcing-Entscheidung auf eine 
intransparente oder mangelhafte Kostendatenbasis, so handelt es sich hierbei zwangsläufig um eine suboptimale 
Entscheidung, die zum gesetzten Ziel der Kostensenkung kaum führen kann."] 
294 Brown and Wilson, The black book of outsourcing, 65 
96 | P a g e  
4.6.3. Dependency on service provider 
As mentioned above, once a process is given to an external provider, it is a challenge to re-
integrate it into the organization. Particularly in cases when entire processes are fully 
outsourced to external providers, there is a danger that the vendor becomes dependent 
on the particular service provider. “The customer becomes dependent when the complete 
return transfer of assets given to the provider is not regulated. If it wanted to resolve the 
contractual relationship, it would have to expect high costs for new acquisitions and 
training of new employees or for the development of alternative providers.”295 During the 
implementation of a contract a close cooperation can also lead to a dependency. Decreases 
of quality or delays in provision of the service may lead to serious consequences in business 
activities of the vendor. “Dependencies are given, when ‘decisions and activities of one 
business partner, without having influence on those, have influence on the own 
welfare.’”296 
For an outsourcing company, dependency on the service provider has the consequence 
that it is “likely to be locked into that relationship”297, neither able to receive its requested 
services in an adequate manner nor be able to move to a different supplier. The risk is 
particularly high, when relying on just one provider or when the outsourced process is 
critical to business success. Processes that have a low degree of complexity, however, may 
be imitated comparably easily and therefore there is a lower danger of dependency.  
4.6.4. Brain Drain 
Of particular importance is the risk to lose know-how that might be needed for future 
business activities. With outsourcing particular processes and transferring employees to 
the service provider, personnel that might be of value at a later point might leave the 
company and leave a gap of knowledge behind that could have a negative impact on the 
company’s performance in the long run. "Outsourcing cuts labour costs but simultaneously 
                                                     
295 Picot and Ertsey, ‘Anreizorientierte Vertragsgestaltung im IT-Outsourcing’, 245 [Original wording: "Der Abnehmer wird 
abhängig, wenn der vollständige Rücktransfer seiner an den Dienstleister übertragenen Assets nicht geregelt ist. Will er 
das Vertragsverhältnis auflösen, muss er mit hohen Kosten für Neuanschaffungen und Ausbildung neuer Mitarbeiter oder 
für die Entwicklung eines alternativen Lieferanten rechnen."] 
296 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 93 [Original wording: "Abhängigkeiten sind gegeben, 
wenn 'Entscheidungen und Aktivitäten eines Geschäftspartners, ohne dass man diese bestimmen kann, Einfluss auf die 
eigene Wohlfahrt haben.'"] 
297 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 189 
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reduces the scope for internal innovative activity and, hence, may result in being 
detrimental to long-run productivity gains."298 This danger is particularly high when 
knowledge that was built up over a longer period of time leaves the outsourcing 
organization for good.  
Remaining personnel might lack the needed knowledge causing a decrease of performance 
quality. “You cannot prevent such a Brain Drain even with the best contract.” 299  
4.6.5. Data security 
For successful outsourcing close and open cooperation are necessary prerequisites. 
However, “through close interlocking of business processes, respectively the design of 
complex interfaces it is inevitable that the involved parties in part gain in-depth insight into 
the respective other organization.”300 There is a conflict between necessary openness for 
the sake of a successful outsourcing relationship on one hand and commitment for secrecy 
on the other. Particularly in relationships with insufficient monitoring mechanisms, this 
provides a danger for data security and confidentiality. "Adequate handling of customer 
data […] is a crucial criterion for the selection of an outsourcing provider.”301  
4.6.6. Risk-minimization 
In order to limit the above-mentioned risks, a general set of risk minimization tools is 
available. While risks of dependency and brain drain can be approached by very targeted 
measures, there are also general strategies available to limit principal/agent problems and 
transaction costs. Those can be summed up under the key words ‘signaling’, ‘screening’ 
and ‘self-selection’. Above all, substantial benchmarking provides the basis for a significant 
minimization of risks. "Do your due diligence. It's better to spend more time and resources 
in the selection process than to regret your decision later. Create a request for proposal, 
and have it answer all of your questions regarding the systems, procedures and costs."302 
                                                     
298 Morroni, ‘Introduction: Organizational variety and economic performance’, 10 
299 Joppe and Ganowski, Die Outsourcing-Falle, 17 [Original wording:“ Einen solchen Brain Drain können Sie selbst mit dem 
besten Vertrag nicht verhindern."] 
300 Osterloh, Outsourcing von sekundären Servicebereichen, Heft 160, 102 [Original wording: "Durch die enge Verzahnung 
betrieblicher Abläufe bzw. die Gestaltung komplexer Schnittstellen ist es unvermeidlich, dass die beteiligten Parteien teils 
recht detaillierte Einblicke in die jeweils andere Unternehmung erhalten."] 
301 Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’, 1155 [Original wording: "Die entsprechende Handhabung von Kundendaten ist 
[…] maßgebliches Kriterium für die Auswahl eines Outsourcing-Dienstleisters.“] 
302 Fujan, ‘Hiring the Right Telephone Consultants and Vendors’, 558 
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The risk for dependency can be lowered by permanent exchange and transparency in order 
to make adjustments when unforeseeable events occur. Spreading process to several 
providers generally limits the risk of dependency. On the other hand, increased 
implementation costs can be expected due to the higher complexity of outsourcing 
relations. “Generally, strategic dependencies due to outsourcing should be avoided. In 
many cases the assessment is valid that only those processes and systems are suitable for 
outsourcing that only have a moderate (or low) strategic significance.”303 
In order to limit the risk, an organization is well advised not to outsource their entire 
knowledge in the intended field. “Outsourcing can create significant flexibility pitfalls if 
internal skills are not maintained. Such buffers, or slack resources, may not be cost efficient, 
but make perfect sense if dependency on a vendor needs to be mitigated."304 A core team 
should stay in-house performing similar task. This may have a positive impact on knowledge 
in the organization and on coordination efforts with the service provider whose problems 
and issues are much easier to understand when there is still some expertise in the field 
available.  
Signaling describes activities of an agent to draw the attention to the high quality of 
processes it provides to potential principals. “Those signals are voluntary samples of own 
competences, such as, for example, insights on own processes of service provision, 
involvement of neutral technical experts and various reference cases of other clients as 
well as the provision of above-average guarantee durations.305 By sending out those signals 
and providing that data, the potential agent attempts to level asymmetries in information 
concerning the quality of its provided services. In order to make signaling attractive and 
sensible, for ‘desired’ agents, costs for signaling need to be lower than expected benefits 
while for ‘undesired’ agents the opposite is the case. 
                                                     
303 Tzouvaras, ‘Make-or-By in der Finanzbranche’, 49 [Original wording: "Grundsätzlich gilt es, strategische Abhängigkeiten 
durch eine Verlagerung zu vermeiden. Vielfach findet sich daher die Einschätzung, dass nur diejenigen Prozesse und 
Systeme für eine Auslagerung geeignet sind, die nur eine mäßige (oder geringe) strategische Bedeutung haben."] 
304 Tan and Sia, ‘Managing Flexibility in Outsourcing’, 189–90 
305 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 80 [Original wording: "Bei diesen Signalen handelt es sich um freiwillige Proben der 
eigenen Kompetenzen, wie bspw. Einblicke in die eigenen Leistungserstellungsprozesse, die Einbeziehung neutraler 
Sachverständiger und verschiedener Referenzfälle anderer Auftraggeber sowie die Gewährung überdurchschnittlich 
langer Garantiezeiten.“] 
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Screening, on the other hand, describes activities of the outsourcing company to reduce 
asymmetries in information by actively requesting signals from potential agents concerning 
their abilities, quality and intentions.  
In a self-selection mechanism, the principal confronts the agent with its requirements and 
asks for a decision to be made by the potential agent. A prime example for this tool is the 
request for proposal (RFP), described in chapter 4.4.2. In an RFP, the outsourcing company 
clearly defines the requirement expected for the intended form of cooperation and the 
potential service providers need to make decision which service level they are willing or 
able to provide. By doing so, self-selection is initiated since agents that are not able to meet 
the requirements properly are likely to withdraw from the bidding process.  
Finally, incentive schemes may contribute to increased determination and care of agents 
to provide the service in the requested quality. Incentive schemes “may [include] agent 
behavior control measures such as risk premiums, contract penalties and result-oriented 
remuneration.” 306 
4.7. Consequences for campaign management 
The above-mentioned aspects provide a series of important consequences for campaign 
management. Since campaigns are also faced with a scarcity of financial and human 
resources that is similar to the ones of private entities, outsourcing represents a technique, 
which is generally adequate to be used in campaign management as well. Particularly 
support functions that include either recurring processes with a low degree of complexity 
or more complex processes that can be regarded as independent projects are sensible to 
be outsourced if cost savings, increases in productivity or quality can be expected. 
"Campaigns should plan forward from the resources they have, or that they can reasonably 
expect to receive."307 If benefits of outsourcing particular processes exceeded the 
connected costs, outsourcing the process should be considered. Campaigning takes place 
in highly dynamic and volatile environments. Necessary coordination with service providers 
may harm the ability to react quickly to unforeseen events. Therefore, it would be wise to 
outsource standard processes that are not influenced by sudden external changes. 
                                                     
306 Houssem, Business Process Offshoring, 82 [Original wording: „Können anbieterverhaltenssteuernde Maßnahmen wie 
Risikoprämien, Konventionalstrafen und ergebnisorientierte Vergütung [beinhalten]"] 
307 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 29 
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The most important consequence is that vendors (hence political parties) should not 
outsource processes that belong to their core competence and create competitive 
advantages. In the long-run, this would harm the competitive position of the party and have 
a negative impact on its electoral performance.  
The following chapter will pick up those conclusions and examine how outsourcing is 
already performed in the field of campaign management.  
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5. Usage of external sources – key empirical findings  
As examined in chapter 3, campaigns have become a management task. Meanwhile, “it has 
become clear in politics, that external knowledge is almost indispensable.”308 Because of 
described changes of campaign characteristics due to the rise of media democracy, parties 
have become increasingly open to externalizing particular tasks. Nevertheless, there are 
large discrepancies between the practice of outsourcing in the United States and in 
Germany. Scholars argue that there is no such thing in Germany as there are “political 
consultants in the United States, who are often entrusted with the overall responsibility for 
a campaign”.309 Rather, it seems that external expertise is mainly gathered in creative and 
productive fields. The extent of outsourcing varies. This will further be explored in this 
chapter. It is important to note that the relationship between the extent of outsourcing 
and quality of output is not linear. Giving processes to external service providers does not 
automatically mean that there are increases in quality or cost saving. Some scholars argue 
that “excessive creativity may even lead to decreased return on advertising investment.”310 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that modern campaign organizations are heavily influenced by 
strategies and methods from product marketing and commercial advertising. This leads to 
the impression that campaigns become livelier when considerable responsibility is given to 
external experts.311 Adapting to the increasingly volatile environment of a media 
democracy with rapid news cycles may be a secondary objective of employing external 
experts, but they do not seem to be the major drivers and motives of usage of external 
resources. Neither do they explain differences in the extent of outsourcing. The question 
remains why in some areas outsourcing seems to be a common practice while in others it 
is hardly being performed. This chapter will therefore shed light on the extent and motives 
to outsource certain processes to external agents and factors that are relevant for the 
extent of outsourcing. At the end of the chapter, focus is changed to service providers. It 
                                                     
308 Griese, ‘Von der Notwendigkeit des Wahlkampfmanagements’, 89 [Original wording: "Mittlerweile hat sich in der Politik 
die Erkenntnis verfestigt, dass externer Sachverstand nahezu unverzichtbar ist."] 
309 Kellermann von Schele, Erfolgsfaktor Kampagnemanagement?, 47 [Original wording: „weit wie es beispielsweise bei den 
Political Consultants in den USA der Fall ist, denen häufig die Gesamtverantwortung für eine Kampagne übertragen 
wird."] 
310 Li, ‘The effects of agency creativity on campaign outcomes’, 111 
311 Althaus, ‘Kommunikationsmanagement im Wahlkampf’, 134 
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will be explored why some agents are willing to take the significant risk to provide political 
parties with a campaign, while others hesitate. 
5.1. Factors influencing openness to outsource 
Before the extent of outsourcing is explored, attention should be brought to the motivation 
of political parties not to provide a service in-house, but to employ external resources. 
Generally, motives from the business environment analyzed in chapter 4.1 are also valid in 
the political sphere. The only exception is the motivation of labor arbitrage. The reason 
therefore stems mostly from ethical considerations. A party aiming at representing a 
certain part of German population and of national interests is unlikely to employ foreign 
sources and bypass German workforce just for the sake of labor arbitrage effects. This 
would be a strategy that would sooner or later backfire at the party during the run of a 
campaign. Generally, factors influencing the make-or-buy decision in political parties can 
be divided into two categories: economic considerations and organizational influence. 
5.1.1. Economic factors 
Political parties are faced with scarce resources. This includes financial as well as human 
resources. Financed by official party funds as well as by donations from institutional and 
private entities, all practitioners agree that there is not a significant lack of financial means, 
but a scarcity that makes parties uncompetitive to the private business sectors when it 
comes to marketing budgets and salaries. Therefore, parties are unlikely to be as able to 
reach outcomes in terms of quality and productivity to the same extent as private providers 
specialized in these fields. 
In the following, a set of motives is further illustrated that are of particular significance for 
political parties: Scarcity of own resources, significant changes in demand between 
campaign and off-campaign seasons and the need for an external perspective. 
5.1.1.1. Scarcity of own human resources 
As mentioned above, financial resources may play an important role in the outsourcing 
decision of political campaigns. This aspect is further explored in chapter 5.1.1.3. The more 
immediate reason for giving a process to an external provider, however, is that there is a 
lack of knowledge or skills within the party to provide it internally. This is mostly due to a 
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lack of skilled personnel in campaign organizations. Hans-Hermann Langguth312 is reminded 
of “when I was with the Greens, one always wished that we had three graphic designers 
and two cutters at our disposal […] and one cinematographers, two sound engineers and 
one screen designer and three good copywriters. This is just not realizable. And this does 
not reflect the reality of such a party.”313 Instead, reality shows that particularly small 
parties may only possess a small team of employees that is able to run the party’s online 
presence. This mostly includes the party’s website and social media such as Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube. Large parties, such as CDU with its party own CDU TV, may be able 
to maintain a semi-professional TV team that can produce own videos for the party’s 
YouTube channel or record party conventions and speeches. However, none of the German 
parties is able to produce state-of-the-art TV commercials due to lack of skilled employees 
and adequate technology.  
A reason for this lies in the complexity of those processes. In order to build up an own team 
of competence it is not sufficient to only hire one or two individuals. Rather, a whole set of 
skilled people must be hired that need to be remunerated at a fairly high level. Katja 
Suding314 emphasizes that “because one graphic designer doesn’t help you in a good 
campaign. Then you can just let it go. A graphic designer is not what you need to launch a 
good campaign. […] He can design a flyer, but that is not what you need.”315 In fact, it is 
much more complex. More specialized skills in a whole variety of topics are needed, ranging 
from strategy development to creative functions. It is for this reason that Stefan 
                                                     
312 Hans-Hermann Langguth is managing co-partner of PR agency „Zum Goldenen Hirschen“. Since 2006 he is leading its 
campaigning unit. In 1999 he became speaker of the federal organization of the Green party. From 2002 until 2005 he 
was deputy speaker of the Gerhard Schröder government.  
313 Langguth, Hans-Herrmann [Original wording: “Als ich bei den Grünen war, hätte man sich immer gewünscht, man hätte 
selbst drei Grafiker und zwei Cutter […] und einen Kameramann, zwei Tonmänner und noch ein Screendesigner und drei 
gute Texter. Das ist einfach nicht darstellbar. Das spiegelt ja auch die Realität von so einer Partei nicht wider.“] 
314 Katja Suding is one of three deputy leaders of FDP. Since 2011, she is member of the Hamburg state parliament. In the 
2015 state election she was main candidate in Hamburg and was responsible for FDP’s first electoral success since the 
2013 Bundestag election in which the party failed to reach the five-percent threshold. 
315 Suding, Katja [Original wording: “Weil ein Grafikdesigner eben nichts hilft in einer guten Werbekampagne, dann können 
Sie es gleich sein lassen. Ein Grafikdesigner ist nicht das, was man braucht, um eine gute Werbekampagne zu machen. […] 
Der kann mal einen Flyer erstellen, aber das ist nicht, das was Sie brauchen.“ ] 
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Hennewig316 underlines that “rather criteria are limits of performance of present resources, 
both in terms of quantity and quality.”317 
When this required expertise is not available within campaign organizations, political 
parties have a strong incentive to either build up own expertise or to outsource these 
services. Building up own expertise is likely to be very costly. As mentioned above, in these 
fields parties compete with the private economy for high quality staff. This leads to 
considerable expenses for salaries. Most parties are simply unable to provide this. “You 
cannot provide this degree of professionalism and the high quality in any party. No 
chance.”318 
Another aspect that leads to a scarcity of human resources of parties is the demographic 
changes. Parties that have a smaller amount of active supporters are faced with the 
problem that those large volunteer support forces known in the 70s and 80s tend to 
decline. "With fewer members and activists, they frequently lack the resources, human and 
material, with which to maintain local-level campaigning, such as canvassing and mail 
drops."319 
This aspect touches upon an entirely different field. It is not the high-skilled specialists that 
are affected by those changes. Rather, parties’ foot soldiers dissolve. For many decades, 
very practical tasks that do not require higher levels of training, such as above mentioned 
canvassing was carried out by volunteer work forces. Only smaller parties such as FDP had 
to outsource this service since they did not have the necessary degree of local organization. 
For parties, canvassing by volunteers not only saved financial resources, it was also a 
method of activation of followers and a marketing technique. Voters watching individuals 
from their community setting up election posters alone had an impact on them. With the 
                                                     
316 Stefan Hennewig is head of campaign and marketing at CDU headquarters in Konrad-Adenauer Haus and a key player for 
the 2017 CDU campaign. As head of internal management he was already deeply involed in the 2009 and 2013 federal 
CDU campaigns. 
317 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: “Kriterien sind eher die Leistungsgrenzen der Ressourcen, die vorhanden sind, 
sowohl quantitativ als auch qualitativ.“] 
318 Suding, Katja [Original wording: “Sie können in der Qualität in keiner Partei […] die Spezialisierung und die hohe Qualität 
vorhalten. Keine Chance.“]    
319 McAllister, ‘Calculating or capricious?’, 38 
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aging society, this is getting increasingly difficult, Peter Radunski320 explains: “There is a 
very simple physiological difficulty. Since the average age of party members has been 57, 
it doesn’t work anymore. When they were 37 it was something entirely different. I mean, 
let alone carrying a rack of newspapers. Carry that one up the stairs and distribute them. 
You can’t do that anymore once you reached a certain age.”321  
It can therefore be concluded that both, a lack of skilled personnel for specialized tasks due 
to limited resources as well as declining amounts of foot solders for mass distribution lead 
to increased motivation to outsource certain processes. 
5.1.1.2. Seasonal changes 
Another key reason for giving processes to external partners is the large difference in 
workload between campaign and off-campaign seasons. Since federal campaigns only take 
place every four years, there is a long-term gap during which there is no demand for most 
campaign processes. Frank Stauss322 underlines that “this gap in between is the actual basic 
explanation […]. If I only had to provide particular competences, particular performance 
peaks, only every four years, every business in the world would say that we use external 
resources during peak times. Whether those are temporary workers or agencies is only a 
question of the sector.”323 There is no party in Germany that is in the position to maintain 
enough permanent party personnel to cover all areas of campaigning. At the same time, 
this would create significant costs. “What should they do for the rest of the time? I have to 
                                                     
320 Peter Radunski has been a senior member of CDU since the late 1960s. From 1981 until 1991 he was CDU federal 
manager followed by the post of senator in Berlin. Between 1976 and 1990, he managed all CDU campaigns and was a 
key player in Helmut Kohl’s campaign organizations. As consultant he advised several state campaigns and is considered 
to be Germany’s pioneer in modern campaigning. 
321 Radunski, Peter [Original wording: “Das hat eine ganz einfache physiologische Schwierigkeit. Seit das Durchschnittsalter 
der Partei 57 Jahre alt ist, geht es natürlich nicht mehr so. Als die 37 waren war das was anderes. Ich meine, allein so 
einen Stapel Zeitungen: tragen sie die Mal die Treppe rauf. Und verteilen. Können sie gar nicht als Älterer.“] 
322 Frank Stauss iscreative director and managing co-partner of Düsseldorf-based agency BUTTER. In this function he was 
deeply involved in all major SPD campaigns from 2001. Also, he was in charge of the 2013 ÖVP campaign in Austria. In 
2013 he published his top-selling book ‘Höllenritt Wahlkampf’ in which he shared many stories from his campaigns. 
323 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Dieses Gap dazwischen, eigentlich ist das die Grunderklärung […] Wenn ich bestimmte 
Kompetenzen, bestimmte Leistungspeaks nur alle vier Jahre erbringen muss, dann würde jedes Unternehmen der Welt 
sagen, dann hole ich mir für die Spitzenzeiten Externe. Ob das Leiharbeiter sind oder Agenturen, ist dann nur eine Frage 
der Branche.] 
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keep paying them. So that makes absolutely no sense.”324 Therefore, much valuable and 
costly expertise is needed during the run of a campaign. From an economic standpoint, 
however, it would be inefficient to employ such staff on a permanent basis, given that there 
is no demand during off-season. 
One option to balance those peaks would be building own expertise that is not only active 
during federal campaigns, but also in state elections. This would lead to a significantly 
higher degree of utilization and therefore increased efficiency. By moving from election to 
election there would hardly be any off-season times for such a campaign team. The reason 
this model (so far) has not been followed more seriously lies in the federal organization of 
parties. Each state organization considers itself relatively independent from the federal 
party. This implies that campaign leaders on the state level are not fond of the idea of a 
campaign team from the federal organization coming to the state, claiming to have 
superior knowledge and taking over campaign responsibility. While even in SPD with its 
relatively centralized organization this would cause conflicts, in decentralized CDU where 
even membership fees are collected by its local entities, this model would likely cause 
outrage among state party leaders. Although its federal structure is also used for 
messaging, particularly if CDU is in the position to be part of an unpopular government, 
regional entities are unlikely to follow instructions from the federal level. As Axel 
Wallrabenstein325 states, “if they said they should work together with this agency, they 
wouldn’t do it.”326  
Another issue concerns actions in case of a series of defeats. In case of bad experiences 
with an external partner, it is simple to substitute it with a different one. Consequences 
would be more difficult if the same campaign processes were outsourced to an internal 
partner. It would not be possible to remove an internal team in case of dissatisfaction. If 
they “lost five times in a row. Then no one is eager to work with them, because they had a 
                                                     
324 Suding, Katja [Original wording: “Was soll die denn sonst die restliche Zeit machen? Die muss ich ja weiter bezahlen. Also 
das macht überhaupt keinen Sinn.“] 
325 Axel Wallrabenstein is co-founder of public relations agency publicis and today chairman of MSL group Germany. He is 
former spokesperson of the Ministry of the Interior of the state Saxony and of Berlin’s Senator of Science, Research and 
Cultural affairs. 
326 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Wenn die sagen die sollen mit der Agentur arbeiten das würden die gar nicht 
machen.“] 
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loser image. Hence, it is, of course, one option, but it can only be part of a combination. I 
mean, you don’t work together with an agency either that has lost six campaigns in a row. 
You always aim for those that won or that narrowly lost but have conducted a good 
campaign.”327 
Nevertheless, CDU is the first party that considered building up such a center of 
competence within party structures. CDU’s ‘Meine CDU 2017’ manifesto proposes a service 
center for campaigns within Konrad-Adenauer-House, which is supposed to service state, 
regional and local party entities in their respective campaigns328. This project has not been 
implemented yet. Therefore, until such a concept has proven to be accepted by parties’ 
state entities, parties are not yet able to balance seasonal changes between campaigns 
themselves. Hence, outsourcing particular processes to external service providers remains 
an efficient and economical way to gather necessary expertise during peak times.  
5.1.1.3. Financial resources 
After elaborating on scarcity of human resources, attention may be brought to probably 
the most decisive 
economic factor: 
Scarcity of financial 
resources. In the end, 
everything depends on 
the availability of 
financial resources. 
Personnel with 
necessary knowledge is 
generally available, but 
                                                     
327 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Die verliert jetzt fünfmal hintereinander in der Struktur. Dann hat doch der 6. 
beim Landtagswahlkampf keinen Bock mehr mit denen zu arbeiten, weil die natürlich ein Loser-Image haben. Also 
deswegen ist es natürlich eine Möglichkeit, aber es ist nur ein Teil einer Kombi-Möglichkeit, weil ich meine, man arbeitet 
ja auch nicht mit einer Agentur zusammen, die 6 Wahlkämpfe hintereinander mitverloren hat, sondern man sucht sich 
immer die raus, die mal gewonnen haben oder die Wahl knapp verloren haben aber den Wahlkampf gut gemacht 
haben.“] 
328 See: Meine CDU 2017. Available at: https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/150817-beschluss-meine-cdu-
2017-1.pdf?file=1 
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at high costs. Therefore, financial resources determine, whether it is possible for a 
campaign to employ permanently costly expertise necessary for in-house production. As 
shown in graph 5.1, a significant majority of experts agree that availability of financial 
resources has influence on the openness to outsourcing. Of 26 mentions, only five were 
skeptical of such influence.  
The underlying question in this regard may be: Is outsourcing more expensive than in-
house-production? If outsourcing turned out to be more cost effective, a general openness 
to outsource should be assumed. Parties are faced with scarce financial resources. 
Therefore, a key task is to allocate budget in a most efficient way. “Budgets are not 
considerably growing anymore. CDU’s budget has declined in comparison to the 1990’s due 
to its party donation scandal. FDP’s budget has declined due to Möllemann. […] Even SPD’s 
budget has declined because affiliated publishing houses don’t create as much revenue 
anymore. And the Green’s budget has slightly increased, but coming from a very low level. 
And DieLinke’s budget is stagnating. At the same time an entire new sector of task comes 
into play. This is the sector of content, marketing and internet social media.”329 
As mentioned above, experts agree that financial resources are a key factor to openness to 
outsourcing. Budget is decisive when parties have to decide which channels to use to 
convey their messages.  When faced with scarcity of resources some channels are dropped, 
while for others, the most economical solution is found. Depending on the costs of 
outsourcing, this may have direct influence on whether processes are given to external 
partners. Volker Ludwig330 underlines that “from the point of view of the client, it is of 
course always a question of price. They have to afford it. From their standpoint, the price-
                                                     
329 Interview with Hans-Hermann Langguth [Original wording: “Budgets wachsen ja nicht mehr wesentlich. Das CDU-Budget 
ist sogar im Vergleich zu den 90iger Jahren gesunken, aufgrund der Parteispendenaffäre. Das FDP-Budget ist gesunken, 
aufgrund von Möllemann. […] Selbst das SPD-Budget ist gesunken, weil die angeschlossenen Verlagshäuser nicht mehr 
so viel Kohle erwirtschaften. Und das Grüne-Budget ist leicht gestiegen, das kommt aber von einem sehr niedrigen 
Niveau. Und das von der Linkspartei stagniert. Gleichzeitig kommt aber ein völlig neuer Ausgabensektor hinzu. Das ist 
dieser Ausgabensektor Content, Marketing und Internet Social Media.“] 
330 Volker Ludwig is director of Berlin-based agency DiG. Since 2002 he participated and later was in charge of DieLinke 
campaigns, respectively of its predecessor PDS. In 2005, he was considered to be the person that invented the catchy 
brand name “DieLinke”. He is also member of the party. 
109 | P a g e  
performance ratio must be in order.”331 This ratio is often connected to the already 
mentioned seasonal changes. Parties need to consider whether they are able to provide 
services with significant peaks in demand for conditions that are competitive with offers 
from external providers that focus on peak times. Steffi Lemke332 states that “campaigning 
is primarily distribution of resources. For which area do I employ which means? […] Money 
is always scarce in each campaign. At least for the Greens. You always have to decide where 
you do not spend it.”333 Experts not only agree that financial resources have an influence 
on openness to outsource, but also that there is an illusion that tasks provided within the 
campaign may be more cost effective. In many cases, this is not the case. Many important 
processes cannot or only with great passive costs be provided in-house. They might not 
visibly create costs, because resources are available anyways. What is often ignored is the 
fact that these resources might be more effectively deployed with other tasks for which 
they are now missing. Experts also point out directly employing temporary personnel will 
most likely be more expensive than deploying an experienced partner. A number of 
temporary contracts create an amount of additional work in terms of administration and 
training that would not be cost efficient.  
On the other hand, a few experts doubt that outsourcing is more economical than in-house 
production in a purely cost-focused approach. “Of course it is more expensive. But at least 
it works then.”334 At the same time, some respondents argue that complaining about 
financial resources of campaigns happen on a high comfort level. Creating a basic level of 
visibility can be achieved without vast financial resources. This was shown by the Pirate 
Party in the 2013 campaign in which they reached a high level of visibility with only a 
fragment of the budget of established parties. Organizations which have the largest need 
to cooperate with external partners due to absence of own resources, are also the ones 
                                                     
331 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: “Aus Sicht des Auftraggebers ist es natürlich auch immer eine Preisfrage. 
Also dass sie sich das leisten können. Dass aus ihrer Sicht quasi das Preis-Leistungs-Verhältnis in Ordnung ist.“] 
332 Steffi Lemke had been Member of Parliament from 1994 to 2002 and again since 2013. From 2002 until 2013 she was 
political general manager of the Green Party. In this function she was responsible for the 2005, 2009 and 2013 Bundestag 
campaigns as well as for the 2004 and 2009 European election campaign. 
333 Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “Wahlkampfplanung ist in aller erster Linie Ressourcenverteilung. Für 
welchen Bereich setzen sie welche Mittel ein? […] Das Geld fehlt immer in jeder Wahlkampagne. Zumindest bei den 
Grünen. Sie müssen immer entscheiden, wo sie es nicht ausgeben.“]   
334 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Natürlich es teurer, aber da funktioniert es wenigstens.“] 
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that have the lowest degree of financial resources available to hire external partners.  
In conclusion, there is no general rule indicating that outsourcing processes will lead to 
increases or decreases of costs. Experts, however, agree that when it comes to efficiency, 
outsourcing indeed has a positive impact. This is also shown by the fact that campaigns 
regularly employ smaller agencies with campaign tasks. Armin Reins335 underlines that “it’s 
not given that, as a customer, I get a lot of quality for a lot of money. Money is not the basis 
for quality. I may find a smaller creative agency with committed creative people that have 
fun doing something cool.”336 By doing so, campaign management realizes that it is unable 
to provide the respective service on its own and therefore finds ways for cost-efficient 
outsourcing. In the end, experts agree that in cases where seasonal changes lead to 
situations in which processes needed during campaigns are not required during off seasons, 
outsourcing provides the more cost-efficient way of service provision. Therefore, financial 
resources play a decisive role in the openness to outsource since they are scarce and 
campaign organizations need to find most cost-effective ways to provide services that 
underlie seasonal changes.  
5.1.2. Organizational factors 
After elaborating on economic factors that determine openness to outsource, attention 
should be brought to factors that lie within campaign organizations. Research question 3 
picks up this aspect, asking what influencing factors such as organizational level, change of 
leaders and party size have on the openness to use external resources.  
5.1.2.1. Age of organization 
The German party system is very mature and stable. Nevertheless, every few years, new 
parties develop. Some of these, such as the Greens, manage to become a sustainable 
power.  Others, such as the Republicans or the Pirate Party achieve successes that receive 
strong popular attention mainly on the state level, but then do not manage to transform 
                                                     
335 Armin Reins is co-partner of Hamburg-based agency Reinsclassen. He is head of the campaigning section of the agency 
and was responsible for the 2013 FDP Bundestag campaign. He is also author of a number of bestselling books on 
marketing. 
336 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Es ist nicht gesagt, dass man als Kunde für viel Geld eine gute Qualität 
bekommt. Geld ist nicht die Grundlage für Qualität. Ich kann mir als Kunde eine kleine, kreative "günstige" Agentur 
suchen, mit engagierten Menschen, die Spaß daran haben, etwas Geiles zu machen.“] 
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those into a sustainable high level of popular support. Young parties generally do not 
possess a developed party organization with nationwide subsidiaries and only a limited 
number of active supporters. Hence, as shown in graph 5.2, experts agree that age of 
organizations has influence on the openness to outsource processes.  
Newly established parties normally lack qualified and experienced personnel who have 
already taken part in federal elections. Therefore, there would be a certain need for 
external partners to fill 
this gap. However, since 
party financing in 
Germany is mostly 
based on public party 
financing (based on past 
success) and donations, 
young parties only have 
limited of financial 
resources available. This 
often forces them to cover as many processes as possible by volunteers or low-cost 
resources. They seldom possess resources to employ qualified personnel no matter 
whether located in-house or at an external service provider. Lutz Meyer337 elaborates “a 
young party is always a bit less organized and therefore initially outsources less, because 
people think they could do it on their own. That becomes less over time. On the other hand, 
it is very much dependent on its participation culture.”338 In 2013, this could be observed 
very well in the campaign of the PirateParty. Due to a lack of financial resources and very 
active volunteer supporters, they managed to organize a federal campaign with a very low 
level of resources. This suggests that the limiting factor for openness to outsource is not 
necessarily the age of the organization itself, but the lack of financial and organizational 
                                                     
337 Lutz Meyer is founder and partner of communications agency ‘Blumberry’. Until April 2016 he was also general manager. 
In 2013 he was heading the CDU Angela Merkel campaign on the side of the service provider. From 1998 to 2000 he was 
speaker of Minister of the Interior Ott Schily and deeply involved in the 2002 SPD campaign, being office manager of 
Matthias Machnig. 
338 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Eine junge Partei ist immer etwas unorganisierter und lagert deswegen 
erstmal weniger aus, weil die Leute noch als meinen selber machen zu können. Das wird sicherlich dann über die Strecke 
dann weniger. Auf der anderen Seite ist sie aber sehr stark abhängig von der Mitmachkultur.“] 
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resources which are connected to it. With parties developing positively but the initial 
enthusiasm about the new party going down, campaign organizations not only are faced 
with an even increasing need for outsourcing, but they become able to spend needed 
resources for the employment of external partners.  
As suggested in graph 5.3, the level of in-house provision of services drops significantly 
once financial resources are received after a first electoral success. “Once they become 
reasonably successful, they suddenly have more money available after the campaign and 
then they can afford buying-in professions.”339 The extent and speed depends on the 
respected service. While some, such as hanging posters, might be outsourced at an early 
state, others, such as 
social media 
campaigning might stay 
with the organization 
for a longer period of 
time. At a certain point, 
however, there is a 
turning point from 
which outsourcing again decreases and in-house provision goes up. This is due to the 
development of local party entities, a growing amount of supporters and increased 
knowledge within the campaign organization. However, this process develops significantly 
slower than the first drop of in-house provision. Again, speed and amount of increase 
depend on the particular characteristics of the party. It is unlikely, however, that the 
amount of in-house provision reaches the same point as right after the party’s foundation. 
Once certain financial resources are available, there is a set of processes that only under 
very specific circumstances would be sensible to provide in-house (e.g. printing). A  vivid 
example for this model is the development of the Green Party. In fact, the Green party did 
not employ an external partner until the 1998 campaign. Since then, very strong ties have 
been developed with Berlin-based agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’, which provides many 
                                                     
339 Interview with Stefan Hennewig [Original wording: “Wenn die dann halbwegs erfolgreich sind, haben die dann plötzlich 
Geld nach dem Wahlkampf und dann kann man es sich eben leisten, professionell zuzukaufen.“] 
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services for the campaign. Some tasks like social media are still performed within party 
campaign structures.  
In conclusion, the age of organizations is only an indicator for its maturity. In this regard, 
German party system consists of three clusters of relevant parties: 
- Mature parties: CDU, SPD, FDP 
- Middle-aged parties: Greens, DieLinke (incl. predecessor PDS) 
- Young parties: PirateParty, AfD 
According to those clusters, the openness to outsource differs. While the degree of 
outsourcing is very low among young parties, middle-aged parties are comparably open 
and mature parties already have a high degree of internal expertise. 
5.1.2.2. Party size 
As age of parties might have influence on the availability of resources, the same might apply 
to the size of parties. Experts agree that it is likely that party size also influences openness 
to outsource (see graph 5.4). As a general rule, the more members a party has, the larger 
is the potential for active volunteer supporters “In the end success of a campaign also 
depends on to what extent the campaign is accepted by campaigning party members.”340 
The larger the 
‘reservoir’ of active 
campaign members is, 
the lower is the 
necessity to employ 
external partners. If 
there are enough 
supporters to hang 
posters, this may be 
done by the party itself 
instead of by an agent. “If a party is very small in its personnel structure, it has to outsource 
a lot. If it is large, it can internally implement many processes, which we have creatively 
pre-developed. For CDU, much was created in the field of digital communications. […] We 
                                                     
340 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Am Ende entscheidet über den Erfolg von einer Kampagne im Wahlkampf 
auch die Frage, wie weit die Kampagne von den wahlkämpfenden Parteimitgliedern angenommen wird.“] 
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set the frame, developed the style and defined topics. But then a party organization can 
also implement a lot. However, if a party only has few personnel and a low budget, it 
becomes difficult.”341 Hence, party size might be another indicator for the availability of 
human and financial resources that may be used for the implementation for a campaign. 
The larger a party is, the higher is the chance that enough qualified personnel may be 
accumulated that are able to provide certain services without external expertise. Another 
relevant factor for the extent of openness to outsource in relation to party size is the 
available institutional structure of the party. Larger parties often possess well-developed 
structures with expertise in many relevant fields and with entities down to the local level 
over the entire geographical extent of the country. This aspect, which may closely be 
related to party size, will be examined below. 
5.1.2.3. Organizational level 
The organizational level of parties represents a valuable asset for campaign organization. 
As mentioned above, with a large force of volunteer supporters available, need for 
cooperation with 
external partners 
decreases.  While a 
small group of 
campaign leaders 
normally defines 
cornerstones of a 
campaign, possibly 
jointly with a lead 
agency, campaign 
organization often follows a top-down approach that requires a broad base of supporters. 
Hence organizational level is of particular importance on the local level. Experts agree that 
this has influence on the openness to outsource. As shown in graph 5.5, only 
                                                     
341 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Wenn die Partei sehr klein in der Personalstruktur ist, dann muss sie sehr 
viel auslagern. Wenn sie groß ist, kann sie viele Prozesse auch intern auch umsetzen, die wir kreativ einmal vorentwickelt 
haben. Bei der CDU konkret ist viel selbst entstanden im Bereich digitaler Kommunikation […] Wir haben den Rahmen 
gesetzt, den Stil entwickelt, die Themen definiert. Aber dann kann eine Parteiorganisation auch selbst viel umsetzen. 
Wenn allerdings die Partei wenig Person hat und auch noch wenig Budget, dann wird es schwierig.“]    
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representatives of FDP were rather skeptical. At the same time, it is remarkable that 
representatives of larger parties with better developed organizational level hardly doubt 
an influence. This suggests that parties that are in the position to enjoy this position realize 
the importance of this asset in a campaign. Respondents of DieLinke or FDP who were more 
critical might have not experienced the advantages of strong local entities over the entire 
area of the republic. “If our parties each have about 500.000 members you need an 
additional 2 million volunteers.”342 This can hardly be attained without strong local party 
organizations. During the 2013 campaign Angela Merkel’s ‘TeAM’ received special 
attention since it was a prime example of a broad workforce of supporters that was steered 
from the federal level, but organized with local or regional party structures. Without a 
strong local workforce, federal campaigns are difficult to implement. “To me, these are the 
heroes of each campaign.  I have done that myself. There are more comfortable jobs than 
to climb on a ladder and attach those things with strange cable straps to lampposts on a 
Sunday afternoon, and to listen to funny comments of passers-by. Without these people 
campaigns would not nearly have this effect, because they would not be as visible.”343 
Some of the tasks provided by volunteers may not be provided at all by external partners. 
It would be hard to imagine seeing hired professionals campaigning at a party booth in 
front of a local supermarket. This most likely would not work. Actively including local party 
organizations also has a positive effect of activation. Parties enjoy having organizations of 
volunteers that do not exist in the private economy. Not only is it likely that active 
volunteers would actually cast their vote for the respective party, their engagement might 
also convince family members or friends to do the same. It can therefore be concluded that 
having a large workforce on the local level might be critical to election success.  
                                                     
342 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: “Wenn unsere Parteien etwa jede so 500.000 Mitglieder haben müssen 
sie nochmal zwei Millionen Freiwillige haben.“] 
343 Interview with Hans-Hermann Langguth [Original wording: “Für mich sind das die Helden eines jeden Wahlkampfes. Ich 
habe das auch selbst schon gemacht. Da gibt es angenehmere Jobs als Sonntagnachmittag mit der Leiter auf den 
Lichtmast zu steigen und mit diesen komischen Kabelbindern dieses Zeug da fest zu machen. Und sich noch lustige 
Sprüche anzuhören von Leuten, die vorbeigehen. Ohne diese Leute würden die Kampagnen nicht annähernd die Wirkung 
entfalten, die sie haben, weil sie einfach nicht so sichtbar wären.“] 
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In times of demographic changes, parties are faced with new challenges when it comes to 
organizing campaigns on the local level. Not only is the number of members decreasing, 
party members also become older and not as resilient as they used to be.  
There are a few processes for which organizational level has no influence on openness to 
outsource. This is mostly the case for strategy development. “A strategy is not developed 
by party members, but there is an elected board that determines a committee. Hence, this 
is a very small group that eventually makes the decision how we want to position 
ourselves.”344 In some cases, (as the Greens in 2013) members decide on what general 
topics are important to them. But strategic campaign decisions are taken independently 
from the party’s organizational level. 
Nevertheless, it may be stated that depending on the organizational structure on the local 
level, campaign management needs to decide which tasks may be provided by volunteers 
and which need to be professionalized. The lower the organizational level of a party is, the 
greater is the need and, hence, openness to employ external partners.  
5.1.2.4. Changes in leadership 
Another aspect that may influence openness to outsource is whether there have been 
changes in party leadership before a campaign. Parties’ histories differ greatly in this 
regard. While leadership in CDU has been very constant over past campaigns, other parties, 
such as SPD or the Greens have experienced more leadership changes. The question is, 
whether this has influence on openness to outsource. As shown in graph 5.6, experts are 
rather skeptical. There is no doubt that in successful campaigns, party leaders or main 
candidates have heavy influence on the party’s program. This was visible during SPD’s 
Schröder campaigns as well as when CDU shifted to Merkel as its leader. On the other hand, 
it could be observed in the 2013 SPD campaign that when the main candidate is confronted 
with a predetermined program that does not fit his character, failure becomes more likely. 
How large is the influence of campaign leadership to employ external partners? 
                                                     
344 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: „Eine Strategie wird auch nicht von einer Mitgliederpartei gemacht, 
sondern da ist ein gewählter Landesvorstand, der wiederum ein Gremium bestimmt. Also das ist eine ganz kleine Gruppe, 
die am Ende da die Entscheidung trifft: so wollen wir uns aufstellen.“] 
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During the long period of Helmut Kohl as party leader, CDU experienced a continuous 
increase of external expertise incorporated into campaign organizations. In their ‘campaign 
commission’ they accumulated marketing experts from the private economy who gave 
valuable support to the assigned agencies. During the 1990’s this was further 
professionalized. At the same time, similar processes could be seen at SPD’s campaign that 
had a total of six 
party leaders 
between 1990 and 
1998. The same 
observation could be 
found again, when 
SPD was headed by 
another five 
different persons 
between 2002 and 
2009. In the same period of time CDU, was only headed by Angela Merkel. Again, both 
parties developed similarly in terms of openness to outsource. Therefore, there is no strong 
indication available that changes in party leadership lead to an increased or decreased 
openness to employ external partners. The same applies to situations in which campaign 
leadership changes. 
However, what changes in party leadership seem to affect is the choice of the external 
partner. While some respondents argue that particularly during the first period of new 
campaign leadership, available expertise should be kept, others underline that one way to 
bring necessary changes to campaigns (e.g. after electoral defeats that led to changes in 
leadership), replacement of external partners is a popular choice. As Kajo Wasserhövel345 
states, “a change in leadership often leads to a realignment of consulting structures. […] 
                                                     
345 Karl-Josef Wasserhövel is chairman of PR agency ‚Elephantlogic‘. From 1995 to 1998 he was personal assistant to SPD 
federal manager Franz Müntefering. After Müntefering’s election as General Secretary, Wasserhövel became his office 
manager. From 2004 until 2009 he was SPD federal manager and was charged with organizing SPD election campaigns.  
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[There is] of course trust that develops towards leadership personalities. […] A new party 
leader or new party leadership normally realigns this accordingly.”346  
A particular problem for external partners is when campaign leadership changes during the 
run of a campaign. Although this does not happen often, agents employed at the 2013 FDP 
campaign were confronted with this phenomenon when main candidate Philipp Rösler was 
replaced by Rainer Brüderle. “With the change to Brüderle different consultants suddenly 
came into play that had their own topics and agendas. This changed the work and made it 
more difficult.”347 With that change, well-planned concepts and strategies needed to be 
revised in order to fit the new situation and candidate. This led to the situation that 
deadlines could not or only hardly be met. Once Election Day came closer and polls were 
at frighteningly low levels, a certain degree of panic could be observed within the 
campaign, leading to impulsive decisions on both sides that were not coordinated well. 
Hence, it was impossible for the necessary trust between new party leadership and agents 
to develop, resulting in uncoordinated activities that most likely had negative effects on 
the overall effect of the campaign.   
In conclusion, it may be stated that changes in campaign leadership do not have a 
significant influence on the openness to outsource, but they may have influence on the 
choice of which external partner to task and on the efficiency of cooperation between 
principal and agent. 
5.1.2.5. Decision making processes 
A factor that came up during the running of the interviews was the influence of decision 
making processes to the openness to outsource. A variety of respondents suggested that 
unclear decision making processes and several centers of power may have a direct 
influence on the amount of external partners tasked with particular processes in a 
campaign (see graph 5.7). In an ideal campaign, there is one center of power, which is a 
                                                     
346 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Ein Führungswechsel führt oft dazu, dass die Strukturen in der 
Beratung neu aufgestellt werden. […] [Es gibt] natürlich auch Vertrauensverhältnisse, die entstehen zu den 
Führungspersönlichkeiten. […] Ein neuer Parteivorsitzender oder eine neue Parteiführung arrondiert das dann auch 
entsprechend neu.“] 
347 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Beim Wechsel zu Brüderle kamen plötzlich andere Berater ins Spiel, die 
ihre eigenen Themen und Agenda hatten. Das veränderte und erschwerte das Arbeiten."] 
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symbiosis of the campaign manager and the main candidate. “Nothing was released 
without me seeing it. And if I said no, it would not be published.”348 Having one center of 
power is a crucial element to effectiveness of campaigns. Everyone involved needs to know 
who is in the position to decide and this must be a small circle of people. This plays a 
particularly important role when it comes to interacting with external service providers. A 
greater variety of contact points would lead to chaotic circumstances. “In the end, it is 
decisive that there is one responsible person who then is also able to make decisions.”349 
This does not need to be a front row politician. In fact, most of the tasks that need to be 
fulfilled in a campaign are well under the radar of top political decision makers. But it must 
be clear to everyone who is in the position to make final decisions. The fewer people there 
are, the most effective a campaign organization works. In terms of outsourcing, this does 
not necessarily have an impact on the openness to outsource a larger amount of tasks, but 
it is less likely that a variety of partners will be hired by different centers of power who 
might work contradictory to each other.  
A particularly vivid 
example of how 
unclear decision 
making processes 
may lead to 
unwanted increased 
outsourcing was the 
2013 SPD campaign. 
Observers as well as 
participants agree 
that there had been 
a variety of centers of power:  
- Secretary General Andrea Nahles who was in charge of the overall campaign but not 
                                                     
348 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Es wurde nichts freigegeben, was ich nicht gesehen habe. Und wenn ich 
gesagt habe nein, dann gab es dann auch nicht.“] 
349 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: “Entscheidend ist am Ende immer, dass es einen Verantwortlichen 
gibt, der dann auch entscheidungsfähig ist.“] 
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settled in party headquarters and had a very difficult relation with candidate Steinbrück 
and party leader Gabriel. 
- head of party Sigmar Gabriel who tried to avoid a major failure in his first campaign as 
party leader,  
- head of parliamentary group Frank-Walter Steinmeier who gathered parliamentary 
expertise and used to be main candidate in the previous campaign, and 
- main candidate Peer Steinbrück who only gradually seemed to adjust to his visible 
position, who was faced with a program that did not connect to his personal 
convictions, and who seemed to have almost no support within Willy-Brand-House.  
As official strategic partner, a joint venture stemming from popular agencies 
‘Johannsen+Kretschmer’ and ‘Super an der Spree’ was chosen from campaign leadership. 
In addition, Hamburg-based APOS was tasked with strategic consultation. With Aimaq von 
Lobenstein, another strategic consultant was chosen by party leader Gabriel to add to the 
campaign350. It turned out that head of campaign Andrea Nahles was very reluctant 
towards them, because she had closer relations to ‘Super J+K’. As a result, there were 
several teams working quite uncoordinated on the same campaign. Rals Tils351 explains that 
“this was problematic, because the understanding of the agency’s role was not coordinated 
with the central decision makers, but with the secretary general.”352 This deficit became 
particularly apparent when comparisons to the CDU campaign were drawn, where only one 
major external partner was employed and where clearly defined decision-making 
processes could be observed that only had two points of contacts for external partners. 
Once imbalances through several centers of power have been created, “it cannot be 
stabilized through an external or outsourced consulting structure. They do not have a 
chance in that regard. That’s what also happened in 2013.”353 
                                                     
350 Alexander and Fischaleck, ‘Die Kanzlermacher’ 
351 Dr. Ralf Tils is partner of APOS (Agentur für politische Strategie). He was deeply involved in the 2013 SPD campaign, 
where he was hired as consultant focussing on strategic issues. He therefore added to the scope of lead agency ‘Super 
J+S’ which was tasked with overall campaign development.  
352 Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Das war dann problematisch, weil das Rollenverständnis dieser Agentur war 
eben nicht mit den zentralen Entscheidungsträgern aber schon mit der Generalsekretärin abgestimmt.“]   
353 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Kann es auch nicht über eine externe oder outgesourcte 
Beratungsstrukturen stabilisiert werden. Da haben die gar keine Chancen mehr, das zu machen. Das war das, was 2013 
auch stattgefunden hat.“]    
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It may be concluded that uncoordinated decision-making processes may accidentally lead 
to an unintended larger openness to outsource processes. With several centers of power, 
each one attempts to exert influence on the campaign organization. That may also include 
that every center employs different consultants and agents with whom they have built a 
relationship of trust. In cases, where only one center of power exists, which is the final 
authority to decide, clear decision making processes lead to a coordinated cooperation 
with one or only a few selected partners with clear responsibilities.  
5.1.2.6. Need for external perspective 
Just like in the private business world there is a natural danger of developing tunnel vision 
in case of a strong focus on particular issues. Political parties seem to be exposed 
particularly to this trap since there is a high danger that positions and opinions of party 
members do not necessarily represent the overall society. Hence, topics that might play a 
central role for close supporters might not have the same significance for the vast majority 
of society and thereby for a large potential of votes.  
Being aware of this tendency, parties often actively demand support from external partners 
to add an outside perspective to their considerations. On one hand, topics need to be 
developed by the party itself, “on the other hand, they are naturally deeply involved in the 
topics so that it sometimes helps to employ an external service provider, which sometimes 
clears a path through the thicket.”354 Parties sometimes need to be corrected in their 
considerations. An external partner who is not biased by the party’s political line can most 
effectively do this. Parties therefore expect professional support and expertise from service 
providers that the party itself would not be able to provide. “That used to be such a trend 
to say we employ agencies that have never conducted a campaign. Something fresh, 
something new with an external view. You can do that. But you can only do that if you are 
well-positioned. Because if you employ an inexperienced agency and, at the same time, 
you are internally badly organized you have a serious problem. That doesn’t work.”355 
                                                     
354 Stauss, Frank [Original wording:„Auf der anderen Seite sind sie natürlich auch so sehr in den Themen drin, dass es 
manchmal eben auch hilft, einen externen Dienstleister mit reinzuholen, der eben auch dann manchmal eine Schneise in 
das Dickicht schlägt“] 
355 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: “Das war ja mal so ein Trend zu sagen, wir holen uns Agenturen, die noch nie 
politische Kampagnen gemacht haben, was Frisches, was Neues, und der Blick von außen usw. Kann man machen. Kann 
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5.2. Factors influencing extent of outsourcing 
Once the make-or-buy decision is answered in favor of ‘buy’ the question arises what 
influences the extent of outsourcing. Outsourcing is not always outsourcing. As indicated 
in chapters 1.1 and 4.2 a range of outsourcing mechanism ranging from internal shared 
service centers to classic external outsourcing is possible. Therefore, this subchapter will 
pick up the main research question ‘what are the determinants for the extent of 
outsourcing performed in election campaigns?’ According to the main hypothesis, focus is 
put on two factors, recalling the model introduced in chapter 1.1. (see graph 5.8): Potential 
loss of control and political transaction costs. The basic principle is that larger potential loss 
of control or political transaction costs are, the smaller willingness to give the service to an 
external partner is. It is not necessary that both factors are equally pronounced. The 
following explores if these two factors have the suggested impact.  
5.2.1. Political transaction costs 
As outlined in chapter 4.6.2, outsourcing certain processes to external partners leads to 
transaction costs. On one hand, those are financial costs resulting from payments made to 
the agent. On the 
other hand, there are 
non-financial costs, 
reaching from an 
increased need for 
coordination (between 
principal and agent) to 
a brain drain on the 
side of the principal. 
Therefore, decision 
makers need to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of outsourcing to make an informed decision.  
                                                     
man aber nur machen, wenn man gut aufgestellt ist. Weil wenn man eine unerfahrene Agentur holt und gleichzeitig noch 
sozusagen intern als Partei schlecht aufgestellt ist, dann hat man ein echtes Problem. Das funktioniert nicht.”] 
 
Graph 5.8: Outsourcing decision based on political transaction Costs and potential loss of control 
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With politics being an area where personal reputation, success stories and power play an 
even more important role than in the private economy, another factor is of significant 
importance: political transaction costs. They describe the extent to which key players in 
campaign management face personal consequences for their career, reputation, etc. in the 
case of outsourcing certain processes to external providers. As stated in chapter 1.1, being 
tested is  ‘the more key players are able to internalize successes and externalize failures, 
the lower potential transaction costs are’. Particularly heads of campaigns are in very visible 
positions. This may lead to promotions to superior party positions or to attractive positions 
in the private economy (e.g. the area of lobbying or political consulting) in case of success. 
At the same time, it may also lead to the end of a political career in the case of major 
failures. In the end, “it is always the campaign manager who is to blame”356. This leads to a 
very high degree of responsibility and, hence, to tendency for risk-aversion. Frank Stauss 
reminds us that there indeed have been former campaign managers who were promoted 
to ministerial positions, but, “I would not know an actual campaign manager who had a 
notable career on the federal level or who ended up as Prime Minister of a state at any 
point in history.”357 This underlines that key party personnel are under heavy pressure, 
particularly when their political fate is connected to the success of the respective campaign. 
Party key players have a genuine interest in personally benefiting from successful 
campaigns. As campaign manager, “you need a political nose, political thinking, and a 
political gut. Perhaps gut feeling is even more important.”358 Therefore, they are unlikely 
to give a process to an external partner if it does not serve the purpose. 
During the run of expert interviews, it became clear that a factor that is highly relevant for 
principal-agent relationship in this regard is trust. Hence, three aspects that have an impact 
on political transaction costs are explored more thoroughly in the following: Potential 
internalization of success, potential externalization of failures and trust.  
                                                     
356 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: „Der Wahlkampfmanager ist natürlich immer schuld“] 
357 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “Ich kann mich nicht daran erinnern, dass jetzt in der Geschichte der Republik ein 
tatsächlicher Wahlkampfmanager am Ende irgendwo in der Ebene von einer nennenswerten bundesweiten Karriere 
gelandet wäre oder Ministerpräsident oder sowas geworden wäre.“] 
358 Lemke, Steffi [Original wording: „Sie brauchen eine politische Nase, ein politisches Denken, einen politischen Bauch. 
Vielleicht ist das Bauchgefühl sogar noch wichtiger.“] 
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5.2.1.1. Internalization of successes 
As mentioned above, an aspect that is of central importance to key campaign personnel is 
that they are able to convert success in campaigns to benefits for their personal 
professional careers. Particularly during the last phase of a campaign, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to differentiate clearly between contributions that have their origins 
internally and those that come from external partners.  In most cases, they stem from 
mutual collaboration. However, in order to reach personal benefits for responsible 
personnel, it seems necessary that achieved successes is being attributed to campaign 
management itself and not to external factors or external partners. Therefore, the question 
arises whether internalization of successes is a factor that contributes to the extent of 
political transaction costs. When talking about the factor of internalization of successes, 
experts had a quite clear opinion. As shown in graph 5.9, eight out of ten times the issue 
was raised with a clear position. Experts claimed that internalization of successes indeed 
plays an important role when it comes to the extent of political transaction costs.  
Before thoroughly analyzing more particular factors and examples of internalization of 
successes, an important differentiation between internal and external perception of 
success factors 
needs to be 
made. Matthias 
Höhn359 states 
“publicly you will 
never manage 
that agents […] 
stand in the 
spotlight. In case 
of doubt, it will 
always be the 
                                                     
359 Matthias Höhn is federal manager of leftist party DieLinke. From 2005 until 2012 he was party leader in the state of 
Sachsen-Anhalt. He was first elected into DieLinke’s federal board in 2010. As federal manager, he is responsible of 
DieLinke campaigns since 2012. 
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candidate or the party leader and sometimes it is both in personal union.”360 However, 
when it comes to personal consequences, the internal perspective is of more importance 
to party personnel. Axel Wallrabenstein underlines in this context that “internally you 
always can see very clearly who was in charge of a campaign and who contributed to its 
success.”361  
During the running of the interviews, it became very clear that internalization of success is 
a factor that is significantly more relevant for experts that were involved in campaigns of 
the two large parties SPD and CDU. Of the above noted ten mentions, nine can be assigned 
to representative of those two parties. Two explanations seem to be most sensible for this 
phenomenon:  
- Of all parties on the federal level, only CDU and SPD have a realistic prospect of being 
the dominant force in government. Therefore, those two parties offer the most 
promising chances for distinctive political careers. 
- Both parties experienced rather large changes in cooperation with external partners. 
While DieLinke and the Greens also relied on long-lasting relationships in the 2013 
elections, CDU and SPD largely worked together with sets of new agents.  
Career prospects play an important role in the extent to which actors perceive political 
transaction costs as relevant for the run of their careers. If a player was responsible for a 
campaign of a party that only has marginal chances to be part of government, career 
options may be limited to internal party positions. This might still represent an attractive 
option; however, arguably government positions are more desirable for most players. A 
prime example is the 2002 SPD campaigns run by Franz Müntefering and Matthias Machnig. 
Both were in very powerful and visible positions and both seemed to have desire for further 
reaching careers. Hence, they had a genuine interest in being associated with potential 
election success. “Everything was clearly assigned. Müntefering and Machnig run a 
campaign […]. They drew the entire political responsibility for the campaign to 
                                                     
360 Höhn, Matthias [Original wording: „Öffentlich werden sie es nie schaffen, dass Agenturen […] im Fokus stehen. Das wird 
dann im Zweifel immer der Spitzenkandidat oder die Parteivorsitzenden und manchmal ist es Personalunion.“] 
361 Wallrabenstein, Axel [Original wording: „Nach innen sieht man das schon sehr genau, wer auch für einen Wahlkampf 
mitverantwortlich war und wer mit am Sieg beteiligt war.“] 
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themselves.”362 Although CDU led all polls, SPD managed to defend its majority.  There is 
no doubt that this was also due to some external factors, such as the big flood in eastern 
Germany. However, Müntefering and Machnig managed to internalize the unexpected 
success of the campaign. A few months later, Müntefering was head of the party, minister 
for labor and Vice-Chancellor and Machnig state secretary, respectively minister on the 
state level at a later stage.  
When parties and agents have been working together in a long-lasting and resilient 
relationship, short-term internalization of success is not as common as when there is a 
rather high fluctuation of external partners. In a long-term relationship, principal and 
agents work together in a series of campaigns and projects and therefore always have to 
keep in mind that it would be inopportune to upset the respective partner by claiming 
responsibility for successes actually achieved by the partner. 
In the case of fluctuation of external providers, key party players often understand agents 
as purely a service provider remunerated for its services. “Consultants are gone afterwards. 
They have fulfilled their contract.”363 Although it is clear to all actors that every success has 
many fathers, there is a natural tendency on both sides attempting to internalize success 
in order to qualify themselves either for further political positions in the case of party actors 
or for further campaign tasks in the case of external service providers. In the 2013 election, 
a large-scale CDU billboard covering the façade of a house next to Berlin main station 
showing the popular ‘Merkel rhombus’ gained large attention (see graph 5.10). During the 
running of the 
interviews it became 
clear that both, party 
and agency claimed 
responsibility for this 
project. While it will be 
literally impossible to 
investigate who had 
                                                     
362 Tils, Ralf [Original wording: „Da war es ganz klar zugeordnet. Müntefering und Machnig machen eine Kampagne […] Die 
haben die politische Verantwortung für den Wahlkampf komplett an sich gezogen.“] 
363 Tils, Ralf [Original wording: „Die Berater sind hinterher weg. Die haben ihren Vertrag erfüllt.“] 
 
Graph 5.10: Merkel rhombus billboard  
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the initial idea for the billboard, it is apparent that both sides attempted to be associated 
with this successful project and tried to internalize this success factor. As Kajo Wasserhövel 
underlines it is a natural reaction by the agent to try to prove its capabilities by claiming 
responsibility for such success stories. It is a genuine asset for an agent to underline that “I 
was responsible for Merkel 2013. And when there are other advertisers sitting there they 
will applaud and say ‘great, cool guys.’”364 Hence, it is a natural tendency for the economic 
man to internalize successes wherever possible to prove one’s personal capabilities for 
personal profit.  
At the same time, one has to realize that in the political sphere this has its limitations. The 
extent to which this is possible or necessary seems connected to the extent to which the 
service provider is dependent on the agent.    
If there are long lasting relationships with realistic prospects for further cooperation (e.g. 
between the Greens and the agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’ or between DieLinke and 
DiG),  hesitation to internalize success on the side of the agent seems to be larger than in 
the case of SPD and CDU. The latters’ agents are more dependent on success stories in 
order to find other contractors after cooperation with the party has ended.  
5.2.1.2. Externalization of failures 
Naturally, taking over responsibility does not only imply that potential successes are 
attributed to people in charge. Accordingly, responsible actors might also be associated 
with potential failures. As describe above, campaign managers often are in their position 
because they strive for higher political careers. While being associated with successes may 
be helpful to attain this goal, failures might cause the exact opposite and bring harm to 
career plans.  Therefore, this section examines if tendencies to externalize failures play a 
role in campaigns and if that they are a relevant aspect for the extent of political transaction 
costs. The assumption is that the smaller possibilities to externalize failures are, the larger 
the impact on political transaction costs is. 
Campaigns are complicated systems of processes that require distinctive expertise. It is 
literally impossible for any campaign manager to have always the maximum of knowledge 
                                                     
364 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Ich habe 2013 Merkel gemacht. Und wenn da die Werber sitzen, 
dann klatschen die und sagen super, coole Type.“] 
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available that is necessary to fully steer all processes of a campaign. Nevertheless, “political 
decision makers need to make decisions because they are holding the responsibility. [...] 
But I would leave a question mark to the aspect of how professional that is.”365 It is clear 
to all actors that there is no such thing as a campaign without mistakes or errors. They 
happen and they are natural. Hence, as shown in graph 5.4, experts have a clear tendency 
to consider externalization of failures as relevant to political transaction costs. Of 21 
mentions with clear positioning, only six considered externalization of failures as an 
irrelevant factor, while 15 statements implied relevance for political transaction costs.  
An interesting aspect is the fact that while experts from smaller parties hardly mentioned 
this aspect, it was mainly CDU and SPD affiliates who raised this topic. While SPD experts 
were divided 
(four statements 
for each 
characteristic), a 
clear majority of 
eight to four 
mentions of CDU 
affiliates claimed 
that 
externalization 
of failures is not 
only a reality, but also a relevant factor for political transaction costs. “I think everybody 
has this reflex. And it is also relevant for political organizations. If you are winning, it was 
you and if you are not winning it was somebody else. Then, the agency is ‘somebody 
else’.”366 When focussing on the 2013 SPD campaign, experts agree that externalization of 
failures was indeed a relevant factor. From the very start when Peer Steinbrink was chosen 
                                                     
365 Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Dann müssen aber die politischen Entscheidungsträger letztendlich die 
Entscheidung treffen, weil die müssen auch die Verantwortung tragen. […] Aber ob das dann immer so versiert in 
professioneller Hinsicht ist, da möchte ich noch einmal ein Fragezeichen dahinter hinsetzen.]    
366 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: „Ich glaube, diesen Reflex haben alle. Und er gilt auch für politische 
Organisationen. Wenn man gewinnt war man das selber und wenn man nicht gewinnt waren es andere. Und die 
Agenturpartner sind dann eben der Andere.”] 
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as candidate, it became obvious that party and candidate did not work in a symbiosis, but 
rather as community of purpose.  “Then they said ‘Peer, you can get everything what you 
want. But the result is your responsibility.”367 Particularly when it was foreseeable that the 
campaign would not lead to election success, actors attempted not to be associated with 
this campaign in order not having to face negative consequences. It became obvious in the 
interviews that this is phenomenon is present on both sides, the principal and the agent. A 
variety of actors particularly pointed out mistakes that were done in areas that did not 
belong to their respective responsibility before claiming that externalization of failures is 
actually not a relevant factor. Therefore, the difference between SPD and CDU may stem 
from the fact that neglecting externalization of failures might already be a step in doing so 
if the party was faced with a major defeat in the past (as it was the case with SPD in 2013). 
Peter Radunski brings it to the point: “There is nothing nicer than making the agency 
responsible. But there is also nothing more dubious”368, keeping in mind that it is not the 
agent that runs a campaign, but it is campaign management on the side of the party. Hence, 
the attempt to externalize failures at the expense of the agent is a real phenomenon. 
However, it is weak when it comes to the facts on the ground. This normally would become 
apparent during the revision process in the aftermath of a campaign. However, “revision 
has been and continues to be a catastrophe. They are normally not performed, if there is 
no political will. In particular, when there is continuity in campaign leadership. They would 
have to tell themselves what they had been doing wrong.”369 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of experts agree that externalization of failures is an aspect 
that is relevant and contributes to the extent of political transaction costs. Even experts 
that maintain long-term relationships with their agents acknowledge that “you can assume 
in each campaign that the agency or the head of campaign […] are the ones held 
responsible. That is part of the game. The agency knows that and, being head of campaign, 
                                                     
367 Interview with Ralf Tils [Original wording: „Dann haben sie gesagt du kannst alles haben was du willst, Peer. Aber das ist 
deine Verantwortung was dabei rauskommt.“] 
368 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Es gibt ja nichts Schöneres, als wenn sie die Agentur verantwortlich 
machen können. Es gibt aber auch nichts Unseriöseres.“] 
369 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Die Aufarbeitungen sind und bleiben eine Katastrophe. Sie werden in 
der Regel nicht gemacht, wenn sie politisch nicht gewollt sind. Vor allen Dingen dann, wenn die Führung sich fortsetzt. 
Müssen sie sich ja nicht erzählen, dass sie was falsch gemacht hat.“] 
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I know this as well.370 Experts point out that externalization of failures is particularly present 
when parties are in processes of realignment. Failures are often used to enforce strategic 
decisions. Regularly one consequence of an election defeat is a change of agent, regardless 
whether errors could be proven or not.  
Since there is also a considerable number of respondents claiming that externalization of 
failures is not a relevant element, the question remains what was different in campaigns 
these respondents took part in. As mentioned above, neglecting this phenomenon might 
already be a characteristic of externalization. However, two other aspects are likely to play 
a role in the extent of externalization of failures: 
- Is there a will to continue to work together with the same partner? 
- The extent to which the external partner was involved in the campaign 
Similar to internalization of successes, externalization of failures becomes a less relevant 
factor when there are long-lasting relationships between the principal and the agent. As 
suggested by game theory, players act differently when they know that there are some 
more rounds to come. Hence, the interest in upsetting one’s partner by making him 
responsible for one’s own mistakes is limited. Everybody in the organization knows that 
“you as political decision maker are responsible. Normally, you know exactly with which 
result you are going home. No political decision maker can say the agency wasn’t that good 
in case of failures.”371 This explanation is supported by the observation that those experts 
who had been working together in long-term relationships (e.g. Frank Stauss and Kajo 
Wasserhövel) did not report considerable externalization of failures. “Perhaps we were just 
lucky, but we have never experienced this. Not even after difficult campaigns and tough 
defeats, anyone would have pointed the finger at us. That might be caused by the acting 
                                                     
370 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: Sie können bei jedem Wahlkampf davon ausgehen, dass die Agentur 
bzw. der Wahlkampfleiter […]dann doch die sind, die Schuld sind. Das gehört dazu. Das weiß die Agentur und das weiß 
auch ich als Wahlkampfleiter] 
371 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Sie stehen als politischer Entscheider in der Verantwortung. 
Normalerweise wissen sie ganz genau, mit dem Ergebnis gehen sie nach Hause. Kein politischer Entscheider kann sich 
hinstellen wenn das schlecht läuft und sagen die Agentur war nicht so gut.“] 
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persons.”372 
The other aspect is the extent to which the external partner was involved in the campaign. 
There are considerable differences in scopes of external partners. While in some campaigns 
they are involved from the very beginning of strategy planning (find one example in chapter 
6.3), in other campaigns, external partners serve as pure service providers for particular 
services (see chapter 6.4). Depending on the extent of involvement, externalization of 
failures may be possible. “If an agency has only been an extended workbench […] one can 
hardly make them responsible for a defeat.”373 
In conclusion, it can be stated that externalization of failures is a relevant factor in 
campaigning, particularly when highly fluctuating external partners are involved in key 
aspects of campaigns. For the most part, this phenomenon is accepted by all stakeholders 
although it is considered a signal of bad chemistry between the principal and the agent. 
5.2.1.3. Trust 
During the running of the interviews, it became apparent that there is a third factor that 
has an impact on the 
extent of political 
transaction costs: 
trust. Experts clearly 
stated that trust 
between principal and 
agent is a valuable 
asset due to a number 
of reasons that will be 
explored in the 
following. As shown in 
graph 5.12, of 41 
                                                     
372 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: „Vielleicht haben wir bisher nur Glück gehabt, aber wir haben es noch nie 
erlebt. Auch nach schwierigen Wahlkämpfen und nach harten Niederlagen, dass man mit dem Finger auf uns gezeigt 
hätte. Das mag an den handelnden Personen gelegen haben.“ 
373 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: „Wenn eine Agentur von vornherein immer nur verlängerte 
Werkbank ist […] dann kann man sie nachher auch schwer mitverantwortlich machen für einen Verlust“] 
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mentions a vast majority of 31 claimed that trust plays a role and has an effect on the extent 
of political transaction costs. Only three stated that this aspect might be negligible.  
Trust is a resource that cannot be created from one day to another. Rather it takes time 
and personal contact for trust to develop. Since there is a danger that actors attempt to 
internalize successes and externalize failures, players seek for a partner they may trust 
enough to minimize dangers of falsely being blamed. There are several factors that 
contribute to the benefits of trust: 
- Similar ways of thinking;  
- Knowledge that the partner is able to provide all needed resources; 
- Continuity in partnership; 
- Identification with principal, and 
- Discreetness 
As Kajo Wasserhövel points out, campaigns are in a field of tension between seeking 
partners that have similar attitudes, opinions and convictions and partners that might be 
able to set new impulses. “I am not fond of relationships, which are too close. That only 
leads to discussions that are not to the point and you also might be too careless when 
performance is not provided. On the other hand, it is difficult if you have a service provider 
– this depends on the subject – that is too far away from politics and you continuously have 
to brief him. That may be very time-consuming.”374 The decisive factor is whether the 
principal can be sure that the agent is not only striving for profit maximization, but rather 
for winning the campaign. To attain this goal, a certain number of like-minded actors are 
necessary. In practice, campaign management bases principal decisions on whom to work 
with on subjective gut feeling and past experiences. Respondents summarized this fact 
under the key word ‘chemistry’ between principal and agent. Often, this aspect is already 
considered in the selection process for service providers. In many cases, there is no public 
tender, but campaign managers contact agencies they know (perhaps through past 
cooperation) and they can imagine as a trustworthy partner again. The ideal goal for 
                                                     
374 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Ich halte nichts davon, wenn das zu eng ist. Weil das dazu führt, dass 
man nicht auf den Punkt miteinander redet und auch unter Umständen zu nachlässig ist, wenn die Leistung nicht 
gebracht wird. Es ist aber auch schwierig, wenn Sie Dienstleister haben - kommt jetzt auf das Gewerk an - der zu weit von 
Politik oder von ihnen weg ist und sie müssen ihn permanent neu einbriefen. Das kann auch sehr aufwendig sein.“] 
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campaign management is to find partners that combine both, advantages of closeness and 
of distance. “Proximity brings understanding. But proximity also brings conformity of 
ideas.”375 Hence, relationships between party managers and agencies that are 
characterized by very similar ways of thinking might be very harmonic, but there is a danger 
that they might sooner or later lose some of their initial creativity.  
In addition, respondents agree that the principal needs to trust that the agent is able to 
provide all necessary resources at the requested point in time. It is expected by campaign 
managers that agents do not attempt to postpone certain tasks due to lack of human 
resources (e.g. through holidays). Since parties are not able to provide certain services and 
therefore strive for cooperation with external partners, there is a certain degree of 
dependency. PirateParty campaign manager Salomon Reyes376 underlines, “we trust the 
persons in charge. If we choose someone, there is a reason for it. […] We don’t have the 
possibilities to constantly second someone who monitors if what needs to be done has 
been done and how the result looks like. At the moment we emit a task it is being taken 
over very liberally.”377 Failure in service provision may lead to negative consequences that 
also might have backlashes on campaign managers personally. Therefore, campaign 
managers are well-advised in working together with trustworthy partners, which can 
ensure that necessary resources can be provided.  
As mentioned above, trust is a factor that grows over time. Therefore, an aspect that 
contributes largely to the extent of trust is continuity in partnerships. Particularly experts 
that were involved in campaigns of DieLinke and the Greens who have been part to close 
and long-term relationships underline the value of trust to both sides. It adds to efficiency 
and effectiveness of a campaign organization. As already mentioned in chapter 5.1.2.4 in 
cases of changes in party leadership, long-term relations between principal and agent may 
be terminated due to a realignment of party structures. This does not necessarily have to 
                                                     
375 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Nähe bringt Verständnis. Nähe bringt aber vielleicht auch eine 
Gleichschaltung der Ideen.“] 
376 Salomon Reyes has been member of the PirateParty since 2011. He was charged with the overall management of the 
2013 Bundestag campaign.  
377 Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Wir vertrauen den Personen. Wenn wir sie ausgewählt haben, dann hat 
das einen Grund. […] Wir haben nicht die Möglichkeiten, die ganze Zeit jemanden abzustellen, der darauf guckt, ob dass, 
was da gemacht werden muss, auch so gemacht wird, wie es sein soll. In dem Moment, wo wir eine Aufgabe abgeben, 
wird die sehr frei übernommen.“] 
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bring an end to a trustworthy relationship if decisions have been made in a transparent and 
understandable manner.  
Politics is a market that triggers emotions. Results of an election may have direct impacts 
on all citizens of a country and beyond. Therefore, experts agree that a general tendency 
in favor of the program of the principal is a good basis for a trustworthy relationship. 
However, the question arises how strong identification with the respective party needs to 
be. Experts agree that holding membership of the party is not a prerequisite. However, 
“there needs to be a certain basic conviction and harmony. Otherwise it doesn’t work. But 
one does not have to be a party member and one does not have to agree to all points.”378 
This does not only apply to the head of the agent, but also to members that work in the 
responsible team. Without a similar basic conviction, it would be hard to find intrinsic 
motivation to work for the success of a given party. All experts from agencies claim that 
only a small percentage of their workforce engaged in campaigns actually holds 
membership in a political party. A particularly interesting case is Lutz Meyer who was in 
charge of the 2013 Merkel campaign with his agency ‘Blumberry’. “Meyer had been SPD 
member for many years, from 1998 to 2000 speaker of SPD minister of interior Schily and 
during the 2002 campaign office manager of campaign manager Matthias Machnig and 
considerably engaged in ‘Kampa’ that helped SPD and Gerhard Schröder to win 
elections.”379 More important than having party membership is an understanding for the 
respective organization. This includes understanding for structure, history and procedures.  
The last factor that contributes to trust is the ability to act in discreet ways and to preserve 
secrets. “It is just trust for trust. The customer trusts us and we trust our employees. […] Of 
course there is a clause in each contract that is signed by everyone […]. But in the end it 
doesn’t help anything because in eight of ten cases you cannot prove where it is coming 
                                                     
378 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: „Es muss eine gewisse Grundüberzeugung und -harmonie gegeben 
sein. Sonst funktioniert das nicht. Aber man muss nicht Parteimitglied sein oder man muss nicht in allen Punkten 
übereinstimmen.“ 
379 Alexander and Fischaleck, ‘Die Kanzlermacher’ [Original wording: "Denn Meyer war viele Jahre SPD-Mitglied, von 1998 bis 
2000 Sprecher von SPD-Innenminister Schily und im Wahlkampf 2002 als Büroleiter des damaligen SPD-
Wahlkampfmanagers Matthias Machnig maßgeblich an der 'Kampa' beteiligt, die der SPD unter Gerhard Schröder zum 
Wahlsieg verhalf."] 
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from.”380 Since parties aim for any weakness in opponents’ campaigns, it is of utmost 
importance that potential points of attacks are not being created due to lack of 
discreetness on the side of the partner. Nevertheless, Armin Reins reminds us that this is 
not a factor unique to campaigns. Obligations of secrecy are sometimes even larger in the 
private sector. “When we advertise for a new car, you can imagine that secrecy is much 
larger. In a party, what is secret there?381 Nevertheless, it is a clear expectation by both 
sides that relevant aspects of a campaign remain to be unknown for the public and 
opponents in order not to lose possible competitive advantages. 
It can be concluded that trust is essential to campaigns. While principal and agent do not 
have to be structurally interwoven, every side needs to be sure that they can address issues 
in private. If actors need to fear that secrets are brought to the attention of the public, 
there is no basis for a fruitful partnership. Hence, trust significantly contributes to political 
transaction costs when party personnel are risking political disadvantages due to 
inadequacies of the service provider. 
5.2.2. Control 
The proposed model states that the extent of outsourcing is not only dependent on the 
level of political transaction costs, but also on the extent of possible loss of control over 
certain aspects of the campaign. This indicates that the higher potential loss of control is, 
the lower the willingness is to give a process to an external service provider. This sub-
chapter will pick up research question two and elaborate on factors that contribute to the 
extent of possible control over the campaign organization. Hypothesis two stated in this 
regard that only if a process is low in complexity, can be standardized, and has negligible 
strategic importance, key actors are able to maintain control over the campaign 
organization. Hence, the following will explore whether these are indeed decisive factors 
that contribute to the degree of control.  
                                                     
380 Interview with Hans-Hermann Langguth [Original wording: „Es ist nur Vertrauen für Vertrauen. Der Kunde vertraut uns 
und wir vertrauen unseren Mitarbeitern. […] Es steht natürlich in jedem Arbeitsvertrag eine Klausel, die jeder unterschreibt 
[…] Im Zweifelsfall nutzt ihnen das gar nichts, im Zweifel kann man ja in acht von zehn Fällen gar nicht beweisen, wo es 
herkommt.“] 
381 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: „Wenn ich für ein neues Auto werbe, ist die Geheimhaltung viel größer. In 
einer Partei, was ist denn da bitte wirklich geheim?“] 
136 | P a g e  
All experts agree that there is no ultimate control over the agent. Nevertheless, agents 
need to be led in order for the campaign organization to work effectively. “Many politicians 
or campaigns fail because they don’t know or don’t realize that an agency also needs to be 
led.”382 It should be defined what role the agent is playing in the overall structure and what 
responsibilities it is taking over.  
Campaign organizations attempt to protect themselves against a possible loss of control. 
While in the past this was done on the basis of clearly defined budgets, tasks and 
contractual clauses that led to penalties in case of underperformance, other actors (such 
as the Greens) try to exert control by integrating the agent deeply into the campaign 
structure, both physically and in terms of responsibilities.  
The following will further explore the mentioned three factors identifying their 
contribution to potential loss of control, indicating possible ways to avoid this 
phenomenon. 
5.2.2.1. Complexity 
Although this aspect was only mentioned a few times, complexity of outsourced services 
seems to play a role in the extent of possible loss of control. All respondents that mentioned 
this factor underlined its relevance. As shown in graph 5.13 all six mentions supported this 
concept. However, it is important to note that all stem from experts related to CDU and 
SPD. Experts affiliated with other parties did not mention this aspect.  
                                                     
382 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: „Viele Politiker oder viele Kampagnen scheitern sicherlich auch daran, dass 
sie das nicht wissen oder sie sich überhaupt nicht bewusst sind, dass eine Agentur auch gesteuert werden muss.“] 
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A low degree of control not only leads to enhanced possibilities for standardization (this 
will further be explored in chapter 5.2.2.2), but it also makes services more measurable 
and, hence, 
more 
controllable. 
Complexity of 
outsourced 
tasks 
particularly 
becomes a 
relevant factor 
when it adds to 
increased non-
financial opportunity costs. Those might stem from increasing need for time-consuming 
coordination and briefings.  
Experts agree that complexity of services is closely connected with the question whether 
the task is a typical service provision such as printing posters or whether it is connected 
with content-related issues of the party. In particular, tasks that are related to internal 
party processes and close to the core of party functions lead to increased risk of loss of 
control in the case of being outsourced. Karsten Göbel383 underlines that “everything that 
is closer to the core brand, to the nature of politics and party, is difficult to impossible to 
outsource.“384 Therefore, experts agree that when dealing with the core of a campaign, the 
more complex tasks should be provided by the party itself.  
                                                     
383 Karsten Göbel in managing director of Berlin-based agency Super an der Spree. He led the 2013 SPD campaign as head 
of a joint venture with agency Johannsen & Kretschmer. Before joining Super an der Spree in 2009, he was planning 
director of agency Zum Goldenen Hirschen, which is closely connected to the Green party. 
384 Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: „Alles was stärker am Marktkern, am Wesen von Politik und Partei ist, 
lässt sich immer weniger bis gar nicht auslagern.“] 
 
Graph 5.13: Influence of complexity of outsourced tasks on potential loss of control 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
PirateParty DieLinke Greens FDP CDU SPD SUM
influence no influence
138 | P a g e  
5.2.2.2. Standardization 
As mentioned above, standardization of processes may lead to increased monitoring and, 
hence, to better control over the outsourced task and the entire campaign organization. 
However, in order to profit from standardization, there must be a general possibility to 
standardize 
campaign 
processes. 
Therefore, 
the following 
will explore if 
processes in 
campaigns 
may be 
standardized 
and if so, 
whether this 
leads to an increased level of control over the organization. As shown in graph 5.14, 
experts’ responses are quite different in this regard. In fact, they are equally torn between 
agreeing that it is possible and that there is an effect on control and neglecting possibilities 
to standardized campaigns. Of 33 mentions, 16 are in favor of the concept of 
standardization, while 17 are against. The question hereby is not whether there would be 
a positive impact of standardization on control. This is agreed by almost all experts. Rather, 
it is controversial whether campaigns may be standardized in the first place. 
A number of respondents argue that many aspects of a campaign consist of standard tools 
that only have to be adapted to the respective campaign reality. In Germany, each 
campaign uses standardized formats such as posters, Wesselmann billboards, direct 
mailings etc. that differ in their content, but not in their form. “In principle each campaign 
is built on certain tangents.”385 Experts argue that there is a high level of standardization of 
formats possible. There are automatisms in the production process of these formats that 
                                                     
385 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: „Im Grundsatz schon baut jeder Wahlkampf eigentlich auf Tangenten 
auf.“] 
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can be reused in future campaigns. For those processes, a very large extent of control is 
possible. The same applies to organizational processes. “Haptics are more or less the same 
everywhere. With haptics, I mean that candidates have election districts. Those districts 
and those candidates need district-related advertising material. […] Somehow, there is an 
online social media component. […] This also applies to the central campaign of the 
frontrunner. At some point there are large-size billboards, at some point a TV spot, at some 
point a radio spot. An online presence needs to be developed, you need a social media 
strategy, you need a press and PR strategy.”386 Many of the organizational processes are 
standardized and may be applied in similar ways in various campaigns. In most cases, 
structures of campaign organizations are alike. For many campaigns, SPD has been working 
in the ‘Kampa’-format while DieLinke has been using its concept of ‘Bundeswahlbüro’.  
Therefore, respondents agree that general structures of campaigns are alike and may be 
reused with little risk of losing control to external partners. 
On the other hand, experts also point out that there are elements that are highly individual 
for each campaign. “Nonetheless there are relatively regular changes in a campaign. Or the 
starting position can change regularly and then you are quickly done with standard tools or 
standardization.“387 While Peter Radunski even claims that nothing may be standardized in 
campaigns, experts agree that hardly any standardization is possible in the context of 
content and strategy. “The standard is that you always have to restart from scratch”388 The 
areas of strategy and content, as well as all creative tasks, need to be entirely redeveloped. 
Regularly, it is the same service provider and even the same personnel that is re-tasked 
with the same process, which they already managed during an earlier campaign. This is 
particularly the case in long-term relationships between principal and agent. Not only are 
                                                     
386 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: „Die Haptik ist überall mehr oder weniger gleich. Mit Haptik meine 
ich, ich habe Wahlkreise, ich habe Kandidaten und Kandidatinnen. Diese Wahlkreise und diese Kandidaten und 
Kandidatinnen brauchen wahlkreisbezogene Werbemittel. […] Es gibt irgendwie eine Online-Social-Media-Komponente 
dabei. […] Das gilt natürlich auch für die zentrale Kampagne der Spitzenkandidatin oder Spitzenkandidaten. Irgendwann 
gibt es Großflächen, irgendwann gibt es ein TV-Spot, irgendwann gibt es einen Radio-Spot. Es muss eine Internetpräsenz 
aufgebaut werden, man braucht eine Social-Media-Strategie, man braucht eine Presse- und PR-Strategie.“] 
387 Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: „Nichtsdestotrotz ändert sich in einem Wahlkampf natürlich relativ 
regelmäßig oder die Ausgangslage kann sich regelmäßig ändern und da ist man dann mit Standard-Tools oder 
Standardisierung schnell am Ende.“] 
388 Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Der Standard ist, dass immer alles wieder von vorne angefangen wird.“] 
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there changes in the visual appearance of campaigns, but there might be changes in overall 
strategies. Since campaigning is not a static business, but evolving constantly, there are 
regular changes in the environment that campaigns need to adapt to. Whether it was the 
introduction of television, the rise of internet or of social media, all developments brought 
significant changes to campaigns and made standardization difficult. Since campaigns are 
perceived with great public attention, there is a need for campaigns to react quickly to 
unforeseen developments. “A campaign on canned peas you may plan from the beginning 
to the end and then implement. You may also plan a political campaign, but you are always 
faced with 10 to 15 incidents that you did not expect, that you perhaps don‘t want to have. 
But somehow you need to react to them.”389 This may not be done in standardized ways. 
Rather, they must be adapted to the specific situation.  
It may be concluded that the possibility to standardize and, hence, its contribution to 
control over outsourced processes depends on whether the process is of technical or of 
strategic, content-related, respectively creative nature. While in the former case, a 
comparably high level of standardization and control is possible, this is not the case in the 
latter. By outsourcing those to an external service provider, campaign managers take high 
risks of being dependent on the expertise of the agent and therefore risk losing control 
over some aspects of the campaign.  
5.2.2.3. Strategic importance 
A key aspect that contributes to potential loss of control is the importance of the 
outsourced process. Importance of processes in campaigns differs greatly. Some tasks, such 
as printing, are obviously important to the overall picture, but there is no strategic 
significance attached. In case of underperformance it is possible to redo the process. This 
might cause unnecessary delays, but it would not put the success of the campaign at stake. 
Therefore, decision makers would not risk losing control over the campaign by outsourcing 
such a process. Experts agree that there is a difference when it comes to processes that are 
                                                     
389 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: „Eine Kampagne über Erbsen in Dosen können Sie von vorne bis hinten 
durchplanen und dann abfeiern. Eine politische Wahlkampfkampagne können Sie auch planen, aber sie kriegen immer 10 
bis 15 Ereignisse rein, mit denen Sie gar nicht gerechnet haben, die sie auch vielleicht gar nicht haben wollen. Aber man 
muss irgendwie drauf reagieren.“] 
141 | P a g e  
important for the overall strategy. This includes tasks such as strategy development and 
content development. 
As shown in graph 5.15, of 27 mentions 24 indicated that strategic importance of 
outsourced task is a relevant factor for potential loss of control over the campaign 
organization. This was an agreement that could be found across almost all parties.  
As the name implies, a strategically important task is developing the campaign strategy. 
This is considered to be a core competence of the parties that should be discussed in party 
institutions and 
committees. In 
order to find 
necessary support 
by party members 
and supporters, 
broad dialogues 
over relevant 
topics are 
necessary. 
Without these, 
experts fear negative consequences on the level of volunteer support during the campaign. 
For all parties this is a process that they do not even consider to outsource. “Strategy needs 
to be done by you. External consultants can never tell you what topics are important and 
how you play them […]. You can never outsource strategy.” 390 This does not imply that 
external partners may not be engaged in the process, but this engagement should be 
limited to the process of strategy development in the context of technical advertising/PR 
strategies. “It may still happen that there is an external strategy consulting / strategy 
development. But not necessarily triggered by a committee decision, rather through the 
leading person who says that ‘I need an external view’”391. All experts agree, however, that 
                                                     
390 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Das müssen sie selber machen. Ein externer Berater kann Ihnen niemals 
sagen, welche Themen hier wichtig sind, wie sie diese spielen […]. Strategie können Sie niemals outsourcen.“]    
391 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Es kann trotzdem sein, dass es dann externe Strategieberatung / 
Strategieentwicklung gibt. Aber jetzt nicht unbedingt ausgelöst durch einen Gremienbeschluss, sondern eher ausgelöst 
durch die Führungspersönlichkeit, die sagt ich brauch noch einmal einen Blick von außen.“] 
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outsourcing processes that possess significant content-related strategic importance would 
lead to increased loss of control.  
In particular, the definition of topics or content is considered a core competence of parties 
with significant strategic implications. While campaign strategies might be comparably 
similar across parties, content development is the main aspect hat individualizes parties. 
From the standpoint of agencies, “the party needs to deliver the program. Not the other 
way around. The program is the product.”392 Being democratic institutions, parties need to 
have tight control on content issues. Decisions need to go through various committees until 
they are officially adopted.  
It can therefore be concluded that “campaigns are politics. Are they too far away from 
politics, they are not good campaigns anymore.”393 Hence, as stated above, there is a strong 
connection between the extent of potential loss of control and the strategic importance of 
outsourced tasks. Campaign managers would risk losing control over the campaign 
organization if they outsourced tasks that are particularly related to the definition of 
strategic topics, which represent the backbone of the party’s campaign.  
5.3. Hesitation to outsource 
After identifying the relevant factors that lead to outsourcing in general and define the 
extent of outsourcing, research question four may be picked up, which implies that there 
might be a general tendency to hesitate outsourcing processes to external providers: ‘Are 
there cases where a process meets all requirements to be outsourced, but a party chooses 
not to? If so, why not?‘ 
Data received from interviews was very clear in negating the underlying assumption. There 
is no evidence in favor of a general tendency to be hesitant on outsourcing. Rather, it seems 
that parties apply a very pragmatic approach to the issue. 
Respondents only reported on minor examples of cases, where campaign members 
decided in favor of own production, although requirements were met to outsource the 
                                                     
392 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Die Partei muss der Agentur das Programm liefern. Nicht umgekehrt“. Das 
Programm ist das Produkt."] 
393 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: „Wahlkampf ist Politik, entfernt er sich zu weit von der Politik ist er kein 
guter Wahlkampf mehr.“] 
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process. This was mostly connected with decisions of local party entities to produce own 
advertising material independently from layouts predetermined by federal campaign 
management and the relevant agent. Experts described cases of own leaflet or social media 
video production that, in their view, was of minor quality due to decisions of local or 
regional entities to go into own production.  
Ultimately, there does not seem to be a difference in openness towards outsourcing 
between private economy and campaigns.  
5.4. Motivation of service providers 
After identifying the most relevant factors that influence the openness of political 
campaigns to give processes to external providers and what has effect on its extent, it is 
worth analyzing motivations on the other side: Why do service providers aim at providing 
their services to political campaigns?  
During a very early stage of the interviews, it became clear that economic reasons may not 
play the decisive role. “The incentive for agencies that are usually active on the classic 
market to go into campaigning is not that high, because it is extremely exhausting, very 
time-consuming, there are considerable risks that parts of customers have problems with 
you doing the campaign of party xy and because you do not have the autonomy over brand 
communications of a campaign.”394  Therefore, despite the fact that agencies might be 
involved in campaign strategy development, they are dependent on opinions of campaign 
management and  party committees.  
In Germany, campaigning is not a lucrative business for agencies. For them, they only 
represent minor incomes in comparison with the private economy. “The main problem is 
[…] that no agency in Germany can live from only doing campaigns.395 Since budgets are 
comparably small and campaigns last several months, it is extremely difficult for 
                                                     
394 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Der Anreiz für Agenturen, die sich eher im klassischen Markt 
bewegen, in Wahlkämpfe reinzugehen, ist nicht so hoch, weil das ist extrem anstrengend, sehr zeitaufwendig, die Risiken 
sind für eine Agentur nicht gering, dass ein Teil der Kundschaft sagt, ich habe ein Problem damit, dass du für die Partei 
XY eine Kampagne machst und man hat auch nicht die Autonomie, die man in der Markenkommunikation über die 
Kampagne hat.“] 
395 Interview with Axel Wallrabenstein [Original wording: “Das Hauptproblem ist, […] dass keine Agentur in Deutschland allein 
vom Wahlkampf leben kann.“ 
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professional agencies to serve this market. In fact, agencies need to have a sound base of 
customers that provides stable, necessary revenue in order to be able to enter into 
campaigning.  
Agencies need to realize that by entering a campaign they are also entering great risks in 
the case of a failure. Due to its high visibility, agencies are more recognized than during 
classic product campaigns. Due to the above-mentioned effects of externalization of 
failures, they may end up in the position of being the actor that is publicly blamed for 
mistakes done by the campaign organization. “If you do everything well, everything was 
right. If you do something badly, you have a great reputation problem.”396 Many agencies 
therefore decide not to enter campaigns, fearing negative consequences in case of failure.  
A much-disputed field is the question of consequences of campaigns for further 
assignments. As mentioned above, the effect of participation in campaigns on orders from 
the private economy seems to be rather negative. From the moment an agency accepts 
cooperation with a political party, it is publicly received as commitment towards this party. 
This may lead to the effect that customers who are not in favor of this party turn their back 
on the agency. “With a political campaign you sometimes obstruct follow-up orders. That 
needs to be seen very clearly.”397 There is disagreement whether cooperation in campaigns 
leads to increased public orders in case of election success. While some respondents argue 
that this is a natural part of the game, others claim that the exact opposite happens. “It is 
often assumed that for an agency this is a great story in regards to orders from the public 
sector. The opposite is the case. Agencies that were active in campaigns, even if they 
worked for the succeeding parties, often seem not to have the possibility to assert 
successfully in the aftermath”398, due to fears that this could be perceived negatively. 
Although this is claimed by a number of respondents, many cases received great public 
attention where the opposite happened. For instance, this was the case, when agency 
                                                     
396 Interview with Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Wenn Sie das gut machen, ist alles richtig gewesen, wenn Sie das schlecht 
machen, dann haben Sie ein großes Reputationsproblem.“] 
397 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Sie verbauen sich manchmal mit einer politischen Kampagne 
Folgeaufträge. Das muss man ganz klar sehen.“] 
398 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Es wird oft unterstellt, dass es eigentlich für eine Agentur im Hinblick 
auf Beauftragung aus dem staatlichen Bereich eine gute Geschichte ist. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. In der Regel ist es 
eigentlich so, dass eine Agentur die im Wahlkampf aktiv ist, auch wenn sie dann für eine erfolgreiche Partei gearbeitet 
hat, danach eigentlich nicht Möglichkeiten hat, sich erfolgreich durchzusetzen.“] 
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‘Butter’, which worked together with SPD for a number of federal and state campaigns 
received a large-scale order from SPD-led Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.399 
Therefore, there is no general rule available on the effects on public orders, but it is clear 
that parties face risks concerning their customer base. 
Due to those reasons, only a limited number of agencies decide to enter this market, while 
a large number of potential service providers prefer staying in classic consumer markets. 
Nevertheless, there are agencies that decide to enter campaigns. What is driving them?  
Many respondents claimed this is very closely connected to emotions that arise in political 
campaigns (in fact, this might as well have a negative impact). “Detergent is ‘only’ 
detergent. A party, and in particular when it is a campaign that decides over general 
directions, is close to my heart. You realize the consequences when you lose. And that’s 
why you are very close to it.400 It is easier to cope with sales figures that are too low than 
with political consequences of a lost campaign. At the same time, respondents see more 
philosophical ‘sense’ in working for political campaigns than only for consumer products. 
“It is a meaningful task that is probably more challenging that saying that I increase market 
share of product xy from 11.5 to 11.8 percent.”401 
Another aspect is the increased thrill attached to campaigns. As in no consumer campaign 
there is a strict deadline at 6 p.m. on Election Day. From one minute to the other, success 
or defeat becomes apparent. This leads to high levels of excitement in campaigns. In classic 
product campaigns, there are always options to readjust when expected outcomes do not 
appear. This is not possible in campaigns. If outcomes on Election Day are below 
expectations and goals, the campaign was a failure. Particularly since this thrill is connected 
to the fact that political campaigns may be considered as high-interest goods with great 
public attention, campaigning is considered to be the ‘Champions’ League’ among 
advertisers. With no other campaign, agencies receive such large feedback in a positive and 
                                                     
399 See: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:152919-2014:TEXT:DE:HTML&src=0 
400 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Ein Waschpulver ist ‘nur‘ ein Waschpulver. Eine Partei und gerade wenn es 
dann im Wahlkampf, um einen Richtungswahlkampf geht, da hängt man mit seinem ganzem Herzen drin. Man sieht 
natürlich auch was es für Auswirkungen es haben kann, wenn man verliert. Und deswegen geht einem die Sache sehr 
nah.“] 
401 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Es ist eine sinnstiftende Aufgabe, die etwas wahrscheinlich in dem Fall 
anspruchsvoller ist, als zu sagen, ich steigere jetzt den Marktanteil von Produkt XY von 11,5 auf 11,8 %.“] 
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negative sense. Particularly if agents have already entered the campaign market on the 
level of state elections, there is no other discipline with superior interest and relevance 
than campaigns on the federal level.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that economic incentives for service providers are rather 
limited. What attracts them are emotional aspects such as the large relevance of campaigns 
and their emotional thrill.  
5.5. Conclusion 
The main research question of this dissertation has been ‘what are the determinants for 
the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns?’ This chapter has carefully 
explored potential factors that can have an influence on the outsourcing decision in general 
and on the extent of outsourcing in particular.  
Openness of campaign organization to outsource processes depends on factors that can be 
divided into two groups: economic and organizational factors. Within the area of economic 
factors, scarcity of own human resources with necessary knowledge on the side of the 
campaign and considerable fluctuation in demand between campaign seasons and off-
seasons work in favor of giving campaign processes to an external partner. The limiting 
economic factor is the scarcity of financial resources, particularly among smaller and newly 
established parties.  
A set of organizational factors further influences openness to outsource.  
- Age of party: Very young parties do not have necessary financial resources, but an 
enthusiastic group of supporters that lead to a very high level of in-house production. 
After initial enthusiasm begins to wear off and financial resources increase, willingness 
to outsource increases as well. This is again being followed by a longer period of time 
during which increasing own expertise and better party structures again lead to a slowly 
increasing willingness to provide services in-house. 
- Organizational level: Being more important than party size or establishment in society, 
a high organizational level in regions and communities leads to decreased openness to 
outsource processes that can be as well provided by local volunteers.  
- Need for external perspective: Particularly in times of defeat, parties notice that realities 
within the party do not necessarily represent the outside world. In order to correct this 
misperception, a high willingness to employ external partners can be observed. 
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- Change of leaders: While some professions are outsourced regardless of party 
leadership, others heavily depend on personal relationships and experience made with 
campaign decision-makers. While this factor also has some influence on general 
willingness to outsource, it is one of the most relevant reasons for potential changes of 
service providers. 
- Decision-making: Clearly defined and transparent decision making processes do not 
only have an influence on openness to outsource. Moreover, it is a key factor for 
efficiency and success of outsourcing relationships. In case of absence of clear decision-
making processes, employing external partners will most likely lead to chaotic 
conditions within the campaign organization.    
As suggested by Hm, the extent of outsourcing indeed seems to be dependent on two major 
factors: 
- The extent of political transaction costs 
- The extent of loss of control over campaign organization 
Both factors can have direct influence on the political future of leading campaign managers. 
Therefore, the higher the risk for at least one of the two factors, the more hesitant 
campaign managers are to outsource the respective process. In case of high risk, the make-
or-buy decision is answered in favor of ‘make’. The situation may arise when all economic 
and organizational factors would signal openness to outsourcing. This, however, does not 
automatically lead to external service provision. Decision makers may still come to the 
conclusion that due political transaction costs and/or loss of control are too high and decide 
in favor of in-house production. 
According to the proposed model, it is indeed possible that one of the factors is pronounced 
while the other is well kept under control. In such a case, the presence of one of the two 
risks is sufficient for campaign management to hesitate to outsource. Only if risks for both 
aspects were low would campaigns give tasks to truly external providers.  
Potential for internalization of success and externalization of failures are important factors 
influencing the extent of political transaction costs particularly in principal-agent-relations 
that have not yet been growing over years. In all cases, however, in short and long-term 
cooperation, the extent of trust is the most relevant factor for political transaction costs. It 
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is the basis for every customer relation. With high level of trust on both sides, political 
transaction costs can be decreased considerably.  
The extent of loss of control is mostly dependent on the extent of possible standardization 
of outsourced processes and their strategic importance for the overall campaign. If 
strategic importance may be negligible and the respective process is standardized, 
potential loss of control is only minor. Complexity of the process may as well play a role, 
but is not as decisive as the other two factors.  
From a purely economic standpoint, campaigns do not represent attractive opportunities 
for agencies. In comparison with consumer markets, budgets that are given to service 
providers are comparably low and agencies enter a high risk of being publicly blamed in 
case of a loss. Hence, a considerable number of agents avoid this discipline. For others, 
however, it represents a highly interesting field mostly connected to emotions. Although 
some might strive for follow-up jobs in case of successes, the main motivation seems to be 
the outlook to take part in a thrilling campaign of a high-interest good with public presence 
larger than any other campaign. In particular, the circumstance that the campaign needs 
to target a particular day during which the result of the campaign is measured provides a 
powerful incentive. It is therefore considered a “champions’ league” for advertisers. 
Based on these findings, the following chapter further explores particular examples of 
campaign processes and shed light on underlying reasons why campaign managers decided 
in favor of either ‘make’ or ‘buy. 
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6. Outsourcing of processes  
After identifying factors that are relevant for the openness of campaigns to give processes 
to external partners and what influences the extent of outsourcing, this chapter aims at 
outlining findings on the state of outsourcing based on particular processes in German 
campaigns. Hence, focus of the following is to analyze the current situation and to identify 
which form of outsourcing is used for which reason. While chapter 6.1 will elaborate on 
general findings, the following sub-chapters will point out cases that are of special interest 
due to very particular characteristics that represent a certain extent of outsourcing in a 
vivid manner.  
6.1. Overall Findings 
This sub-chapter will focus on findings that were of similar characteristics across all relevant 
parties, while the following choose particular examples of principal-agent relationships that 
were of individual character. Across all parties, similarities in the extent of outsourcing 
could be observed in the fields of strategy development, advertising, online campaign and 
logistics. Therefore, they represent the backbone of the following analysis.  
6.1.1. Strategy development 
The process of strategy development in this case is strictly regarded as finding a strategy 
for the party’s PR campaign. It does not imply content-related issues, but is rather a 
technical process. Across all parties, strategy development is performed in close 
cooperation with external partners. On first sight, this is surprising since it appears to be 
contradictory to the proposed model. However, when analyzing it in more detail, it 
becomes clear that there is a high degree of external expertise present, but only to the 
extent to which no strategic decisions need to be made.  
Once strategic considerations come into play, campaign management very much strives for 
pulling the strings themselves. In those strategic questions, external service providers serve 
as consultants that make proposals. Decisions are not outsourced, but kept well within 
party structures. “What we don’t do is buying programs or strategic papers. They are 
almost entirely developed by the party structure, respectively discussed and decided by 
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committees.”402 This is also the case in other parties. External parties are engaged by 
campaign management, invited to develop implementation strategies, present them to 
decision makers and party committees who then make strategic decisions. Some parties, 
such as CDU even start their strategy development without any involvement of external 
partners. This mostly involves a situation analysis, benchmarking and demographic 
analyses (more about the latter can be found in chapter 6.5). Based on the outcomes of 
this process they decide 
which partner fits best 
to the respective 
situation. Most parties 
therefore maintain 
strategic divisions, 
which are tasked with 
this kind of service 
provision. “We provide 
advice and support. 
What is then done is 
under the sovereignty of politics.”403 Therefore, not outsourcing the process of strategy 
development does not mean that there are no external partners involved. However, their 
role is limited to consulting tasks, respectively, at a later stage, development of 
implementation strategies for the campaign.  
In the field of strategy development, hesitation to outsource relevant processes mostly 
stem from a high potential of loss of control over the campaign organization (see graph 
6.1). Although political transaction costs may still appear in the form of backlashes of 
potential mistakes done by the tasked agent to campaign management, decision makers 
would risk losing control over the campaign when giving very basic considerations that have 
direct influence on the run of the campaign out of hand. Developing the main campaign 
                                                     
402 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: “Aber was wir nicht machen ist Programme oder strategische Papiere 
einzukaufen. Die werden fast komplett vom hauptamtlichen Apparat entwickelt bzw. von den Gremien dann diskutiert 
oder beschlossen.“]    
403 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Wir bieten Rat und Unterstützung an. Was dann gemacht wird, ist 
natürlich die Hoheit der Politik.“] 
 
Graph 6.1: Allocation of strategy development in the model 
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strategy is not only very complex (all aspects of a campaign need to be included), it is also 
of prime strategic importance for the overall campaign organization. Therefore, campaign 
managers prefer controlling this aspect of campaigns by not giving it to external service 
providers. 
6.1.2. Advertising material 
During the strategy development process, a variety of advertising strategies are also 
considered, which requires strong expertise in the field. Hence, almost all practical 
processes related to advertising are outsourced to external service providers across all 
relevant parties. Advertising processes include tasks that require special competences or 
infrastructure, such as design, creation, printing, photography, film production, production 
of advertising material, etc. “A poster designer, an art designer came from outside. We 
couldn’t provide that. We couldn’t produce films. Those we had to do together with others. 
The same applies to TV and radio spots and so on. Those large walls at large party 
conventions: couldn’t do those. Others had to make them.”404 Processes connected to 
advertising can be divided into two categories: creative and production processes.  
Creative processes require highly qualified personnel in the field in order to reach 
outcomes that are of a quality suitable for federal campaigns. Due to the seasonal changes 
mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.2, parties are not in the need to maintain costly creative 
personnel during off-campaign seasons. Generally, the same agents that consulted during 
the strategy development process are tasked with creative implementation of the defined 
strategy. This mostly involves all campaign materials, ranging from posters to online 
campaign. For specific disciplines, additional partners or sub-contractors are hired. This 
includes photographers who contribute to candidate images as well as film crews, which 
produce TV commercial or YouTube videos.  
For processes related to the production of advertising material, particular infrastructure is 
needed that would not be economic for the parties to provide. In order to print large 
amounts of poster, special printers are needed which professional printing companies are 
                                                     
404 Interview with Peter Radunski [Original wording: “Ein Plakatgestalter, ein Art Designer, kam von draußen, das konnten wir 
nicht. Wir konnten nicht Filme machen. Die mussten wir mit anderen machen. Fernsehspots, Hörfunkspots desgleichen. 
Die großen Wände bei den großen Parteiveranstaltungen: konnten wir nicht, mussten andere machen.“] 
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able to provide. The same applies to mailing activities. Writing, printing, bagging, stamping 
and dispatching mailings on a large scale would bind party resources to an extent that 
would not be 
acceptable. With 
external providers’ 
technologies and 
economies of scale, 
they are able to 
provide those services 
faster and most likely 
cheaper than the 
respective party itself 
is. Hence, such 
processes are widely outsourced to external agents. Even the PirateParty, which is very 
skeptical of cooperating with the private economy, chose that way. “We had a system, the 
so-called P-Shop, Pirate Shop, to which the single state associations gave their orders. How 
much money they wanted to spend, respectively how many posters and how much scatter 
material they wanted to order. […] And exactly those things then went to the warehouse 
of the Pirate Shop and from there to the individual association.”405 The Pirate Shop worked 
together with a choice of private printing companies that provided professional printing 
services to the campaign. This not only led to decreases of costs due to economies of scale, 
but also to increased quality of advertising materials. This system of centralized process 
provision by an external service provider is a very popular model and is observed at all 
parties.  
This trend only started a few years ago. In past times, large parties, such as SPD and CDU 
were in the possession of printing plans that were charged with producing advertising 
material in a hybrid outsourcing model. However, this changed with the rise of the internet 
and the ability to access quickly resources that are distant from party headquarters. 
                                                     
405 Interview with Salomon Reyes [Original wording: „Wir hatten ein System, den sogenannten P-Shop, Piratenshop. An den 
haben die einzelnen Landesverbände ihre Aufträge gegeben. Wie viel Geld sie ausgeben wollten für bestimmte Plakate, 
bzw. wie viel Plakate und wie viel Streumaterial sie ordern wollten. […] Und genau die Sachen gingen dann in das Lager 
des Piratenshops und wurden von da weitergeleitet an die einzelnen Gliederungen.“]   
 
Graph 6.2: Allocation of advertising in the model 
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“Today, it is mostly cheaper to produce that through so-called online printing houses, 
where you send data to and which deliver directly. Because they can use a higher utilization 
rate than the printer around your corner, costs are normally reduced by 50 percent. “406 
Nowadays, although some party-owned printing plants still exist they are not tasked with 
large-scale production of advertising material due to lack of competitiveness. Depending 
on the organizational level of the party external services, providers are also used for the 
distribution of advertising material and hanging of posters.  
As shown in graph 6.2, advertising is a process that is outsourced almost entirely to external 
service providers by all parties. Advertising only possesses a very limited potential to lead 
to loss of control. Since processes outsourced in the field of advertising only have a limited 
and very technical scope, strategic importance of the respective service is low. In all cases, 
failures in the production process would not lead to strategically significant consequences. 
While redoing processes would lead to unnecessary delays, it would not have negative 
impacts on the strategic goals of the campaign. Advertising processes are highly 
standardized, since only a limited amount of different campaign material is used in German 
campaigns. Content-related questions would be of more strategic relevance, but they may 
be included in aspects covered by chapter 6.1.1. 
The same applies to potential political transaction costs for campaign decision makers. 
Failures in a production process of a certain advertising product would not lead to negative 
effects for top campaign personnel’s’ careers. At the same time, however, there is no 
significant potential to internalize successes in advertising processes, since they are mostly 
routine tasks, which are expected to be fulfilled smoothly. Therefore, design and 
production of advertising materials is mostly if not entirely outsourced to external 
providers across all German parties.  
6.1.3. Online campaign 
Online campaigns are probably the aspect of campaigning that has experienced the most 
dramatic changes over the past decade. While in the 1990s, it was only a marginal 
                                                     
406 Interview with Lutz Meyer [“Heute ist es häufig günstiger, das über so genannte Online-Druckereien zu machen, wo man 
die Daten hinschickt und die dann direkt ausliefern. Weil die mit einer anderen Auslastung fahren können als der Drucker 
um die Ecke und damit gehen die Kosten in der Regel um 50 % runter.“] 
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phenomenon, online campaigns have developed to become an important strategic pillar in 
every election campaign. By today, campaigns need to develop entirely new strategies for 
their online presence that go hand in hand with their offline-strategy. Knowing that this 
field is of considerable strategic importance and attainable without a large amount of 
financial resources, parties mostly employ in-house units developing and implementing 
their online campaign. Since online communications is also a primary channel for the 
parties’ permanent campaign, online campaigning is not subject to seasonal changes to the 
extent of classic campaigns.  
There have been several attempts to outsource online campaigning to external service 
providers. In most cases, however, they proved not to be successful. “In 2009 we had a 
service provider that was in charge of this ‘MyCampaign’-tool. In 2013 we brought that 
back to our house and did it on our own.”407 A particular characteristic of online 
campaigning tools is 
speed which plays a 
decisive role. 
Campaigns need to be 
able to react instantly to 
events, particularly in 
the field of social media. 
Hence, there is often no 
time for lengthy 
coordination processes 
between party 
organization and service provider. It proved to be more efficient if the actors who decide 
over content (the party) are also the ones who are in charge of the online campaign. Again, 
this does not mean that there are no external partners involved, but their role is limited to 
the provision of ‘online advertising materials’ with similar characteristics as the ones 
described in chapter 6.1.2.  
                                                     
407 Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “2009 hatten wir noch einen Dienstleister, der dieses MeineKampagne-Tool 
betreut hat. Das hatten wir für 2013 ins Haus geholt und selber gemacht.“] 
 
Graph 6.3: Allocation of online campaign in the model 
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As shown in graph 6.3, there is a high risk of loss of control and of potential political 
transaction costs attached to processing a party’s online campaign. Hence, parties choose 
not to outsource this task, but rather to provide it internally.  
Key campaign personnel would be likely to feel consequences for their political future, in 
case of failures in widely-perceived online campaigns. It would be difficult to argue that 
processes of such strategic importance are given to external providers and externalize 
mistakes on their account. Hence, a very high level of trust would be necessary for both 
sides to cooperate. Since online campaigns nowadays include a whole variety of formats, 
reaching from classic campaign websites to social media like Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube, and up to attempts to connect offline tools with online counterparts, it has 
become an area of great complexity. Although individual platforms are standardized, there 
is a high degree of freedom when it comes to content and how those platforms are used.  
Therefore, the situation is comparable to the one of strategy development: While external 
service providers may deliver particular tools and designs, the overall strategy and control 
over a party’s online campaign is kept within party structures. 
6.1.4. Logistics and events 
Logistics and events are an area with particular characteristics that differ from many other 
aspects of the campaign. Hardly any other aspect is as detached from political issues as 
logistics and events. They are highly technical tasks for which very specialized expertise is 
necessary and which include processes such as logistic services for candidates as well as 
material, stage construction, security and sound and video technology.  
For the provision of all processes, German parties almost solely use external service 
providers. This is mostly due to the reason that those services are rarely demanded during 
off-campaign seasons. There are only very few party events (such as conventions) between 
campaign times that require significant expertise and workforces in the field. It is a prime 
example for services that do not belong to the core competences of parties. In logistics and 
events, “much happens via state and county associations. There is little organized centrally. 
Actually only the central kickoff and closing events for campaigns, which we generally run 
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with our service providers.”408 As shown in graph 6.4, there is a low extent of political 
transaction costs and a low level of potential loss of control attached to these processes. 
Since they require very particular expertise, no political leader will be held responsible for 
mistakes made in 
logistics and events. 
While all relevant 
process may have a high 
level of technical 
complexity, they may 
still be considered of low 
complexity from a 
managerial standpoint 
since tasks are clearly 
defined and of limited 
scope. This is particularly the case in technical process connected to events. There is a high 
degree of standardization, since campaign events do not differ in their organizational and 
technical characteristics from non-political events rganized on a very regular basis by 
private entities. Strategic importance of individual process is limited in this field, because 
they only represent technical components that add to campaign and advertising strategy. 
They are important elements to the overall picture, but they are not connected to strategic 
decisions. Hence, all parties prefer to outsource those processes to external service 
providers. 
6.2. Case 1 - Union Betriebs-GmbH  
All relevant German parties hold participations in a number of enterprises. However, there 
are significant differences in their extent. While The Greens largest participation is a 2,13% 
holding of locally active ‘1. Bürger Solaranlage Hemmingen GbR’409, SPD’s fully owned 
                                                     
408 Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “Veranstaltungsmanagement passiert viel über die Länder- und die 
Kreisverbände. Es wird wenig zentral organisiert. Eigentlich nur die zentralen Auf- und Abtaktveranstaltungen für die 
Wahlkämpfe, die wir dann in der Regel mit unserem Dienstleister zusammen gemacht haben.“] 
409 See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2014 Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen. Available at: 
https://www.gruene.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/2014_Rechenschaftsbericht_END.pdf 
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subsidiary Deutsche Druck- und Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (DDVG) is a holding with nominal 
capital of 36 Million Euro410 that holds shares in a whole variety of businesses, mostly 
publishing houses.  Although publishers generally would qualify as agents for campaign-
related services, this is hardly the case. DDVG mostly represents a source of revenue for 
SPD.  
A more interesting case for outsourcing of campaign tasks is CDU subsidiary Union Betriebs-
GmbH (UBG). CDU holds 100 per cent of UBG, an operating company with 2.15 Million Euro 
nominal capital.411 Unlike DDVG, UBG cannot be considered as a holding with the primary 
goal of revenue creation, rather it is a party owned company that offers very practical and 
tangible services to both CDU and third parties. The company currently employs roughly 50 
individuals mostly located at the headquarters in Rheinbach (close to former federal capital 
Bonn), divided into four divisions: 
- IT 
- Computer center 
                                                     
410 See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2013 SPD. Available at: 
https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Parteiorganisation/Finanzen/Rechenschaftsberichte/ 
411See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2013 CDU. Available at: 
https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/rechenschaftsbericht2013.pdf?file=1 
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- Publishing house 
- Printing plant 
In addition, there is a graphic team consisting of four people in UBG’s Berlin branch located 
in CDU headquarters at Konrad-Adenauer-Haus. The organization is headed by a managing 
director who is assisted by an authorized officer. A managing director who is assisted by an 
authorized officer heads the organization.  A department head heads the second 
establishment in Berlin. There are two fiduciary partners of UBG. Ex officio those are CDU 
federal manager (and head of campaigns) and the head of the party’s central department 
(Zentrale Aufgaben und Service - ZA). Hence, there is close organizational interaction 
between UBG and party leadership. Nevertheless, UBG claims a certain degree of 
independence from CDU. “We are a pure enterprise, we are self-financed, we are not on 
the drip of CDU.”412  
UBG is active on the free market. CDU is not its only customer. It is offering services to 
institutions, companies or individuals in various fields. Nevertheless, CDU and affiliates on 
European, federal, Länder, county and local levels represent UBG’s core customers. In this 
context, it is important to note that even for the provision of services of CDU, UBG formally 
needs to compete with other agents in countrywide tenders. It has to submit an offer just 
like any other potential service provider. Nevertheless, it can be stated that UBG has a 
competitive advantage not only being located in the heart of CDU headquarters, but also 
knowing exactly what is expected by party decision makers through personal interaction. 
The close structural entanglement between CDU and UBG may lead to conflicts of interests, 
because the partners are also the company’s largest customer. “What works for a party 
would always lead to problems in commercial enterprises, because as partner you have to 
look at profit orientation, but at the same time, being the principal client, you also want to 
have fast services.”413 This may become particularly problematic if CDU needed to have a 
certain service provided as quickly as possible while a different customer is willing to pay a 
                                                     
412 Bach-Meiers, Sonja [Original wording: „Wir sind ein reiner Wirtschaftsbetrieb, wir müssen uns komplett finanzieren, wir 
hängen nicht am Tropf der CDU.“] 
413 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: “ Was für eine Partei funktioniert, würde in einem Wirtschaftsunternehmen immer zu 
Problemen führen, weil man als Gesellschafter auf die Gewinnorientierung gucken muss, aber man als Hauptauftraggeber 
natürlich auch einen schnellen Service will.“] 
159 | P a g e  
higher price for a service provided instead.  UBG claims to attempt to satisfy both sides. 
“Although CDU is always present with priority, one always tries to find solutions that satisfy 
both sides.”414 This is attempted either by negotiating deadlines for service provisions or 
by working overtimes. 
Processes outsourced to UBG 
CDU outsources processes to UBG in both, campaign and off-campaign seasons. During off-
seasons, UBG provides services typical to the ones of PR agencies, making use of its graphic 
team located in Berlin. That includes graphic design for permanent campaign billboards or 
layouts for printed party material.  
UBG’s publishing house is used mainly  by CDU for its member magazine ‘Union’. Although 
it does also play a certain role in campaigns, the magazine can more precisely be seen as a 
tool of permanent campaigning and activation medium for party members. Since UBG’s 
graphic team only consists of four people, it is not able to provide all creative services 
needed during a campaign. In addition, “it is not that UBG could map a complete service 
during campaign, neither in the area of printing, nor in IT.”415 Rather, UBG serves as one of 
several ‘external’ providers interacting with each other and campaign management. For 
candidates’ and local or regional entities, UBG provides layouts for their campaign. This 
does not only include websites, but also elements such as stationary, business cards, 
argumentation cards and election posters. This is a web creation tool, but also includes 
printing.  
Printing is offered by UBG in its own printing plant and in cooperation with sub-contractors. 
The only exception are large-size billboards for which UBG does not have own capacities. 
Often, printing is given to UBG together with related IT services, such as web site creation 
and production of leaflets.  
The most relevant processes of CDU campaigns outsourced to UBG are IT processes. UBG 
serves as a webhost for the entire web presence of the party’s federal branch and of most 
regional associations. In this case, webhosting also includes email management for the 
                                                     
414 Bach-Meiers, Sonja [Original wording: „Die CDU ist zwar immer prioritär da, aber man versucht die Lösungen 
herbeizuführen, dass beide Seiten gleichermaßen befriedigt werden.“] 
415 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Aber es ist nicht so, dass die UBG den Komplettservice im Wahlkampf auch nicht im 
Bereich Druckerei abbilden könnte und auch nicht im Bereich IT.“] 
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entire party. Some CDU candidates or MPs insist on local providers to carry out their web 
services. This is mainly due to local PR considerations. “But during the last five, six years 
one can notice the tendency that more and more state organizations request UBG services. 
This is probably connected to the fact that IT is getting more complex. […] Nowadays, a 
connection of the website to the central member database is sensible and relevant […]. 
Then it makes sense to contact UBG, because there it is located. I think that this is the 
reason that we notice an increasing power of UBG as a service provider for IT for the entire 
party.”416  
Shared service-center 
UBG represents a very illustrative example of internal outsourcing to a shared service-
center. With this variety of customers, UBG is able to achieve higher utilization than each 
of the outsourcing entities would on their own. In particular, the high discrepancies 
between campaign seasons and off-seasons can be compensated. In addition, the degree 
of professionalization and of price-quality ratio seems to rise. “I consider this as an 
extremely good way, because you reach a degree of professionalism that you otherwise 
would have to acquire externally more expensively and more diverse.”417 At the same time, 
with many party entities using UBG services, a higher degree of corporate identity can be 
ensured than with each candidate or local organization working with different partners 
from their respective precinct.  
Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource 
Founded immediately after the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1945, 
CDU is the second oldest party after SPD. According to the model described in chapter 
5.1.2.1, it is therefore at a stage, where processes are increasingly reintegrated into party 
structures. UBG was founded in 1960418 and therefore has a history of over 50 years during 
                                                     
416 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Aber es ist schon Tendenz der letzten fünf, sechs Jahre festzustellen, dass mehr und 
mehr Landesverbände Angebote bei der UBG abfragen. Was aber wahrscheinlich damit zu tun hat, dass die Komplexität 
der IT größer wird. […] Jetzt ist eine Anbindung der Website an die zentrale Mitgliederdatei schon sinnvoll und relevant 
[…] Dann macht es Sinn gleich mal bei der UBG nachzufragen, weil da liegt das Ding. Ich glaube, dass das der Grund 
dafür ist, dass wir da eine zunehmende Stärkung der UBG als Dienstleister im IT-Bereich für die Gesamtpartei merken“] 
417 Meier, Lutz [Original wording: “Das finde ich ist ein extrem guter Weg, weil sie damit einen Professionalisierungsgrad 
reinkriegen, den sie draußen viel teurer und auch viel diverser einkaufen müssten.“] 
418 See: https://www.ubgnet.de/ueber-uns.html 
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which significant development and knowledge building was possible. After originally  
founded as a publishing house, its development over six decades made it possible to offer 
a variety of services and processes. Hence, age of the party seems to be an important factor 
that processes are outsourced from CDU to UBG.  
Being a very established people’s party with the largest number of members among 
German parties, CDU had total assets of almost 176 Million Euros in 2013419. It is therefore 
in a relatively comparably comfortable financial situation. For the 2013 campaign, CDU had 
a campaign budget of 47.2 Million Euros420. Together with roughly 20 Million Euros spent 
by sister party CSU, it had the largest campaign budget during the 2013 campaign. It is 
therefore able to give processes to external partners that charged for their services. Even 
outsourcing posting in many districts, CDU indeed outsources rather many services. This 
would most likely be impossible without the relatively large financial resources gathered 
by the party over the years of its existence.  
During the 2013 campaign, CDU applied very lean decision-making processes. External 
partners only had two points of contact within the party: Federal manager and head of 
campaign and marketing. This was mainly due to the fact that trust “has been growing over 
time since there were also many constants in staffing and now it is a relatively small 
corridor up from working level. Discussion with the campaign manager, sometimes a 
meeting with the Secretary General, but then normally directly from there to the panel 
with the party leader.”421 This created a very outsourcing-friendly environment in which 
transaction costs in the form of increased need for coordination is kept at a minimum level.  
There is an exceptionally high degree of constancy in CDU leadership. Since 1973, the party 
only has had three party leaders. Since 2000, Angela Merkel has been leading the party. 
Hence, there was no need to change deliberately service providers for profiling reasons or 
to send out the signal of a restart. This is visible in the long-lasting cooperation between 
                                                     
419 See: Rechenschaftsbericht CDU 2013. Available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/043/1804300.pdf 
420 See: http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/140330/wahlkampfausgaben 
421 Hennewig, Stefan [Original wording: „Was wahrscheinlich damit zu tun, das Stichwort Vertrauen, was Sie gerade fragten, 
auch hausintern natürlich gewachsen ist über die Zeit, weil da auch viele Konstanten in der Personenbesetzung dabei 
sind und das ist jetzt ein relativ schmaler Gang von [der] Arbeitsebene: Besprechung mit dem Wahlkampfmanager, 
manchmal noch eine Runde mit dem Generalsekretär in der Regel aber dann direkt von da aus in die Runde mit der 
Parteivorsitzenden.“] 
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CDU and UBG. 
Political transaction costs 
Since UBG offices are not only located in CDU headquarters, but with the company being a 
full subsidiary of the party, it is integrated very well into campaign structures. From the 
office of CDU’s campaign manager to UBG head of office it is only a short walk down three 
sets of stairs. The close relation of the two organizations, both from a logistical as well as 
organizational point of view, leads to a very high level of trust between the two entities. 
Hence, processes, which have a fairly high risk of significant political transaction costs in 
case of failures and that lead to a comparably high level of loss of control may be given to 
UBG as an internal outsourcing provider.  
A closer look on outsourced processes shows that this is indeed the case. Although social 
media is still carried out by CDU itself, its online presence is a sensitive service, which only 
wants to be given to a partner that is in the possession of a high degree of trust from party 
decision makers. Particularly during the last decades, campaigns have gone increasingly 
more online. Hence, a party’s online presence is of increasing importance.  
Political transaction costs are comparably high, since it is expected from party members 
that CDU affiliate UBG be given a certain role (‘if not the party trusts in UBG, who then 
does?’).  
At the same time, it is hardly possible to externalize failures on a campaign’s web presence, 
since it is based mainly on 
content that comes from 
the party directly. UBG may 
be in charge of web design, 
but what is observed 
mainly from the electorate 
stems from the party’s 
program and official party 
positions. Hence, UBG can 
hardly be held responsible 
for major failures in this context. 
Therefore, campaign manages would face risks if they neglected a cooperation with UBG 
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or if party and campaign websites were of significant lower quality than before.  Not giving 
any processes to UBG seems to be literally impossible since the close entanglement 
between the two organizations, particularly in IT and member data management creates a 
significant competitive advantage for UBG. Therefore, keeping UBG out of the campaign 
would expose key campaign personnel to notable criticism even within their own party.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that political transaction costs for key campaign personnel 
are fairly high due to the actual existence of UBG. Although UBG without a doubt 
represents a very useful agent for CDU that has the potential to work efficiently and with a 
high degree of utilization, political transaction costs are high because campaign managers 
hardly have a chance to avoid its services.  
Loss of control 
As mentioned above, there are two processes outsourced to UBG that are of significant 
strategic importance: The party’s online presence and its member data management.  
Party websites are of significance due to the rise of media democracy and voters’ 
expectations that parties have a strong online presence. Naturally, the party’s web design 
needs to go hand in hand with overall strategic considerations and corporate identity that 
are not developed by UBG, but by the party itself and external partners. Nevertheless, the 
federal party’s online presence as well as the one of regional associations are strategically 
important ‘entry points’ for potential voters to get to know the party, its personnel and 
positions.  
CDU’s member index might not be as visible for outsiders during the run of a campaign, but 
it possesses an even higher strategic importance than the party’s web presence. Member 
indices are an element in German campaigns many campaigners from oversees envy. It is 
a database with approx. 450.000 potential voters, who can already be considered as 
supporters or who have at least strong sympathies for CDU.422 That represents a most 
valuable source of actual voters who mostly do not need to be persuaded, but only 
activated. Since this is of considerable strategic importance, it seems quite sensible not to 
give this process to an external agent, but to keep it within the  party organization. At the 
same time, it is a process that can be easily standardized. Technically speaking, member 
                                                     
422 http://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/parteien-in-deutschland/138672/mitgliederentwicklung-cdu-und-spd 
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indices are databases that can also be found elsewhere in the business world. It is not a 
process that needs to be newly created for the campaign. Rather, it can be regarded as a 
standard process with limited complexity. The database itself can be administrated in 
routine tasks. More complex is integrating membership data into campaign websites and 
the ones of regional or local party entities. In particular, a balance between practicability, 
benefit and strict German privacy laws needs to be incorporated.  
As already mentioned above, the party’s online presence is also of significant strategic 
importance, since large parts of political campaigns happen to take place online nowadays. 
However, it is important to note that UBG was only in charge of hosting and administrating 
party websites. They did not play an active role in planning and designing the party’s online 
campaign. Therefore, the process outsourced to UBG, is mainly a provision of a platform. 
That process is highly standardized with a whole range of CDU entities using the same 
designs, webhosts and layouts. UBG provides a standardized platform and toolkits that can 
be adopted by the customers to their specific needs. Hence, those processes are of limited 
complexity.  
It can be concluded that despite the strategic importance of its member database, the party 
only faces a limited risk of losing control over the campaign, since processes given to UBG 
are of high standardization and low complexity. Therefore, self-made political transaction 
costs seem to be higher than the potential loss of control.  
Overall, UBG as an internal outsourcing provider creates notable added value for CDU, 
particularly in the field of routine tasks that can be given to a trustworthy partner that is 
integrated deeply into party structures and that is able to offer competitive pricing and 
clear priorities in favor of the party.   
6.3. Case 2 - DieLinke/DiG  
There are many similarities in the characteristic of campaign management and their 
cooperation with external partners between the parties DieLinke and the Greens. In both 
cases, not only fringe processes are given to partners. Rather, they take part in key strategic 
decisions. In addition, from an organizational point of view, both parties apply a model of 
outsourcing that can be considered as a hybrid form of outsourcing. While the Greens have 
been closely cooperating with agency ‘Zum Goldenen Hirschen’ of their former speaker 
Hans-Hermann Langguth, DieLinke has been cooperating for many years with agency DiG 
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headed by the inventor of the brand name ‘DieLinke’, Volker Ludwig. While there has been 
a whole range of media coverage concerning the Greens and their “house agency”423 Zum 
Goldenen Hirschen, less is known about campaign organization of DieLinke, which will be 
described and analyzed in the following. 
There are two major external partner involved in DieLinke campaigns: above-mentioned 
DiG and Media Service GmbH. The latter is a classic example of internal outsourcing, similar 
to the one analyzed in chapter 6.5. ‘Föderative Verlags-, Consulting- und 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH’ or short ‘FEVAC’ is a full subsidiary of DieLinke. FEVAC is in the 
possession of shares of a number of businesses. One of them is Media Service GmbH of 
which FEVAC holds 45 per cent of nominal capital424 Therefore, services outsourced to 
Media Service GmbH can be regarded as internal outsourcing. They include production-
related implementation of DiG proposals as well as logistics.  
A third external partner is ‘minuskel screen partner’. They are responsible for the 
implementation of DieLinke’s websites.  
Clearly, the main partner and lead agency is DiG. The relation between left wing party 
DieLinke and DiG is closely connected with the personality of DiG managing director Volker 
Ludwig. Already in 2002, he managed the left party’s (at this point still known as PDS) youth 
campaign, since 2007 he is party member425. From years of its creation between 2005 and 
2007 until today, Ludwig has been a key person in the creation of the brand ‘DieLinke’. 
“Agency stake in this name finding is ‘Die’ as prerequisite for the establishment of a new, 
independent political brand.”426 
Hence, his agency has been in charge of literally every campaign ever since. “This is a very 
special form of cooperation between principal and agent with all its advantages and 
disadvantages and therefore without tender.”427 
                                                     
423 Alexander and Fischaleck, ‘Die Kanzlermacher’ 
424 See: Rechenschaftsbericht 2014 DieLinke. Available at: http://www.die-
linke.de/partei/fakten/finanzen/rechenschaftsberichte/ 
425 See: http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/volker-ludwig/4893546.html 
426 Pätzold, ‘DIE LINKE wirkt, nicht nur politisch…’, 3 [Original wording: "Agenturanteil an dieser Namensfindung ist dieses 
'DIE' als Voraussetzung für die Etablierung einer neuen, eigenständigen politischen Marke."] 
427 Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: “Das ist schon eine ziemlich besondere Form der Zusammenarbeit zwischen 
Auftraggeber und Agentur mit allen Vor- und Nachteilen und insofern ohne Ausschreibung.”] 
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From a legal standpoint, DiG is a privately registered organization that has no capital 
investment from its vendor. However, there are extremely close ties between DiG and 
DieLinke. This is not only the case in the person of Volker Ludwig, but also in the ones of 
many of its employees and the fact that the managing director of the agent is also member 
of the principal. Hence, services outsourced from DieLinke to DiG are no classic cases of 
external outsourcing. Rather they represent a hybrid form between external and internal 
outsourcing. “In fact there is no formal connection. Therefore, in terms of organization it is 
outsourcing, but, apart from personal political relations, if you developed campaigns and 
the fundamental image of the party together for such a long time, a form of symbiosis is 
naturally developing.”428  
This reasoning is further supported when light is shed on the way the two organizations 
cooperate during the run of a campaign. Although DiG is not in the same building or in the 
immediate proximity from the party’s headquarters, distances are still very short. Both are 
located in the eastern part of Berlin, both sides frequently visit each other. There is 
constant contact over phone. “In this respect it is almost like we are a branch office during 
the run of a campaign without actually being part of the party.”429 Ludwig believes that this 
is even more cost efficient than actually being present in party headquarters on a 
permanent basis.  
For campaigns, staff in DieLinke headquarters shifts into campaign mode. Approximately 
one year before an election, party leaderhip decides on a campaign strategy. For better 
understanding of relevant aspects, external partners, including DiG, are being heard. In a 
committee named ‘Bundeswahlbüro’ all internal campaign expertise is brought together. 
The committee consists of relevant division leaders, representatives of regional 
associations and of top candidates. It meets about once a month. External partners, namely 
DiG, are also part of the committee, developing an implementation strategy of the strategic 
campaign outlines defined by party executive. “There, we are actually equal partner. 
                                                     
428 Höhn, Matthias [Original wording: „Es gibt in der Tat sozusagen keine formale Verbindung. Insofern ist es eine 
Auslagerung im organisatorischen Sinne, aber natürlich, abgesehen von persönlichen politischen Beziehungen oder 
Mitgliedschaften, wenn sie über einen so langen Prozess gemeinsam Kampagnen entwickeln bzw. auch das 
grundsätzliche Erscheinungsbild der Partei, dann entsteht natürlich so eine Form von Symbiose.“] 
429 Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: “insofern ist das eigentlich fast so wie in Wahlkampfzeiten, wie hier ein bisschen 
Außenstelle. Ohne dass [wir] jetzt Teil der Partei sind.”] 
167 | P a g e  
Nevertheless, it is clear to all in the round that there is the agent whom we assign and who 
receives our money.”430 A subordinated committee, ‘Wahlstab’, is then responsible for 
operational implementation. Meeting approximately once a week, it is headed by federal 
manager Matthias Höhn and consists of relevant division managers, finance managers, the 
party leader’s office and the federal manager’s office. The ‘Wahlstab’ discusses all 
operational issues, leading from logistical question, delivery dates and circulation volumes 
to online activities and qualification measures. In short: everything that needs to be 
organized during the run of a campaign. Again, DiG is an inherent component of this 
committee. In conclusion, it can be summarized that, although formally being an external 
actor, DiG is part of all relevant party institutions related to campaign management. 
This model of cooperation is regarded as superior to classic forms of external outsourcing. 
While short distances between principal and agent are guaranteed and party structures do 
not have to be duplicated, permanent personnel of party headquarters receive valuable 
assistance from DiG and its employees. The party’s goal is to create an efficient 
organizational structure and to transform party headquarters to campaign headquarters 
with DiG personnel being the only external element present. Important to note in this 
regard is that there is a discrepancy in formal versus actual decision making processes. 
Formally, there is a campaign committee (Bundeswahlbüro) with a fragile balance of 
                                                     
430 Ludwig, Volker [Original wording:“Wir sind da eigentlich Gleichberechtigte. In der Runde ist es aber allen trotzdem klar, 
da sitzt sozusagen der Dienstleister, den wir beauftragen, der unser Geld quasi bekommt.” 
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specifically proportional representation of members from various backgrounds. However, 
this committee proved to be too large and hardly working in this campaign. Therefore, 
many strategic decisions were taken in unofficial channels between party leadership and 
agent.  
Processes outsourced to DiG 
DiG was in charge of a variety of processes in the past federal campaign. Besides typical 
services offered by PR agencies such as poster design and production, DiG is also in charge 
of online campaigns of both the federal party division and on the state level. In addition, 
DiG not only drafts the campaign strategy, but is also in charge of implementation once the 
party (again in close consultation with the agent) makes decisions about content. Unusual 
for outsourcing in the political sphere is that DiG is also tasked with financial controlling. 
Mirrored to the respective division in party headquarters, the agency also maintains a 
controlling unit that monitors campaign budgets. Finally, yet imporantly, the only 
comprehensive archive of DieLinke campaigns does not exist in party headquarters. Rather 
it is in the possession of DiG. Neither the party itself, nor Rosa Luxemburg foundation are 
able to maintain such an archive. DiG, however, considers this as part of their mission. This 
creates an element of dependency of the principal on the agent.  
Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource 
As described in chapter 5.1.2.1, DieLinke and the Greens constitute the cluster of middle-
aged parties. Although DieLinke was only created in 2005, it is important to note that this 
newly united party is mostly based on personnel and infrastructure of the former party 
PDS, which was founded in 1990 after German reunification. Hence, the ‘real’ age of the 
organization is already over 25 years. Therefore, unlike newly established parties, DieLinke 
was able to resort to a grown party organization that was already in the possession of own 
subsidiaries to which processes could be outsourced.  
Being focussed mostly on the left wing of society, DieLinke is not a people’s party. Their 
financial resources are not of the same kind as the ones of CDU or SPD. “DieLinke does not 
have such a large amount of financial resources to only stuff external expertise in its 
structure. Hence, in this constellation, party employees are employed only with 
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campaigning. Everything else is somewhat left behind.”431 For a party with limited 
resources, this is a very rational approach: To rededicate existing personnel to the greatest 
extent possible and use external expertise for those functions that can’t be covered by its 
own people. In campaign mode, daily party business needs to be continued. Therefore, 
DieLinke keeps certain core staff in its campaign headquarters next to the campaign 
organization.  
As stated above, main party motivation to work together with DiG seems to be the criterion 
of continuity. It is unlikely that this approach will soon change unless a major election 
defeat on the federal level shakes the party. Therefore, an extremely high level of trust 
plays a major role in DieLinke’s cooperation with DiG.  
Political transaction costs 
Since both sides have been working together for a long period of time, a deep relationship 
of trust was developed. 
This is underlined by the 
fact that even changes in 
key campaign personnel 
in the party did not lead to 
a termination of this 
cooperation. Volker 
Ludwig underlines that 
they “would not work for 
a different party. […] The 
party always has a very 
direct access to us.”432 
Nevertheless, political transaction costs considering the services offered by DiG are of 
limited extent. Being closely connected to DieLinke and cooperation with DieLinke 
                                                     
431 Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: „DieLinke hat nicht derartig viele finanzielle Ressourcen, um nur mit externe Expertise 
so in gegliederte Strukturen zu stopfen. D.h. da kommen die Mitarbeiter der Partei zum Einsatz und die beschäftigen sich 
dann in so einer Konstellation ausschließlich mit Wahlkampf, alles andere bleibt irgendwie liegen.] 
432 Ludwig, Volker [Original wording: „Erst einmal ist es so, dass wir nicht für eine andere Partei arbeiten würden.[…] Die 
Partei hat immer einen sehr direkten Zugriff auf uns.“ 
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subsidiary Media Service, human reflexes leading to an externalization of failures are 
hampered. On the contrary, party key personnel would expose themselves to great risk in 
case of a change of agents. So far, DieLinke campaigns have been comparably successful. 
Over a long period of time and thanks to consistency in the choice of their partners, 
DieLinke managed to build a very consistent brand image. A campaign manager willing to 
bring change to this fruitful cooperation has to take big risks connected to his or her own 
career. If change was brought with the following election not being a success, it very likely 
that this would create a core center of criticism. Therefore, DieLinke campaign managers 
would only risk the political transaction costs of a change if there was enough reasoning in 
the form of a major defeat.  
Loss of control 
The degree of potential loss of control DieLinke is risking with its cooperation with DiG is 
significantly higher than political transaction costs. Although party management underlines 
that strategy finding processes are kept within party committees, DiG is already involved in 
this stage of the campaign. Taking part in all major committee meetings making proposals 
to party leadership, DiG is in a unique and powerful position. They might not be final 
decision makers, but there is no doubt that their advice is being heard, respected and 
influential for the actual campaign strategy.  
While processes easy to standardize, such as print or logistics or the party’s online shop, 
are given to subsidiary Media Service, processes carried out by DiG include campaign 
strategy development, campaign design, online campaign and other elements where only 
a limited extent of standardzation is possible. Those elements need to be re-invented for 
each campaign. As mentioned above, DiG and DieLinke are very consistent in their brand 
communication. Hence, there are certain elements that can be reused, but in terms of 
design and approach, there have been changes to the party’s campaigns over the last years. 
The same applies to the complexity of DiG’s services. They are mostly of creative nature, 
leading to the necessity of very individual approaches.  
The fact that DiG has a high standing in internal campaign hierarchy and the fact that a 
change of agents would require significant risk taking shows that, although the party still 
holds its hand over final strategic decision, the extent of loss of control can be regarded as 
comparably high.  
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6.4. Case 3 - Wesselmann 
Arguably the most established case of outsourcing in German campaigns is advertising 
made by Wahlkampf Werbung Wesselmann Wattenscheid GmbH. The company provides 
large-size portable billboards that are displayed during the course of a campaign mostly on 
center strips of busy roads. Those billboards are only permitted to be erected during a 
clearly defined period of time before each election and have to be taken down in the 
aftermath. Wesselmann offers full service consisting of negotiations on behalf of the 
ordering party with communities, the display itself and its setup and dismantling. The 
company is the only 
large-scale supplier of 
such a service and is 
contractor to almost 
all parties. It is “the 
largest outsourcing 
activity that exists in 
campaigning.”433 
During federal 
elections, roughly 28.000 billboards need to be serviced, each equipped with new posters 
every six weeks.434 
Wesselmann founded his company in 1961. The reason behind Wesselmann’s success lies 
in the fact that unauthorized billboarding was prohibited during the mid-60’s of the past 
century. Wesselmann took that chance and offered his services to both, SPD and CDU.435 
While its billboards are rarely used by marketing campaigns outside the political sphere, 
Wahlkampf Werbung Wesselmann Wattenscheid GmbH’s dominance is exemplified by the 
fact that those billboards are actually called „Wesselmänner“ in political jargon. For parties 
they are of particular importance because German campaigns are “very billboard 
dominated campaigns, because they possess the best media value. Hence, reach, visibility 
                                                     
433 Radunski, Peter [Original wording: „Das ist also […] die größte Outsourcing-Aktion, die es eigentlich gibt im Wahlkampf.“]   
434 Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’ 
435 Westhoff, ‘Politiker wählen Wesselmann’ 
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and costs are in a very good ratio.”436 Since they are only temporary, yet located at 
strategically important spots close to large streets, they disturb the surroundings and 
therefore possess a high level of visibility.  
Organizational factors influencing openness to outsource 
Setting up large-scale billboards does not require specific know how, but a rather large 
workforce that enables a nationwide erection within a short period of time. Most parties, 
in particular peoples’ parties such as CDU and SPD, should be able to provide the needed 
workforce due to their intense organizational level even on local level. However, logistic 
requirements are very high since Wesselmann billboards are of large scale. A high number 
of vans as well as solid structures to which billboards can be attached are necessary to 
provide the service. Since parties do not possess those resources, they would need to be 
built up. That would lead to financial burdens that would not be in a healthy relationship 
to other means of political marketing. “You need to manage that. They need huge 
hangars. Those posters, they are delivered quite early, they have to be mounted, dried 
and then they lay there to dry. And then you quickly need human resources as well as 
material to build them up everywhere. […] You cannot quickly copy that.”437 
Since Wesselmann provides its service to all parties in all campaigns nationwide it makes 
use of economies of scale that could only be reached by parties if they created a shared 
service center on their own, servicing all party entities. However, due to the reasons 
mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.2 such centers do not (yet) exist. Therefore, there are clear 
economic indicators suggesting outsourcing this service to an external provider such as 
Wesselmann.  
Particularly in established parties that have been working together with Wesselmann for a 
longer period of time there is a degree of expectations that is very much in favour of 
Wesselmann. “If you said, as a party, that we go down and book 20% less Wesselmann 
billboards, with guarantee you face a shitstorm within the party. Because everyone 
                                                     
436 Lutz Meyer [Original wording: “Damit ist es zunächst einmal ein sehr plakatdominierter Wahlkampf, weil die die besten 
Mediawerte haben, also Reichweite, Sichtbarkeit und Kosten stehen in einem echt guten Verhältnis] 
437 Stauss, Frank: [Original wording: „Sie müssen das erst mal schaffen. Die brauchen da riesige Hallen, diese Plakate, die 
werden ja auch relativ früh angeliefert, weil die werden alle aufgezogen, getrocknet, dann liegen die da erst mal zum 
Trocknen und dann müssen sie natürlich auch zeitnah das Personal und das Material zur Verfügung haben, um die 
überall aufzustellen. […]das kann man nicht so schnell nachmachen.“] 
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instantly calls you and say ‘there has always been a Wesselmann, now there is none, what’s 
going on?’”438. This tendency seems to be more developed in established parties than in 
young parties such as the PirateParty that do not have a long-term relationship with 
Wesselmann.  
Political Transaction costs 
With their billboards, Wesselmann offers a channel of communication to political parties. 
They do not offer entire strategies. Despite the fact that Wesselmann billboards are very 
popular and widely used by 
parties, plenty of other 
communication channels 
are available. Hence there 
is no danger of 
dependency on 
Wesselmann services. At 
the same time, their 
importance to the 
foundation of campaigns is 
too limited that errors in 
delivery could have drawbacks on key players in campaign management. No one has to fear 
negative implications to their career because a Wesselmann billboard was set up in a false 
way or at an unattractive location. Hence, political transaction costs for key players are very 
low. A unique element of Wesselmann services is that they are used by various parties 
during the same electoral campaign. Unlike other service providers, Wesselmann offers its 
services simultaneously to direct competitors. This again underlines Wesselmann’s role as 
a provider of single profession. They are not involved in any strategy development.  
Loss of Control 
There are significant strategic implications on where which large-size billboard is 
presented. However, as mentioned above, from an organizational point of view, 
                                                     
438 Stauss, Frank [Original wording: “ Wenn sie als Partei sagen, ich gehe jetzt mal runter und ich buche 20%  Wesselmänner 
weniger und dann haben sie einen Shitstorm in der Partei garantiert, weil sofort die Leute anrufen und sagen: ‚hier stand 
immer ein Wesselmann, jetzt steh keiner da, was soll das?‘“] 
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Wesselmann billboards represent one of many channels of communication to voters. They 
might play an important role within the overall strategy, but they are not the strategy. 
Therefore, there are few strategic implications from a managerial point of view and can 
rather easily be given to an external service provider. There is no notable loss of control in 
case of outsourcing. 
The processes Wesselmann offers are highly standardized. By offering only three sizes of 
billboards, set-up, gluing, poster changes and dismantling, there is a limited scope 
consisting of routine tasks. Since the same boards are stored between campaigns and are 
reused, Wesselmann offers tasks that are routine and of limited complexity for its 
employees. 
With both factors, political transaction costs and loss of control at a low level, services 
offered by Wesselmann are a prime example for services that should be outsourced to third 
parties. Although parties in principle could negotiate with communities and set up 
billboards on their own, Wesselmann is able to use tremendous economies of scale by 
offering its services to all parties for all kinds of elections as well as non-political institutions 
(such as World Games 2005). Therefore, outsourcing large-size billboards to external 
service increases efficiency of a campaign. 
6.5. Case 4 - Polling & Research 
Polling represents a special case in outsourcing of campaign processes. Polling is the only 
process that has been outsourced by all parties for some time. Therefore, it is the only 
outsourcing process for which a considerable amount of research is available and can be 
analyzed as a whole ranging over all relevant parties. As early as in 1965, computer-based 
projections were published. “They came from Bad Godesberg-based Ifa-Institute that had 
the reputation from the very start to be close to SPD, making its analyses part of ideological 
trench battles in the 60s and 70s.”439 During the following decades, polling and research 
was not only performed by newspapers and TV stations, but also by parties themselves.  
Processes outsourced to polling agencies 
                                                     
439 Schönenborn, ‘Demoskopie in der beschleunigten Stimmungsdemokratie’, 310 [Original wording: "Sie kamen vom Bad 
Godesberger Infas-Institut, das von Beginn an im Ruf der SPD-Nähe stand und dessen Analysen damit fast automatisch 
Teil der ideologischen Grabenkämpfe der sechziger und siebziger Jahre wurden."] 
175 | P a g e  
While at the beginning focus was mostly put on the projection of potential election 
outcomes, it has shifted to research on relevant groups of voters and to opposition 
research. "But by the late 1990's, opposition research had come to mean sitting in front of 
a computer examining everything from newspaper articles, to property records, to civil and 
criminal court records'"440 By today, polling and research has become an integral part of 
any federal campaign. Before campaign strategies are implemented, they are tested 
thoroughly by assigned polling agencies in order to find out which technique or method is 
perceived in which way. “For this, polls provide good and reliable material. Therefore, 
parties on the federal or state level usually assign suitable institutes at an early stage.”441 
Their core function is to find the current support level for the party, identify fields of policy 
that are of relevance and to find how the party is perceived among society. This information 
today may be critical for election success. Therefore, parties expect increased 
professionalism in polling agencies. "Campaign polls are usually run by professional polling 
firms, not in-house volunteer operations, where enthusiasm and inexperience might 
introduce unwanted variables."442 
Organizational influence on outsourcing decision 
Polling and research are processes being outsourced over the entire spectrum of parties. 
Those organizational aspects that highly differ between the relevant parties only lead to 
insufficient answers. Inadequate factors include organizational level and size of parties 
(large and highly organized parties, such as SPD, and smaller parties with weaker local 
representations, such as FDP, outsource polling and research) as well as age of organization 
and establishment, (old and established parties, like SPD or CDU, and middle-aged parties, 
like the Greens and DieLinke, and young parties like AfD), all employ polling agencies). 
Marking those factors as irrelevant for the decision to outsource polling and research, there 
are two factors left which seem to bring an explanation: lack of knowledge within the 
organization and the extent of financial resources.   
                                                     
440 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 55 
441 Gerster, ‘Botschaften und Bilder’, 100 [Original wording: "Umfragen liefern dazu gutes und gesichertes Material. 
Deswegen beauftragen Parteien auf Bundes- oder Landesebene dafür in der Regel frühzeitig geeignete Institute.]" 
442 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 111–2 
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Polling and research are highly sophisticated areas in which a high degree of knowledge is 
required in order to conduct surveys and interpret them adequately and reliably. Since this 
know how is very costly and only required for a very short period of time and at particular 
points in time, it is not economic for parties to provide this service on their own. Therefore, 
it seems that the major driver for outsourcing polling and research does not come from 
classic organizational factors, but from economic considerations. These are based on 
financial backgrounds of the parties.  
In order to conduct professional and reliable polls, a reasonable financial investment is 
necessary. In 2013, all parties except for the Pirate Party, employed external polling 
agencies. While ‘classic parties’ had campaign budgets between 4 and 23 Million Euros, 
Pirate Party claims to have only a budget of 400.000 Euros.443 With such a small amount at 
disposal, the vast majority of the budget was spent for design and production of advertising 
material as well as logistics. PirateParty’s lack of financial resources can therefore explain 
its hesitation to outsource polling.  
Political transaction costs 
Polling agencies can be hardly held responsible for defeats. Due to the nature of their 
services, they do not represent a goal for externalization of failures. However, particularly 
during the 2005 Bundestag election, polling institutes were criticized heavily for deviations 
of up to six percent between projections and actual election outcome.444 However, it is 
difficult to prove whether this was indeed an error of polling institutes. Late deciding voters 
occur in a significantly increasing amount and therefore it seems very likely that they 
caused the errors instead. Nevertheless, cooperation with public opinion research requires 
a high amount of trust, since large parts of campaigns are built on the outcomes of polls 
that were conducted on behalf of the respective party. Therefor, long-term cooperation 
between parties and polling agencies has been developed. This is shown by the fact that 
SPD has a long-lasting relationship with Infratest Dimap while CDU has been working 
together with Allensbach Demographic Institutes for several decades. It is highly unlikely 
                                                     
443 See: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/millionen-aufwand-spd-goennt-sich-groesstes-wahlkampf-budget-a-
905334.html 
444 See: http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/archiv/2005.htm 
177 | P a g e  
that those relationships will change in the foreseeable future. It can be summarized that 
political transaction costs for outsourcing polling and research are relatively small.  
Loss of control 
Polling consists of highly standardized processes that allow comparison between surveys. 
Polling techniques need to be very transparent and known to campaign management in 
order to be able to draw correct conclusions. As mentioned above, polls and research 
outcomes are of supreme strategic importance since entire campaigns can be built on 
them. "Research is the most underrated of professions and one of the most important. 
Spring for the money - it can make the difference." By giving this decisive process out of 
house, the party takes a very high risk of losing control over the following campaign. 
Therefore, campaign 
members with respective 
backgrounds closely 
accompany the work of 
polling agencies. The polls 
themselves are 
standardized, but of high 
complexity. Many aspects 
can provoke inaccurate 
results. "Even the method 
of payment can affect data quality. An hourly wage might reduce the incentive to submit 
bogus call reports, but it provides less motivation to complete the calls in a timely manner. 
Piecework payments might reward persistent employees, but might also credit sham call 
reports."445 Therefore, conducting proper and methodologically clear polls require a high 
level of expertise. Overall, the level of loss of control is defined higher than political 
transaction costs, but still limited since polling is a very standardized process that is very 
transparent and open to monitoring. 
  
                                                     
445 Burton and Shea, Campaign Craft, 112 
 
Graph 6.11: Allocation of polling & research in the model 
178 | P a g e  
7. Conclusion 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined factors which contribute to the overall openness to outsource 
processes in campaign organizations and which influence the extent to which they are 
outsourced. This final chapter will sum up the most important aspects of the research and 
outline possibilities and limitations of transferring knowledge and techniques from the 
business world to a political context. In the final passage, it will make recommendations to 
improve further efficiency of campaign organizations by applying an optimized approach 
to outsourcing in campaigns. 
7.1. Academic value 
In the following, conclusions are drawn concerning the scientific benefit of this study. In 
particular, research questions stated in chapter 1.1 will be picked up and answered as well 
as general remarks concerning the adoption of business management techniques. It 
became clear that the environment of campaign organizations has changed significantly 
over the last decades. Decreasing political interest together with decreasing party 
identification and increasing voter volatility have led to an increasing need for 
professionalized campaigns with the ability to specifically aim at relevant target groups. 
Employing professional agents with relevant processes may be one way to raise the level 
of professionalism of a campaign. 
Transfer of management knowledge to campaigns 
The basic approach to this study was the attempt to apply management techniques found 
in the private economy to a political context. Management processes in campaign 
organizations cangenerally be considered as similar to the ones of private entities. This is 
particularly the case when it comes to standardized processes, which are simple to 
operationalize. As outlined in chapter 6.1, those include the production of advertising 
material or logistics. Examples of outsourcing processes with a high degree of 
standardization can be found in most of the mainstream outsourcing literature. This is due 
to the fact, that its focus is mainly on the IT industry, which is dealing with processes of 
similar standardized characteristics. 
However, there are limitations in the possibility to transfer this knowledge to campaigns. 
Unlike in standard economic literature, there are a number of processes in campaigns 
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(particularly concerning strategy development), that are of highest complexity. As shown 
in chapter 5.2.2, they tend to have very high necessity to exert close control. While this 
need exceeds the one of most businesses that outsources standardized processes, there 
seem to be more similarities with highly innovative firms. Like political parties, they are 
faced with more costs that are difficult to measure and operationalized. This particularly 
concerns non-financial costs, which may be of considerable extent. Their control 
requirements are comparably higher as the ones of political parties. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that transfer of management knowledge concerning outsourcing is indeed 
possible, but mainstream outsourcing literature is insufficient. There are notable 
differences between standard economic organizations and political parties. Moreover, 
parallels are found in literature dealing with innovation outsourcing. As MaryAnne M. 
Gobble, realizes in her 2013 essay, “outsourcing innovation, in particular, demands that 
client firms move from regarding outsourcing as a transaction – x dollars paid for y units 
manufactured – to engaging in ongoing relationships with vendors who are true partners 
in the process.”446 This underlines the parallels between innovative businesses and political 
parties with intangible transaction costs as the common denominator. Therefore, popular 
transaction costs economics turn out to be insufficient for further explanation. The model 
of knowledge-based explanations of boundary choice seems to be a more suitable 
approach. “Knowledge-based theories of the firm also regard the specificity of assets, 
particularly human assets embedded in firm-specific routines, language, and skills, as 
critical to the performance of the firm.”447 This is particularly relevant when classic 
transactions costs models are not able to explain further factors such as intangible political 
transaction costs for decision makers in complex structures like campaign organizations. 
Determinants for the openness to outsource 
Although organizational factors (Q3) were meant to be considered at a later stage, it 
became clear  they not only influence the extent of outsourcing, but even the openness to 
outsource at all. This willingness to outsource is mostly determined by economic factors, 
namely scarcity of own human resources, seasonal changes in demand and available 
                                                     
446 Gobble, ‘Outsourcing Innovation’, 66 
447 Poppo and Zenger, ‘Testing alternative theories of the firm: transaction cost, knowledge-based and measurement 
explanations for make-or-buy decisions in information service’, 857 
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financial resources. In addition, some organizational factors are relevant: age of a party, its 
organizational level, and the need for an external perspective. This is valid under the 
assumption that campaign organizations have the choice to build up either their own 
expertise or to employ an external service provider.  
Determinants of the extent of outsourcing performed in election campaigns 
The main research question is concerned with factors related the extent of outsourcing 
performed in election campaigns (Qm). The answer to this question is that the most 
prominent determinants are the extent of political transaction costs for leading campaign 
managers and the extent of loss of control over the campaign organization in case a process 
is given to an external partner.  
Main factors that contribute to the extent of political transaction costs (Q1) are natural 
tendencies to externalize failures and to internalize successes as well as the extent of trust 
between the outsourcing organization and the service provider. The latter is mainly 
achieved through close and long-lasting relationships. 
The extent of control over the campaign organization (Q2) is determined by the complexity 
of the service, its strategic importance and possibilities for standardization. Here, above 
mentioned differences to mainstream outsourcing literature come into play where, in most 
cases, complexity is not as developed as in the political campaign context.  
Depending on the degree of those two factors, the model introduced in chapter 1.1.1 can 
be applied. Outsourcing may be performed at four possible intensities: not at all, service 
provision by an internal provider (shared-service-center), service provision by a hybrid 
agent, and classic external outsourcing. The larger political transaction costs and/or loss of 
control are the lower the willingness of parties to give the process to an external service 
provider.  
No general hesitation to outsource processes 
A hypothesis that was picked up with Q4 is that campaign organizations are more reluctant 
to give processes to external providers than private business organizations. However, it 
became quite clear that this is not the case. There is no indicator for increased hesitation 
to outsource among campaign managers. As described above, the decision depends on 
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organizational and economic factors as well as on the extent of political transactions costs 
and control.  
However, parties are hesitant to outsource strategy development, because they consider 
this process as one of their core competences. The same phenomenon can be observed in 
the field of online campaigning, which has experienced a considerable rise during the last 
two decades. On the other hand, it is common practice that all processes connected to the 
production of advertising material are given to agents. Only in rare cases, larger parties are 
able to provide this by a printing plant that belongs to the respective party’s group of 
companies. 
Variance between parties 
A significant variation between parties was observed when differentiating by the factor of 
age. Very young parties rarely outsource processes due to a very enthusiastic support 
group, which is able to provide many processes by itself and to a lack of financial resources. 
Middle-aged parties, such as DieLinke or the Greens outsource even basic processes like 
hanging of posters, due to their inability to be present in remote areas. Mature parties, 
such as SPD or CDU, again produce a variety of services in-house. This is possible through 
gained expertise and increased financial means through past election successes.  
7.2. Recommendations for optimized usage of external resources 
This last sub-chapter asks the question, whether the current state of outsourcing is 
effective and sensible. It therefore picks up research question 5: What kind of processes 
should be outsourced? Recommendations are based on opinions expressed by experts 
during the running of the interviews. The focus thereby was not to choose particular 
processes and to define to what extent they should be outsourced. This depends on the 
particular situation and circumstances. Rather, general recommendations are made that 
may have an influence on a whole variety of processes and their make-or-buy decisions.  
7.2.1. Have more courage to outsource strategy development 
As shown in chapter 6.1.1, campaign organizations are very reluctant when it comes to 
outsourcing strategy development. This is connected to both, fear of loss of control and to 
risks of political transaction costs. Some experts are very clear in this regard: “You can never 
outsource actual politics. If you started to do so, you have already lost. You have to this on 
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your own.”448 It is clear that definition of content is the core competence of a political party 
and its program is its product. Core competences should not be outsourced, particularly if 
it needs to go through a somewhat democratic process and needs to be adopted by the 
majority of party convention delegates. It therefore also possesses a function of 
identification trigger for party members. It would be hard to motivate party members to 
actively engage in campaigns, if they had no say in what the party stands for. 
However, there is nothing wrong with integrating an external consultant into the process. 
While its task might not be the definition of a program, it would indeed have the 
competence to define a focus strategy for various topics based on outcomes of 
demographic surveys. They could very well serve as a valuable consultant in this regard not 
only at the very beginning of the campaign, but months (and perhaps even years) before. 
“They don’t trust the creatives or thinkers enough that they could give valuable input. 
Arrogance of parties that only they have a political view is too large. From time to time it 
would be sensible to listen to employees of agencies. They are also voters.”449 Most experts 
agree that parties would benefit from having a sparring partner with whom they may 
analyze and discuss their strengths and weaknesses, although it is also agreed that final 
decisions need to be made by campaign leadership.  
External partners might as well serve as facilitators in strategy development processes. 
“Normally it is clear that formation of opinion, negotiation process and the decision are the 
task of party committees. This I would never question. As far as I can observe it, the 
problem is that party committees, party boards, party executive committees, party 
executive are no longer areas of mutual trust. This is due to various changes we experience. 
It means that people increasingly act tactically to each other. Moreover, this tactical 
handling does not necessarily lead to good decisions being made.450 Hence, external 
                                                     
448 Interview with Katja Suding [Original wording: “Aber die eigentliche Politik können Sie niemals outsourcen. Wenn Sie das 
machen, haben Sie schon verloren. Das müssen Sie selber machen.“] 
449 Interview with Armin Reins [Original wording: “Man traut den Kreativen oft nicht zu, dass sie wertvollen Input geben 
können. Dazu ist dann wohl die Arroganz der Parteien, dass nur sie politisch den Durchblick haben, zu groß. Das ein oder 
andere Mal wäre es sicher sinnvoll, auf Agentur-Mitarbeiter zu hören. Schließlich sind das auch Wähler.“] 
450 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Normalerweise sagt man, klar, das ist die Meinungsbildung, der 
Aushandlungsprozess und die Entscheidung die Aufgabe von Parteigremien sind. Das würde ich auch nie in Frage stellen. 
Das Problem ist aber nur, soweit ich das beobachten kann, dass durch verschiedene Veränderungen, die wir haben, die 
Parteigremien, Parteivorstände, Parteipräsidien, Fraktionsvorstände, keine Vertrauensräume mehr sind. D.h. die Leute 
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partners could not only give advice, but moderate decisions making processes that bring 
decision makers as well as regular party members on board. While focus hereby would not 
be to find the Holy Grail that changes everything from one day to another, but to 
consistently build strategies that are perceived well by the electorate, particularly in phases 
of crises. 
7.2.2. Implement shared service centers to cope with seasonal changes 
As elaborated in chapter 5.1.1.2, significant seasonal changes between campaign and off-
campaign seasons are a decisive economic factor that prevents parties from building up 
their own expertise. The main argument from almost all respondents from party 
organizations has been that elections on the federal level only take place every four years. 
In between, costly human resources for campaign tasks are not needed.  
While this might be true on the federal level, this changes when state elections are also 
taken into account. With 16 states holding elections every 5 years on different time tracks, 
there are multiple elections held every year on the state level or above. Hence, if party 
structures allowed the implementation of a shared service center with gathered campaign 
expertise that is accessible by all state associations as well as by the federal party, 
significant increases in productivity could be achieved. As shown in chapter 5.2.2.2, there 
are many processes needed in a campaign that are well possible to standardize. By giving 
those tasks to a shared service center, utilization could be increased and expertise could 
be held within the organization, avoiding a brain drain.  
Some party experts argue that this model might be perceived critically, because state 
associations of parties very much underline their independence from the federal party 
(particularly, when they conclude bad that outcomes in polls are connected to federal 
policies). In some parties, such as CDU, membership fees are even collected on the local 
level and  given up the ladder until they reach the federal association. Therefore, state 
parties might fear that they would lose some of their independence. In addition, a change 
of external partners is a particular wish in order to pursue changes of image or strategy. In 
                                                     
bewegen sich dort untereinander zunehmend taktisch zueinander. Und dieses taktische Umgehen führt nicht unbedingt 
dazu, dass gute Entscheidungen getroffen werden.“ 
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case of a series of losses, it would be difficult to convince state organizations to work with 
the same partner again.  
However, a shared service center does not need to be tasked with all relevant processes of 
a campaign. A certain degree of freedom to find suitable a truly external partner is sensible. 
However, there are no reasons not to install a shared service center for all state and federal 
associations which are tasked with those processes that are considered of low strategic 
importance. This shared service center would be able to provide processes on a very 
constant basis to all state and federal campaigns of the party. To a certain extent, Union 
Betriebs-GmbH is a step towards that direction. However, its resources considering 
campaigns are very limited. A true shared service center would be able to build up 
necessary expertise within party structures that would fill a current gap: “I am not aware 
of any true talent pool of any party, where you could say that business is really being 
learnt.”451 Hence, a shared service center for campaigns would have multiple possibilities 
to improve productivity of a campaign, without necessarily increasing costs. 
7.2.3. Outsource creative thinking 
Being important elements of each democracy, parties themselves possess democratic 
internal structures. Unfortunately, those processes are often rather time-consuming and 
complex. In the opinion of many respondents, this is a contrast to creative thinking. 
Creative minds need some freedom to manoeuvre. Being tight in party structures and 
dependent on committees is likely to have negative consequences on the outcome of their 
work. As mentioned in chapter 5.1.2.6, having an external perspective on the party itself, 
its program and its perception among the electorate is often sensible and helpful, since 
parties tend to mix up their internal with external perception. Often this leads to increased 
alienation with the electorate. “Concerning advertising and design questions, it is strongly 
recommended to have a partner on the side who is not only an external idea provider, but 
one that prevents you to look at PR work from solely an internal perspective.”452 By 
                                                     
451 Interview with Frank Stauss [Original wording: “Ich kenne eigentlich keine wirkliche Kaderschmiede einer Partei, wo man sagt, da wird dieses Handwerk wirklich gelernt.“]   
452 Interview with Matthias Höhn [Original wording: “Bei der werberischen und Gestaltungsfrage empfiehlt es sich aus meiner 
Sicht dingend, einen Partner an seiner Seite zu haben, der nicht nur Ideengeber von außen ist, sondern sie auch ein 
Stückchen davor bewahrt, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit aus einer kompletten Binnensicht heraus zu entwickeln.“] 
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employing an external partner who is tasked with creative thinking, chances are good that 
creative PR strategies are developed, that are actually able to reach the intended groups. 
Nevertheless, it is important to integrate the external partner well into party and campaign 
structures so that it can understand and sense a party’s identity and convictions. “Such a 
publication can actually only be texted by someone who worked in many party committees 
and was involved when this field of policy was developed, someone who is deeply involved 
in terms of content.”453 This combination of external perspective with enough room to be 
creative and thorough knowledge about the party’s program can be achieved by proposed 
outsourcing of creative thinking to a trusted partner who is working in close cooperation 
with the rest of the campaign organization.  
7.2.4. Don’t use too many external partners  
Every campaign organization is well-advised to consider carefully where external expertise 
is needed and in what fields, and where they are able to provide the necessary services on 
their own. “I can only establish the rule to analyze own strengths and weaknesses and to 
make the best possible decision what to buy externally and what to provide with internal 
resources based on such a SWOT analysis and the available financial resources.”454 
Regardless of the extent of services provided by an external partner, all respondents advise 
that only a very limited number of service providers should be employed. Limit both in the 
sense of employed simultaneously and over the long run. 
As shown in chapter 5.1.2.5 one reason that led to SPD’s major failure in the 2013 campaign 
was that too many centers of powers employed too many external partners which did not 
cooperate with each other. This is not a problem exclusive to SPD. If there were only one 
major external partner, who perhaps has sub-contractors for the provision of specialized 
services, productivity and efficiency of the campaign would considerably be increased. 
Need for time-consuming cooperation meetings and briefing could be limited to the lowest 
                                                     
453 Interview with Karsten Göbel [Original wording: “So eine Publikation, die kann eigentlich nur jemand textlich erstellt 
werden, der in vielen Gremien einer Partei mitgearbeitet hat und auch dabei war, als dieses Politikfeld bearbeitet worden 
ist, der inhaltlich so stark drin ist.“] 
454 Interview with Steffi Lemke [Original wording: “Ich kann da nur die Regel aufstellen, die eigenen Ressourcen, die eigenen 
Stärken und Schwächen analysieren und aus einer solchen SWOT-Analyse und den Finanzmitteln, die zur Verfügung 
stehen, die bestmögliche Entscheidung treffen, wo kaufe ich mir extern was dazu und wo muss ich es mit internen Mitteln 
selber bekommen.“] 
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possible extent. At the same time, it may be ensured that the entire campaign fits together 
and follows a consistent strategy and design.  
Just as important as to only employ a limited number of service providers at a time it is to 
minimize fluctuation of external partners. Only close principal-agent relationships that 
involve high levels of trust may lead to desired success. As described in chapter 5.2.1.3, 
trust needs time and experience to develop. It takes time getting to know the partner, his 
convictions and reactions. If trust is attained, then campaigns follow a clearly defined 
strategy that follows a consistent concept, time is needed to develop this. It literally takes 
years of trusted relationships to develop a party image that fits to the party and 
appreciated by the electorate.  
In conclusion, campaigns should build a well-functioning and efficient campaign 
organization with only few external partners which deliver a sound and consistent message 
to the electorate.   
7.2.5. What should not be outsourced 
Last, but not least, experts do not only make recommendations concerning processes being 
outsourced, but also what processes should NOT be outsourced. As a general rule, 
processes suitable to being outsourced should be “manageable, billable and of with 
characteristics that the client, hence the party, says that we can’t do it.”455 If one of those 
basic criteria is not met, a campaign organization should prefer providing the service in-
house. The same applies to processes, which are party-specific and content-related and 
have influence on the identity of the party. By outsourcing such a process, a party would 
risk losing support of its followers and active members.  
However, the most important kind of processes, which should not be given to external 
providers, are processes linked to messages parties try to transmit. The party’s content or, 
as noted in chapter 5.2.2.3, the party’s core competence. The closer a process is linked to 
the core brand of the party, the more cautious a party should be when confronted with the 
make-or-buy decision. The product needs to come from the party itself. An external agent 
may assist it, as proposed in chapter 7.1, but content needs to come from the party. 
                                                     
455 Interview with Volker Ludwig [Original wording: “Überschaubar, abrechenbar und letztlich der Gestalt, dass der 
Auftraggeber, also die Partei, sagt, das kriegen wir auch gar nicht hin.“] 
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“Actually, you can outsource almost everything, except for the point, what is important to 
me in an election? Thus, the question what is my fundamental conviction? Why am I 
competing? This, you cannot actually outsource.”456 As several respondents report, this 
was attempted on a few occasions, but it failed, because it did not fit to the party’s political 
DNA.  
It can therefore be concluded that that productivity of campaigns can be even further 
increased by making slight changes to their outsourcing behavior. More courage to 
outsource strategy development processes should be considered as long as they do not 
interfere with the party’s core competences that are connected to fundamental convictions 
and the basic program of the party. Those processes should be kept in-house. Creativity is 
considered a field that requires mental freedom and does not fit to the very tight, 
democratic and lengthy organizational process of political parties that require involvement 
of a number of different party leaders and committees. Parties should refrain from 
employing too many external partners, both simultaneously and over the run of several 
elections. The development of mutual trust is considered a key factor for campaign success. 
This aspect could be affected negatively, if a party consistently changes its external 
partners. Employing several service providers in the same campaign should be avoided, 
because it may lead to mistrust, chaos, lengthy coordination processes and to an 
inconsistent campaign image.  
A promising approach would be the implementation of a shared service center located at 
a party’s federal headquarters that would not only be available for federal campaigns, but 
also to campaigns run on the state level. Width this approach and the circumstance where 
there are usually multiple elections on state level or above every year, higher utilization 
rates could be attained, brain drains avoided and a higher level of productivity achieved. 
  
                                                     
456 Interview with Kajo Wasserhövel [Original wording: “Eigentlich können sie fast alles auslagern bis auf den Punkt, worum 
geht es ihnen selber bei einer Wahl? Also die Frage, was ist meine Grundüberzeugung, warum trete ich an? Das können 
Sie eigentlich nicht auslagern.“] 
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V. Appendix  
Interview guidelines 
Leitfrage 
(Erzählaufforderung) 
Check- Wurde das erwähnt? 
Memo für mögliche 
Nachfragen (nur stellen 
wenn nicht von allein 
angesprochen) 
Formulierung anpassen! 
Konkrete Fragen – an passender 
Stelle in dieser Formulierung stellen 
Aufrechtherhaltungs- und 
Steuerungsfragen 
Teil I - Organisation der 
Kampagne 
Eine Kampagne ist meist 
von langer Hand geplant 
und von großem 
Organisationsaufwand 
gekennzeichnet. Können 
Sie mir etwas über die von 
Ihnen durchgeführte 
Kampagne und Ihrer 
Organisation erzählen? 
 
Aufbau und Rollenverteilung 
 
 
Aufgaben des 
Kampagnenmanagers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolle anderer Akteure in der 
Kampagnenorganisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vergleich zu früheren 
Kampagnen 
 
 
 
Grad der Standardisierung 
 
Wie war das Kampagnenteam 
aufgebaut? 
 
Wer waren die wichtigsten Akteure 
auf Seiten der Partei? 
 
Beschreiben Sie die Aufgaben und 
Herausforderungen eines 
Kampagnenmanagers. 
 
Welche Rolle spielten  
- Parteigremien  - innerpart.Machtstrukturen  - politische Entscheider  bei der Planung und Durchführung 
der Kampagne? 
 
Gab es eine Abgrenzung zwischen 
technischer und politischer 
Kampagnenführung? 
 
Wo lagen Gemeinsamkeiten bzw. 
Unterschiede zwischen Ihrer letzten 
Kampagne und früheren? 
 
Wie standardisiert kann eine 
Kampagne sein? 
 
Gibt es einzelne Standardprozesse? 
Wie war das mit Ihrer Rolle 
? 
 
 
Wer hatte auf Parteiseite 
das Sagen? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wer spielte innerhalb der 
Partei noch eine Rolle? 
Wie waren die 
Interessenlagen zwischen 
den Parteigremien? 
Leitfrage 
(Erzählaufforderung) 
Check- Wurde das 
erwähnt? 
Memo für mögliche 
Nachfragen (nur stellen 
wenn nicht von allein 
angesprochen) 
Formulierung anpassen! 
Konkrete Fragen – an passender 
Stelle in dieser Formulierung 
stellen 
Aufrechtherhaltungs- und 
Steuerungsfragen 
200 | P a g e  
Teil II – Entscheidung und 
Ablauf der Auslagerung 
Können Sie mir etwas  über 
die Entscheidungsfindung bei 
der Frage der Auslagerung 
und den Ablauf einer 
Auslagerung erzählen? 
Kriterien bei der 
Auslagerungs-Entscheidung 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolle von 
Führungswechseln 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolle von Exklusivität und 
politischer Nähe des 
Service-Anbieters 
 
Motivation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rolle finanzieller 
Ressourcen 
 
 
Transaktionskosten 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geeignete und ungeeignete 
Bereiche 
 
Nach welchen Kriterien wählten 
Sie Ihren/Ihre Anbieter aus? 
 
Welche Voraussetzungen bringt 
ein Service-Anbieter idealerweise 
mit? 
Welche Voraussetzungen müssen 
erfüllt sein, damit bestimmte 
Prozesse ausgelagert werden 
können? 
 
Haben mögliche kurz zuvor 
stattgefundene Führungswechsel 
eine Auswirkung auf die 
Auslagerungsbereitschaft? 
 
 
Wie eng muss ein Anbieter mit 
der Partei verwoben sein? 
 
Was motiviert den 
Wahlkampfleiter? 
 
Was ist die größte Angst eines 
Wahlkampfleiters? 
 
Mit welcher Motivation wird ein 
Prozess an einen externen 
Anbieter vergeben? 
 
Was ist die Motivation eines 
Anbieters an einem Wahlkampf 
mitzuwirken? 
 
Ist Auslagerung unterm Strich 
teurer oder günstiger als 
Eigenherstellung? 
 
Welche finanziellen und nicht-
finanziellen Kosten entstehen 
durch Auslagerung? 
 
Wie versuchten Sie, diese Kosten 
zu minimieren? 
 
Welche Prozesse oder Bereiche 
eignen sich besonders gut oder 
Und welche Rolle spielt das 
Vertrauen? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welche Rolle spielte das 
Geld? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wie ist das mit der 
Strategieentwicklung? 
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 besonders schlecht für eine 
Auslagerung? 
Leitfrage 
(Erzählaufforderung) 
Check- Wurde das erwähnt? 
Memo für mögliche 
Nachfragen (nur stellen wenn 
nicht von allein 
angesprochen) 
Formulierung anpassen! 
Konkrete Fragen – an 
passender Stelle in dieser 
Formulierung stellen 
Aufrechtherhaltungs- und 
Steuerungsfragen 
Teil III – Konsequenzen der 
Auslagerung 
Können Sie mir mehr über 
die Konsequenzen der 
Auslagerung und das 
Zusammenspiel mit dem 
Service-Anbieter erzählen? 
Negative Auswirkungen? 
Kontrollmöglichkeiten? 
Vertrauliche Informationen? 
 
 
 
 
 
Anbieter als Sündenbock 
 
 
 
 
 
Fallbeispiele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratschläge 
 
Wie stellen Sie sicher, dass die 
Qualität von ausgelagerten 
Prozessen zufriedenstellend 
ist? 
 
Wie stellen Sie sicher, dass ein 
Anbieter im Laufe der 
Kampagne kein „Eigenleben“ 
entwickelt? 
 
Müssen Anbieter für Fehler des 
Parteimanagements 
herhalten? 
 
Wer bekommt die Lorbeeren 
bei einer erfolgreichen 
Kampagne? 
 
Was wurde von externen 
Dienstleistern ausgeführt?  
 
Was wurde von der Partei 
selbst durchgeführt? 
 
Wer hat praktische Arbeiten 
wie Plakatdesign, Plakatierung, 
Wahlumfragen, 
Veranstaltungen etc. 
durchgeführt? 
 
Gab es Prozesse, die selbst 
durchgeführt wurde, aber 
besser hätten ausgelagert 
werden sollen? Bzw. 
andersherum? 
 
Welche Prozesse sollten Ihrer 
Meinung nach ausgelagert 
werden? 
Und wie kontrollieren Sie die 
Anbieter? 
 
Wann überschreitet ein 
Dienstleister seine Grenzen? 
 
 
Wer bekommt den Ruhm 
bzw. die Tracht Prügel? 
 
 
 
 
Was wurde denn bei Ihren 
Kampagnen ausgelagert? 
 
 
 
 
Können Sie noch mehr zu 
den Anbietern und den 
ausgelagerten Prozessen 
erzählen? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Was würden Sie künftigen 
Kampagnen raten? 
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Leitfrage 
(Erzählaufforderung) 
Check- Wurde das erwähnt? 
Memo für mögliche 
Nachfragen (nur stellen wenn 
nicht von allein 
angesprochen) 
Formulierung anpassen! 
Konkrete Fragen – an 
passender Stelle in dieser 
Formulierung stellen 
Aufrechtherhaltungs- und 
Steuerungsfragen 
Teil IV – Spannungsfeld 
Effizienz und 
Mitgliederpartei 
Können Sie mir berichten, 
wie bei Ihrer Kampagne die 
Parteibasis einbezogen und 
gleichzeitig die 
Professionalität und Effizienz 
der Kampagne sichergestellt 
wurde? 
Auswirkungen der Einbindung 
auf Effizienz und Effektivität 
 
 
Spannungsfeld zwischen 
Einbindung und Auslagerung 
von Aufgaben? 
Wie werden lokale 
Parteiorganisationen in die 
Kampagne eingebunden? 
 
Hat der Grad der 
Organisationsdichte 
Auswirkung auf die 
Bereitschaft auszulagern? 
 
Welche Auswirkung hat die 
Parteigröße auf die 
Bereitschaft Prozesse 
auszulagern? 
 
Wo ist die Bereitschaft 
auszulagern größer? In 
etablierten oder in jungen 
Parteien? 
 
 
 
Können Sie mir noch etwas 
über die Aufgaben von 
Freiwilligen erzählen? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welche Rolle spielt das Alter 
einer Partei? 
 
